UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2062
In Re: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,
Petitioner - Appellant.
No. 15-1073
CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
MARK HERRING,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 15-1146
In Re: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,
Petitioner - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge (3:14-cv-00648-REP); Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge (3:14-cv-00705-HEH); Robert E. Payne, Senior District
Judge (3:14-cv-00648-REP).
Submitted: July 30, 2015 Decided: November 5, 2015
Before DUNCAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Chase Carmen Hunter, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
These consolidated appeals arise out of two identical
petitions for relief before different judges in the same
district court. In Nos. 14-2062 and 15-1146, Chase Carmen
Hunter appeals the district court’s orders (1) conditionally
dismissing her request for injunctive relief; (2) dismissing her
request for temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive
relief, and denying her motions for permission to electronically
file her submissions and to appoint counsel; and (3) denying her
motion for reconsideration and recusal. In No. 15-1073, Hunter
appeals the district court’s order dismissing as frivolous her
similar request for temporary, preliminary, and permanent
injunctive relief.
Hunter first challenges the district courts’ denials of her
motions for temporary restraining orders. Because we lack
jurisdiction to review the denial of a temporary restraining
order, we dismiss those portions of the appeals. See Virginia
v. Tenneco, Inc., 538 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (4th Cir. 1976).
Hunter next contends that both district courts abused their
discretion in denying her requests for preliminary and permanent
injunctions. See Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Fire Engine
Co., 332 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2003) (providing standard of
review). Our review of the record reveals no such abuse, as the
requested injunctions are barred under the Anti-Injunction Act.
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28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012) (“A court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.”).
To the extent Hunter claims that the district courts’
dispositions were otherwise erroneous, we disagree. Hunter’s
petitions are not so complex as to create “exceptional
circumstances” warranting the appointment of counsel. See
Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated
on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist.
of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989). Nor do we find any support for
the contention that the district judges should have recused
themselves from her cases. See Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 545 (1994) (holding that rulings based on facts in the
proceedings “almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion”). Finally, we see no error in the district
courts’ refusals to grant her permission to file electronically.
Accordingly, we affirm the district courts’ orders in part,
dismiss the appeals in part, and deny as moot the motion for a
stay pending appeal, motion to expedite, and mandamus petition
seeking a ruling on the motion for reconsideration. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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