FILED
NOVEMBER 10,2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 32806-6-111
) (consolidated with
Respondent, ) No. 32903-8-111)
)
v. )
)
MICHAEL DUKE COOMBES, )
)
Appellant. ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
)
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of )
)
MICHAEL DUKE COOMBES, )
)
Petitioner. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. - After withdrawing his guilty plea, Michael
Coombes was convicted of first degree murder while armed with a firearm. Mr.
Coombes appeals, contending (1) the trial court erred in imposing a 36-month
term of community custody, (2) the trial court erred by imposing a community
custody condition prohibiting Mr. Coombes from having any association or
contact with gang members or their associates, and (3) the judgment and sentence
improperly omitted the jury's finding that Mr. Coombes used a firearm in the
No. 32806-6-111; No. 32903-8-111
State v. Coombes; P RP ofCoombes
commission of the first degree murder. In his consolidated personal restraint
petition (PRP), Mr. Coombes contends that the sentencing court erred in including
a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm in its calculation of his offender
score.
We affirm Mr. Coombes's conviction and dismiss his PRP. We remand for
the trial court to (1) correct the community custody term to be consistent with the
law in effect in 2007, (2) conduct a hearing to consider the gang association
prohibition, and (3) include in the judgment and sentence the jury's finding that
Mr. Coombes used a firearm in the commission of the first degree murder.
FACTS
In September 2007, the State charged Michael Duke Coombes with first
degree murder while armed with a firearm and first degree unlawful possession of
a firearm. In June 2008, Mr. Coombes pleaded guilty to first degree murder
without a weapon enhancement and to first degree unlawful possession of a
firearm. In the plea statement, the State made the following recommendation:
(g) ... 300 months in prison, credit for time served, dismiss
weapon enhancement. Dismiss Intimidation of Witness
charge, 08-1-00556-0, plead to Unlawful Possession of a
Firearm charge on a different day, $500.00 crime victims
compensation assessment, $200.00 court costs, $100.00 DNA
[deoxyribonucleic acid] collection fee, restitution, 24-48
months community custody.
2
No. 32806-6-111; No. 32903-8-111
State v. Coombes; P RP 0/ Coombes
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 13,21. On June 16,2008, the trial court entered a
judgment and sentence as to the first degree murder charge and a separate
judgment and sentence as to the unlawful possession of a firearm charge.
In April 2009, Mr. Coombes filed a motion for writ of habeas corpus in
superior court alleging his plea was invalid. The superior court transferred the
writ to this court for consideration as a PRP. In an unpublished opinion filed
January 27,2011,1 this court granted Mr. Coombes's PRP and remanded the case
back to the trial court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea because he was not
informed that early release credits were unavailable during the first 240 months of
his first degree murder sentence. Mr. Coombes then withdrew his guilty plea and
the case was set for a jury trial.
Before trial, Mr. Coombes moved in limine to exclude any mention of his
alleged gang affiliation. In response, the State stipulated that it would not elicit
testimony from its law enforcement witnesses regarding any gang affiliation but
that it wanted to reserve the right to raise gang-related evidence for purposes of
impeachment of witnesses related to the witness intimidation charge.
1 In re Pers. Restraint o/Coombes, No. 28036-5-111, 2011 WL 240687, 159
Wn. App. 1044.
3
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-II1
State v. Coombes; PRP ofCoombes
At trial, the State called April Atkinson to testify for purposes of the
witness intimidation charge. During her testimony, the State asked Ms. Atkinson
whether she recalled Mr. Coombes saying, '" I got Cryps, [sic] Blood, mafia,
whatever gangs you can think of after [witness Jamie Hall], so [Ms. Hall] better
watch her back[.]'" Report of Proceedings (RP) at 420. Ms. Atkinson replied that
she did not remember Mr. Coombes making the statement. The State later called
Detective Theresa Ferguson to testify regarding her investigation. Detective
Ferguson testified that Ms. Atkinson had told her that Mr. Coombes made the
above-quoted threat concerning Ms. Hall. Detective Ferguson also testified that
Ms. Atkinson had told her that Mr. Coombes believed certain people had "ratted
him out." RP at 586.
