14-3912
Mazur v. New York City Department of Education et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 6th day of November, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
8 Circuit Judges.
9 GEOFFREY W. CRAWFORD,*
10 District Judge.
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
13 JOAN MAZUR,
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 -v.- 14-3912
17
18 NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
19 et al.,
20 Defendants-Appellees.
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22
*
The Honorable Geoffrey W. Crawford, United States
District Judge for the District of Vermont, sitting by
designation.
1
1 FOR APPELLANT: STEVEN A. MORELLI, LAW OFFICE OF
2 STEVEN A. MORELLI, Garden City,
3 New York.
4
5 FOR APPELLEES: MICHAEL J. PASTOR (with Richard
6 Dearing on the brief) for
7 Zachary W. Carter, Corporation
8 Counsel of the City of New York,
9 New York, New York.
10
11 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
12 Court for the Southern District of New York (Torres, J.).
13
14 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
15 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
16 AFFIRMED.
17
18 Joan Mazur appeals from the judgment of the United
19 States District Court for the Southern District of New York
20 (Torres, J.) dismissing her discrimination complaint on
21 summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with
22 the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
23 presented for review.
24
25 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
26 de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable
27 to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable
28 inferences in its favor.” Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416
29 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2005).
30
31 1. A number of Mazur’s claims, including claims
32 asserted under § 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law
33 (“NYSHRL”), and the New York City Human Rights Law
34 (“NYCHRL”) were dismissed on the ground of collateral
35 estoppel because these claims were litigated during Mazur’s
36 hearing pursuant to N.Y. EDUC. § 3020-a (hereinafter “§
37 3020-a”) . Because such a hearing is “an administrative
38 adjudication, we must give its findings preclusive effect.”
39 Burkybile v. Bd. of Educ. of Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free
40 Sch. Dist., 411 F.3d 306, 311 (2d. Cir. 2005). This accords
41 with the general principle that “New York courts will give
42 administrative determinations preclusive effect if made in a
43 quasi-judicial capacity and with a full and fair opportunity
44 to litigate the issue.” Id. at 312.
45
46 During the hearing, Mazur presented both of her
47 discrimination theories, arguing that her supervisors’
2
1 criticisms and charges were mere pretexts for
2 discrimination. A. 140-41, 163-64. The hearing officer,
3 after a full and fair litigation, determined that Mazur was
4 subject to discipline because of, inter alia, her excessive
5 absenteeism, poor teaching, and failure to improve in
6 response to the recommendations of her supervisors. A. 130-
7 31, 182-89. Defendants advance these findings as
8 legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions.
9 Absent evidence sufficient to support a reasonable finding
10 of discriminatory motivation--which, as we conclude below,
11 is lacking–-we must accept the hearing officer’s
12 determination that Mazur was guilty of the charged conduct
13 and disciplined for these legitimate reasons.
14
15 Mazur argues against this preclusive effect on the
16 ground that there is an insufficient opportunity for
17 discovery in a § 3020-a proceeding. We reject her argument,
18 as did the district court, because she neither identifies
19 any discovery demand she made in the § 3020-a proceeding
20 that was rejected nor points to any subsequently available
21 evidence that could have changed the result. See Special
22 Appendix (“SPA”) 15 (“Here, [p]laintiff does not point to
23 any deficiencies in the discovery in connection with the
24 3020-a hearing, and tellingly, [p]laintiff does not provide
25 any additional evidence in her moving papers that post-dates
26 the 3020-a hearing or demonstrates that the discovery in the
27 3020-a hearing was somehow deficient.”).
28
29 2. Mazur challenges the grant of summary judgment on
30 her claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
31 (“ADEA”) and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
32 Because her employer provided non-discriminatory reasons for
33 the disciplinary action taken towards Mazur, the presumption
34 in Mazur’s favor established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
35 Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) “completely drops out of the
36 picture.” James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 154 (2d
37 Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38
39 We agree with the district court that Mazur failed to
40 make out a sufficient case under the ADEA because Mazur does
41 not point to evidence from which a jury could draw a
42 reasonable inference of age discrimination. The district
43 court concluded that Mazur had failed to rebut defendants’
44 reasons, and Mazur has not specifically addressed this
45 finding on appeal. SPA 21. And assuming her sprained ankle
46 is a disability under the ADA, Mazur failed to adduce
47 evidence of discrimination to rebut her employer’s
3
1 identification of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for
2 her discipline.
3
4 3. Mazur argues that summary judgment should not have
5 been granted on her ADEA and ADA hostile work environment
6 claims. An “actionable discrimination claim based on
7 hostile work environment . . . is one for which the
8 workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
9 ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently pervasive to alter
10 the conditions of the victim’s employment . . . . .”
11 Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 240 (2d
12 Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In view of
13 the stringent standard governing hostile work environment
14 claims and the fact that summary judgment was properly
15 granted on Mazur’s ADEA and ADA discrimination claims, the
16 district court correctly determined that Mazur’s hostile
17 work environment claims were unsupported by the record.
18
19 4. As to Mazur’s First Amendment retaliation claim,
20 the district court properly found that summary judgment was
21 warranted because Mazur’s complaints did not address a
22 matter of public concern. See Ruotolo v. City of New York,
23 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008). As to Mazur’s Equal
24 Protection, ADA, ADEA, and NYSHRL retaliation claims,
25 summary judgment was proper because Mazur “has offered
26 insufficient evidence of causation linking [her]
27 [suspension] to motives of retaliation or discrimination to
28 overcome the cumulative probative weight of the evidence of
29 a legitimate reason for [her] discharge and of the final
30 termination decision” rendered during the § 3020-a hearing.
31 Collins v. New York City Transit Authority, 305 F.3d 113,
32 119 (2d Cir. 2002). As to the NYCHRL retaliation claim:
33 even construed broadly in Mazur’s favor, these claims fail
34 for a lack of the requisite causal link between Mazur’s
35 complaints and any alleged retaliatory action. Moreover,
36 the record contains numerous non-retaliatory reasons for any
37 action taken against Mazur. See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole
38 Cheuvreux North America Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 n.8 (2d Cir.
39 2013) (noting that summary judgment is appropriate if “the
40 record establishes as a matter of law that discrimination
41 play[ed] no role” in employer’s actions) (internal quotation
42 marks omitted).
43
44
45
46
4
1 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
2 Mazur’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of
3 the district court.
4
5 FOR THE COURT:
6 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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