In Re: Chase Hunter v.

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2062

In Re: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,

Petitioner - Appellant.

No. 15-1073

CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

MARK HERRING,

Defendant - Appellee.

No. 15-1146

In Re: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,

Petitioner - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge (3:14-cv-00648-REP); Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge (3:14-cv-00705-HEH); Robert E. Payne, Senior District
Judge (3:14-cv-00648-REP).

Submitted: July 30, 2015 Decided: November 5, 2015
Before DUNCAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.

Chase Carmen Hunter, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

These consolidated appeals arise out of two identical

petitions for relief before different judges in the same

district court. In Nos. 14-2062 and 15-1146, Chase Carmen

Hunter appeals the district court’s orders (1) conditionally

dismissing her request for injunctive relief; (2) dismissing her

request for temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive

relief, and denying her motions for permission to electronically

file her submissions and to appoint counsel; and (3) denying her

motion for reconsideration and recusal. In No. 15-1073, Hunter

appeals the district court’s order dismissing as frivolous her

similar request for temporary, preliminary, and permanent

injunctive relief.

Hunter first challenges the district courts’ denials of her

motions for temporary restraining orders. Because we lack

jurisdiction to review the denial of a temporary restraining

order, we dismiss those portions of the appeals. See Virginia

v. Tenneco, Inc., 538 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (4th Cir. 1976).

Hunter next contends that both district courts abused their

discretion in denying her requests for preliminary and permanent

injunctions. See Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Fire Engine

Co., 332 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2003) (providing standard of

review). Our review of the record reveals no such abuse, as the

requested injunctions are barred under the Anti-Injunction Act.

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28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012) (“A court of the United States may not

grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except

as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary

in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its

judgments.”).

To the extent Hunter claims that the district courts’

dispositions were otherwise erroneous, we disagree. Hunter’s

petitions are not so complex as to create “exceptional

circumstances” warranting the appointment of counsel. See

Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated

on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist.

of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989). Nor do we find any support for

the contention that the district judges should have recused

themselves from her cases. See Liteky v. United States, 510

U.S. 540, 545 (1994) (holding that rulings based on facts in the

proceedings “almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or

partiality motion”). Finally, we see no error in the district

courts’ refusals to grant her permission to file electronically.

Accordingly, we affirm the district courts’ orders in part,

dismiss the appeals in part, and deny as moot the motion for a

stay pending appeal, motion to expedite, and mandamus petition

seeking a ruling on the motion for reconsideration. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

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adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART

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