The State called Detective Timothy Madsen to testify for purposes of the
first degree murder charge. Detective Madsen testified that Mr. Coombes made
the following pretrial statements to him about the murder victim:
Q And what did Mr. Coombes tell you next about Mr. Nichols?
A He told us that Mr. Nichols, whom he described as Red, had
been arguing with Mr. Coombes' nephew, Chris .....
During the argument between Chris and Red, or Mr.
Nichols, Chris had hit Mr. Nichols in the head after throwing
an empty beer can at him.
Q What did Mr. Coombes say happened after that?
4
No. 32806-6-111; No. 32903-8-111
State v. Coombes; PRP o/Coombes
A He told us that Red, or Mr. Nichols, had walked over to Mr.
Coombes and stated, quote, "You keep that fucker away from
me or I'll stab him."
Q Stab who?
A And he was referring to his-that Red was telling Mr.
Coombes to keep Chris, Mr. Coombes' nephew, away from
Red, or Mr. Nichols.
Q What did he say next?
A Mr. Coombes told us that at one point, Red had threatened
Mr. Coombes by saying he knew some gypsy jokers that
would take care of them, and then he told us he-
MR. COMPTON: Objection. Your Honor, can we
approach on this?
THE COURT: Yes.
(BENCH CONFERENCE HELD.)
MR. COMPTON: My objection is the next words
out of the detective's mouth is going to be about Mr.
Coombes' gang affiliation, which he claims to have some
Aryan connection.
THE COURT: Is this going to be part of his
statements as threats, but not the detective did not write any
statements that he-
MR. TREECE: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I thought
we went over this in the [CrR] 3.5. This is after he had been
[read his Miranda 2 rights].
THE COURT: Right, but when we specifically
talked about gang affiliation, I didn't hear the statement corne
out at the [CrR] 3.5 hearing this was the specific statement.
So I would [sustain the objection] because we ruled on that
[during the motions in limine].
RP at 603-04.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694
(1966).
5
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-III
State v. Coombes; PRP o/Coombes
At the end of trial, the jury found Mr. Coombes guilty of first degree
murder while armed with a firearm and of tampering with a witness but not guilty
of intimidating a witness. Mr. Coombes appealed the convictions for first degree
murder and tampering with a witness. In an unpublished opinion filed June 18,
2013, 3 this court affirmed the conviction for first degree murder and reversed and
remanded the tampering with a witness conviction because of an erroneous jury
instruction.
On remand, the trial court resentenced Mr. Coombes on the first degree
murder charge, lowering his offender score from a six to a five after removing the
conviction for tampering with a witness pursuant to this court's June 2013
decision. In the judgment and sentence entered after resentencing, the trial court
imposed a 36-month term of community custody. The trial court also imposed a
community custody condition "[t]hat the defendant not be allowed to have any
association or contact with known felons or gang members or their associates."
CP at 110. The judgment and sentence does not indicate the jury's finding that
Mr. Coombes used a firearm in the commission of the first degree murder.
Mr. Coombes appeals.
State v. Coombes, Nos. 30550-3-III, 30551-1-III, 2013 WL 3148180,175
3
Wn. App. 1025.
6
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-III
State v. Coombes; P RP ofCoombes
ANALYSIS
1. Whether the sentencing court erred in imposing a 36-month term of
community custody
Mr. Coombes contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred by
imposing a 36-month tenn of community custody under RCW 9.94A.701, where
the law in effect at the time of the offense, fonner RCW 9.94A.715 (2006),
provided a variable term of 24 to 48 months of community custody for serious
violent crimes.
This court reviews de novo whether the trial court had the requisite
statutory authority to impose community custody conditions. State v. Armendariz,
160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). While Mr. Coombes challenges the
tenn of community custody for the first time on appeal, such a challenge is
appropriate because courts must correct an erroneous sentence upon discovery. In
re Pers. Restraint ofCall, 144 Wn.2d 315, 331-32, 28 P.3d 709 (2001).
