UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4038
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY AKRAH MORRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Paul W. Grimm, District Judge. (8:13-
cr-00445-PWG-1)
Submitted: October 30, 2015 Decided: November 5, 2015
Before GREGORY and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marc Gregory Hall, LAW OFFICES OF MARC G. HALL, P.C., Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Thomas M. Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Akrah Morris was convicted by a jury of conspiracy
to commit robbery, two counts of robbery, and two counts of
brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c), 1951 (2012). The district
court sentenced him to a total of 505 months’ imprisonment on
the charges, which included a mandatory, consecutive sentence of
32 years’ imprisonment for the two firearm charges. On appeal,
Morris argues that the district court erred in admitting
portions of coconspirator testimony and that his sentence is
unreasonable. We affirm.
I.
“We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion
and will only overturn an evidentiary ruling that is arbitrary
and irrational.” United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 401 (4th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if we
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence, however, we review the admission under the
harmless error standard. Id. “In order to find a district
court’s error harmless, we need only be able to say with fair
assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping
the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not
substantially swayed by the error.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted).
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Morris argues that the district court erred in admitting
the testimony of a coconspirator that the coconspirator
participated in approximately three dozen robberies. We reject
Morris’ contentions that the testimony was irrelevant or that
its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative
value. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. We conclude that the evidence
was relevant as it assisted the jury in assessing the witness’
credibility, Fed. R. Evid. 607, and that the prejudicial effect
Morris alleges is purely speculative and not supported by the
record.
Morris also challenges the district court’s admission of
coconspirator testimony that a jacket appearing in still images
appeared to be the same jacket as the one worn by Morris on May
31, 2012. Even if we were to conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in admitting this evidence, we would
reject Morris’ claim because, in view of the substantial
evidence against Morris, we are confident that the testimony had
at most a negligible effect on the jury’s deliberations and
verdict. Thus, any error in admitting the testimony was
harmless.
II.
Morris also challenges the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. We review the sentence under a
“deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
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States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In making its Sentencing
Guidelines calculations, the district court may consider facts
presented at the sentencing hearing that are established by a
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Cox, 744 F.3d
305, 308 (4th Cir. 2014).
Morris argues that the district court procedurally erred by
failing to state whether the Government established Morris’
participation in unindicted robberies by a preponderance of the
evidence and further erred by failing to explain what role the
unindicted robberies had in the court’s sentencing
determination. We disagree. The district court stated that,
based on the Government’s evidence, there was “no question” that
Morris participated in the unindicted robberies. Though the
district court did not use the phrase “preponderance of the
evidence,” it is clear the Government sufficiently established
these facts. The court also stated that the evidence of the
unindicted robberies justified a sentence at the top of the
Guidelines range, but nonetheless imposed a sentence at the
bottom of that range. It is apparent from the court’s
explanation of its sentence that any role the unindicted
robberies may have played in the court’s sentencing
determination was negated by the impact of the mandatory
§ 924(c) sentences. Next, Morris claims that the district court
failed to give careful consideration to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
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factors, other than the nature of the offense. This argument is
belied by the record, and is accordingly rejected.
Having concluded that Morris’ sentence is procedurally
reasonable, we next review it for substantive reasonableness,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Because Morris’ sentence “is within . . .
a properly calculated Guidelines range[, it] is presumptively
reasonable. Such a presumption can only be rebutted by a
showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian,
756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.) (internal citation omitted), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
Morris fails to rebut this presumption. Morris’ claim that
his sentence is substantively unreasonable essentially argues
that he should have received no punishment for the conspiracy
and robbery counts because the mandatory sentences on the
§ 924(c) counts were sufficient to satisfy the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. We reject this proposition. In thoroughly
explaining its sentence, the court adequately considered the
totality of the circumstances and imposed a reasonable sentence.
Accordingly, we reject Morris’ arguments and affirm the
judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
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in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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