Nov 06 2015, 11:00 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jill M. Acklin Gregory F. Zoeller
McGrath, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Carmel, Indiana
Christina D. Pace
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Timothy W. Moore, November 6, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
29A02-1507-CR-866
v. Appeal from the Hamilton
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable J. Richard
Appellee-Plaintiff Campbell, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
29D04-1403-FD-2198
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Timothy W. Moore appeals his conviction for failure to register as a sex
offender, as a Class D felony, following a jury trial. Moore presents a single
issue for our review, namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to
support his conviction. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Following his conviction for child molesting in 2007, Moore registered as a sex
offender with the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department. As a registrant,
Moore was required to check in with the Sheriff’s Department annually, and he
was subject to random home visits by law enforcement. Moore was also
required to notify the Sheriff’s Department of any address changes. When he
moved to another residence within Hamilton County in 2010, Moore notified
the Sheriff’s Department of the move. However, after Moore was evicted from
that residence, Moore moved to Kentucky in March 2014 without notifying the
Sheriff’s Department.
[3] On March 12, 2014, Hamilton County Sheriff’s Detective Kija Ireland, who
had performed random home visits at Moore’s residence, observed that
Moore’s mobile home was gone from the property where he had lived.
Detective Ireland discovered that Moore had moved to Kentucky without
notifying the Sheriff’s Department.1 Accordingly, the State charged Moore
1
Moore presented evidence that he had moved from that residence to Kentucky on March 11, 2014.
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with failure to register as a sex offender, as a Class D felony. A jury found him
guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgment and sentence accordingly.
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Moore contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is
well-settled. Tobar v. State, 740 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 2000).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine only the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the
verdict. We do not assess witness credibility, nor do we reweigh
the evidence to determine if it was sufficient to support a
conviction. Under our appellate system, those roles are reserved
for the finder of fact. Instead, we consider only the evidence most
favorable to the trial court ruling and affirm the conviction unless
no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pillow v. State, 986 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
[5] To convict Moore of failure to register as a sex offender, as a Class D felony,
the State was required to prove that, on or about March 12, 2014, Moore was a
sex offender required to register under Indiana Code Chapter 11-8-8 and that he
knowingly did not reside at his registered address. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17(a)(5)
(2013). On appeal, Moore contends that “the Indiana statutory scheme that
implements a requirement to register applies [to] individuals who have specific,
particular ties to Indiana[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 7. And he maintains that,
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[h]ere, the State did not establish that Moore was an Indiana
resident on March 12, 2014. In fact, the undisputed evidence in
the record is that Moore had moved to Kentucky on March 11,
2014. . . . Put simply, on March 12, 2014—the date that the
State charged and argued as the pertinent date during closing
argument—Moore was no longer a resident of Indiana. As such,
per Indiana Code [Section] 11-8-8-7(a), Moore was no longer
required to register on the Indiana Registry.
Appellant’s Br. at 8.
[6] Moore’s argument on appeal misses the mark. Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-
7(a) governs who is required to register as a sex offender in Indiana. There is
no dispute that Moore complied with that statute when he registered as a sex
offender following his 2007 child molesting conviction. The question presented
here is whether Moore violated Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-17(a)(5), which
requires a sex offender to reside at his registered address. See Montgomery v.
State, 14 N.E.3d 76, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Moore does not dispute the
evidence showing that he did not reside at his registered address on March 12,
2014. Moore’s obligation to comply with Indiana’s sex offender registry
statutes did not cease because he moved out of state.2 Indeed, Moore was
required to notify the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department of his move to
Kentucky within seventy-two hours of the move. I.C. § 11-8-8-11 (2013);
2
Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-19 provides that a sex offender is required to register under Chapter 8 until the
expiration of ten years after the date he is released from a penal facility, placed in a community transition or
community corrections program, placed on parole, or placed on probation for the sex offense requiring
registration, whichever occurs last. Moore makes no contention that the term of his registration requirement
had expired as of March 2014.
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Johnson v. State, 925 N.E.2d 793, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding evidence
sufficient to convict defendant of failure to register as a sex offender when he
moved out of state without notifying local law enforcement), trans. denied. The
State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Moore failed to register as a sex
offender pursuant to Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-17(a)(5), as charged.
[7] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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