The Sentencing Refonn Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, governs
a court's imposition of community custody. The SRA provides that any sentence
imposed under its authority must be in accordance with the law in effect when the
offense was committed. RCW 9.94A.345. Mr. Coombes's crime occurred
between August 30,2007, and September 2,2007, so fonner RCW 9.94A.715
7
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-II1
State v. Coombes; PRP ofCoombes
governs. RCW 10.01.040 would also support this conclusion, as it provides,
"Whenever any criminal or penal statute shall be amended or repealed, all offenses
committed ... while it was in force shall be punished or enforced as if it were in
force, notwithstanding such amendment or repeal, unless a contrary intention is
expressly declared in the amendatory or repealing act."
This court analyzed a similar issue in State v. Snedden, 166 Wn. App. 541,
544-45,271 P.3d 298 (2012), citing RCW 10.01.040. This court concluded that
the legislature had expressed the requisite "contrary intent" in the amendatory act.
Id. at 544. The legislature had directed courts "to apply the provisions of the
current community custody law to offenders sentenced after July 1,2009, but who
committed their crime prior to August 1,2009 to the extent that such application is
constitutionally permissible." LAWS OF 2008, ch. 231, § 6. Therefore, because
Mr. Snedden fit within this category and made "no argument that the application
of the current statute is constitutionally impermissible," this court concluded that
the trial court properly relied on RCW 9.94A.701 even though it was not in effect
when he committed his crime. Snedden, 166 Wn. App. at 544. But, unlike the
offender in Snedden, Mr. Coombes contends the trial court's application of
RCW 9.94A.701 is constitutionally impermissible as a violation of the prohibition
8
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-II1
State v. Coombes; PRP o/Coombes
on ex post facto laws because the law in effect when he committed the crime
called for a 24 to 48 month range of community custody.
This court reviews de novo alleged violations of the prohibition of ex post
facto laws. State v. Pillatos, 159 Wn.2d 459,469,474-77,150 P.3d 1130 (2007).
The party disputing the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving
that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Enquist,
163 Wn. App. 41, 45, 256 P.3d 1277 (2011).
Both the United States and Washington Constitutions prohibit ex post facto
laws. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; CONST. art. I, § 23. The State violates the
prohibition on ex post facto laws when it imposes punishment for conduct that was
not punishable when committed or when it increases the quantum of punishment.
In re Pers. Restraint 0/ Flint, 174 Wn.2d 539, 545, 277 P.3d 657 (20 12) (quoting
In re Pers. Restraint o/Hinton, 152 Wn.2d 853,861,100 P.3d 801 (2004)). In
order to bring a successful ex post facto claim, Mr. Coombes must show that the
law he is challenging (1) is operating retroactively, and (2) increases the quantum
of punishment from the level he was subject to on the date of the crime. Id. at
545,554.
Mr. Coombes satisfies both prongs of this test. First, RCW 9.94A.701 by
its own terms operates retroactively. The session law amending former
9
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-III
State v. Coombes; PRP o/Coombes
RCW 9.94A.701 that pennits variable terms of community custody included the
same statement of legislative intent as that of 2008, chapter 231, quoted above.
LAWS OF 2009, ch. 375, § 10. It also added this statement: "This act applies
retroactively and prospectively regardless of whether the offender is currently on
community custody or probation with the department, currently incarcerated with
a term of community custody or probation with the department, or sentenced after
the effective date of this section." LAWS OF 2009, ch. 375, § 20. Additionally, the
statute operates retroactively as to Mr. Coombes because Mr. Coombes committed
his offense before the legislature amended the statute. Thus, Mr. Coombes has
satisfied the first prong of the test.
As for the second prong, the applicable quantum of punishment increases
when a statute makes a fonnerly discretionary punishment mandatory. Lindsey v.
Washington, 301 U.S. 397,401-02,57 S. Ct. 797, 81 L. Ed. 1182 (1937). In
Lindsey, at the time of the offense, the sentencing court had discretion to impose a
penalty of imprisonment for at least 6 months and up to 15 years. Jd. at 398.
Before sentencing, the legislature made the maximum penalty mandatory, and the
offender then received the required 15-year sentence. Id. at 398-99. The United
States Supreme Court held that the new law impermissibly increased the severity
of punishment and invalidated the offender's sentence. Id. at 401-02.
10
No. 32S06-6-III; No. 32903-S-II1
State v. Coombes; PRP ofCoombes
Here, when Mr. Coombes committed the offense in late 2007, the SRA
imposed a discretionary range of community custody of 24 to 4S months. See
Former RCW 9.94A.7IS(l) (stating that a sentencing court was required to
sentence an offender "to community custody for the community custody range
established under RCW 9.94A.SSO or up to the period of earned release
awarded pursuant to RCW 9.94A.72S(l) and (2), whichever is longer");
former RCW 9.94A.SSO(S) (200S) (establishing a sentencing guidelines
commission empowered to recommend community custody ranges); former
RCW 9.94A.030(41)(a)(i) (2006) (classifying first degree murder as a "serious
violent offense"); and former WAC 437-20-010 (listing the community custody
range for serious violent offenses as 24 to 4S months). The legislature repealed
RCW 9.94A.71S in 200S and added RCW 9.94A.701, which maintained the
language from former RCW 9.94A.715 authorizing variable terms of community
custody. LAWS OF 200S, ch. 231, §§ 6, 7. 4 Then, in 2009, the legislature amended
former RCW 9.94A.701 by removing the language permitting variable terms of
community custody. LAWS OF 2009, ch. 37S, § 5. The legislature replaced the
4 Subsequently, the legislature reenacted former RCW 9.94A.71S and then
repealed it once again. LAWS OF 200S, ch. 276, § 305 (reenactment); LAWS OF
2009, ch. 2S, § 42(2) (second repeal).
11
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-III
State v. Coombes; PRP ofCoombes
variable tenns with fixed terms of 36, 18, or 12 months of community
custody, depending on the type of offense. LAWS OF 2009, ch. 375, § 5;
RCW 9.94A.701(l)-(3). For Mr. Coombes's offense, the community custody tenn
is 36 months under the amended statute. RCW 9.94A.701(1)(b).
Per Lindsey, the new community custody law increased the punishment
because it changed a previously discretionary tenn to a mandatory tenn. Because
Mr. Coombes has satisfied both prongs for establishing an unconstitutional ex post
facto law, we vacate the community custody portion of Mr. Coombes's sentence
and remand for imposition of a tenn consistent with the law in effect in 2007.
2. Whether the trial court erred by imposing a community custody
condition prohibiting Mr. Coombes from having any association or
contact with gang members or their associates
Mr. Coombes challenges the trial court's imposition of a community
custody condition prohibiting him from having any association or contact with
gang members or their associates. Mr. Coombes did not object to this condition at
sentencing. Citing State v. Jones, 118 Wn. App. 199, 76 P.3d 258 (2003), he
argues he may raise this issue for the first time on appeal. We disagree that Jones
supports his argument.
In Jones, the defendant argued that the trial court did not have authority to
impose certain community custody conditions. Although Everett Jones did not
12
No. 32806-6-111; No. 32903-8-111
State v. Coombes; PRP ofCoombes
object to the community custody conditions at sentencing, the Jones court stated
that he could raise the conditions for the first time on appeal. To support its
statement, Jones cited State v. Julian, 102 Wn. App. 296, 9 P.3d 851 (2000).
Jones, 118 Wn. App. at 204 n.9. In Julian, we held that a sentence imposed
without statutory authority could be addressed for the first time on appeal. Julian,
102 Wn. App. at 304.
Here, however, the trial court had authority to impose a gang association
prohibition term as a community custody condition. Former RCW 9.94A.700(5)
(2003) of the SRA permitted trial courts to impose certain discretionary conditions
during the course of community custody. One such condition was prohibiting
contact with "a specified class of individuals," and another was imposing other
"crime-related prohibitions." Former RCW 9.94A.700(5)(b), (e).5
5 The judgment and sentence does not cite the statute under which the
sentencing court exercised its discretion to impose the gang-related prohibition. In
his analysis, Mr. Coombes cites RCW 9.94A.700(5)(b), which allows the court to
prohibit contact with a "specified class of individuals," while the State cites
RCW 9.94A.700(5)(e), which permits the court to impose other general "crime
related prohibitions." The cases interpreting each type of condition use essentially
the same standard for both, requiring that the condition relate to the crime. See
State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326,350, 957 P.2d 655 (1998), abrogated on other
grounds by State v. Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 792,239 P.3d 1059 (2010)
(interpreting former RCW 9.94A.120(9)(c)(ii) (1998), which permitted courts to
prohibit offenders from having contact with a "specified class of individuals");
State v. Cordero, 170 Wn. App. 351, 373, 284 P.3d 773 (2012) (interpreting
13
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-II1
State v. Coombes; PRP ofCoombes
The question actually presented here is whether the condition was
appropriate under the facts of this case. The appropriateness of this particular
community custody condition involves a trial court's discretion. Former
RCW 9.94A.700(5). An alleged error involving a trial court's discretion, such as
the one raised here, is susceptible to waiver. In re Pers. Restraint ofShale, 160
Wn.2d 489,494, 158 P.3d 588 (2007) (citing In re Pers. Restraint ofGoodwin,
146 Wn.2d 861, 873-74, 50 P.3d 618 (2002)). Because we are remanding this
case to correct errors in the judgment and sentence, we exercise our discretion to
not review the issue on appeal; rather, we remand to the trial court to consider
argument on this issue, so as to afford us a better record for review, ifnecessary.6
former RCW 9.94A.505(8) (2006), which permitted courts to impose "crime
related prohibitions"). For this reason, we cite both and do not analyze them
separately.
6 Mr. Coombes additionally contends the condition prohibiting him from
having any association or contact with gang members or their associates violates
his First Amendment right of free association. Were we to reach this issue, we
would note that while on community custody, a defendant's constitutional rights
are subject to the infringements authorized by the SRA. In re Pers. Restraint of
Waggy, 111 Wn. App. 511, 517,45 P.3d 1103 (2002). Freedom of association
may be restricted if reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the
State and public order. Id. (quoting State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22,37-38, 846 P.2d
1365 (1993)).
14
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-III
State v. Coombes; PRP ofCoombes
3. Whether the trial court improperly omitted afinding that Mr.
Coombes used afirearm during the commission ofthe offense
Both parties agree that the judgment and sentence entered after Mr.
Coombes's resentencing improperly omitted a finding of the jury. The remedy for
clerical or scrivener's errors in judgment and sentence forms is remand to the trial
court for correction. In re Pers. Restraint ofMayer, 128 Wn. App. 694, 701, 117
P.3d 353 (2005).
At the end of trial, the jury found by special verdict that Mr. Coombes had
used a firearm in the commission of the murder. While the judgment and sentence
entered in January 2012 after the jury trial indicated this finding, the judgment and
sentence entered in August 2014 after resentencing failed to include this finding.
We accept the State's concession of error and remand to the trial court for
correction of Mr. Coombes's judgment and sentence to reflect the jury's finding
that Mr. Coombes used a firearm in the commission of the murder.
We therefore remand this case for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
PERSONAL RESTRAINT PETITION
In his personal restraint petition, Mr. Coombes contends that when he
withdrew his plea to the first degree murder charge in accordance with this court's
opinion, he also withdrew his plea to the unlawful possession of a firearm charge
15
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-II1
State v. Coombes; PRP ofCoombes
as both were part of the same plea agreement. He further argues that because he
was never retried for the unlawful possession of a firearm charge, it is no longer
part of his criminal history and cannot be included in the calculation of his
offender score.
To prevail in this personal restraint petition, Mr. Coombes must show either
a "constitutional error that results in actual prejudice or nonconstitutional error
that results in a miscarriage ofjustice." In re Pers. Restraint of Waggy, 111 Wn.
App. 511, 518,45 PJd 1103 (2002). Bare, unsupported allegations will not
satisfy this burden of proof. Id. at 518-19. Rather, he must show that more likely
than not he was prejudiced by the error. Id. at 518. "A petition that fails to meet
this basic level of proof and argument may be dismissed summarily." Id. at 519.
Mr. Coombes asks this court to conclude that he withdrew both his first
degree murder plea and his unlawful possession of a firearm plea in August 2011
following the decision of this court. "This remedy is available to a defendant only
where, as part ofa 'package deal,' the defendant was correctly informed of the
consequences of one charge, but not of another charge." In re Pers. Restraint of
Bradley, 165 Wn.2d 934,941,205 PJd 123 (2009) (quoting State v. Turley, 149
Wn.2d 395,399-401,69 PJd 338 (2003)). A plea bargain is such a deal "if the
agreements as to the individual charges are indivisible from one another." Id.
16
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-III
State v. Coombes; PRP ofCoombes
Appellate courts look "to objective manifestations of intent in determining
whether a plea agreement was meant to be indivisible." Id. "Where 'pleas to
multiple counts or charges were made at the same time, described in one
document, and accepted in a single proceeding,' the pleas are indivisible from one
another." Id. at 941-42 (quoting Turley, 149 Wn.2d at 400).
While this case is in a different procedural posture than other cases that
have considered the issue of divisibility of a plea agreement, these other cases are
helpful in determining whether Mr. Coombes's petition has merit. First, Mr.
Coombes signed two separate statements of defendant on plea of guilty for each of
the charges. These statements were signed on different days, but they were both
filed on June 16, 2008. Each of the separate documents made only one reference
to the other charge. 7 Specifically, in each plea statement, the State made the
following recommendation encompassing the whole plea agreement:
(g) ... 300 months in prison, credit for time served, dismiss
weapon enhancement. Dismiss Intimidation of Witness
charge, 08-1-00556-0,plead to Unlawful Possession ofa
Firearm charge on a different day, $500.00 crime victims
7 The judgment and sentence for the firearm charge also made one
reference to the sentence for the murder charge, stating that the sentence of 41
months for the firearm charge should run "concurrent with Count 1." CP at 34.
The murder charge was labeled as count I on the separate judgment and sentence
for that charge.
17
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-III
State v. Coombes; PRP ofCoombes
compensation assessment, $200.00 court costs, $100.00 DNA
collection fee, restitution, 24-48 months community custody.
CP at 13,21 (emphasis added). The recommendation that the firearm charge be
entered on a different day is an indication that the parties intended the unlawful
possession of a firearm charge to be divisible from the murder charge.
Additionally, while the Bradley court considered the fact that there were cross-
references to other charges in the separate plea documents, it determined such
references were not dispositive of an indivisible plea deal. 165 Wn.2d at 943.
Second, Mr. Coombes committed the crimes on different days, with the
murder occurring between August 30, 2007, and September 2, 2007, and the
unlawful possession of a firearm occurring September 4, 2007. While this
difference of a few days alone does not establish an indivisible plea deal, it is a
distinction from Turley worth noting. State v. Chambers, 176 Wn.2d 573, 581,
293 P.3d 1185 (2013); Bradley, 165 Wn.2d at 943.
Third, while the record does not include the report of proceedings from Mr.
Coombes's sentencing following the guilty pleas, the dates the two judgment and
sentences were entered by the court suggest that the pleas were accepted in two
separate proceedings, which is another important difference from Turley. The
18
No. 32806-6-III; No. 32903-8-111
State v. Coombes; PRP o/Coombes
judgment and sentence for the murder charge was dated June 9, 2008, while the
judgment and sentence for the firearm charge was dated June 16,2008.
Finally, the documentary record itself evidences an intent to create two
separate pleas. Significantly, Mr. Coombes's habeas corpus petition and this
court's unpublished opinion focus only on Mr. Coombes's plea to first degree
murder. In his petition and in this court's unpublished opinion, there is no
mention of Mr. Coombes's separate and later plea to unlawful possession ofa
firearm. Based on the above considerations, especially the documentary record,
we conclude that the sentencing court properly considered Mr. Coombes's guilty
plea to unlawful possession of a firearm as part of his criminal history. We
therefore dismiss Mr. Coombes's personal restraint petition.
Lawrence-Berrey, 1.
WE CONCUR:
Siddoway, C.J.
19