J-S57001-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.R.H., MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: D.H., MOTHER
No. 693 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Decree February 10, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000603-2013
CP-51-DP-0000813-2010
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.H-R., MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: D.H., MOTHER
No. 695 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Decree February 10, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000602-2013
CP-51-DP-0000814-2010
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 10, 2015
Appellant, D.H. (Mother) appeals from the February 10, 2015 decrees
involuntarily terminating her parental rights, and changing the permanency
goals to adoption, with respect to her minor female children, D.H.-R., born in
J-S57001-15
December 2002, and D.R.H., born in August 2005 (collectively, the
Children).1 Upon careful review, we affirm.2
By way of relevant background, the Children were placed in the
custody of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services, Children and
Youth Division (DHS), on October 19, 2010, due to Mother hitting D.H.-R.,
the oldest child, and D.H.-R. being afraid to go home. Id. at 2. In addition,
on the same date, Mother inadvertently called DHS, and DHS overheard
Mother yelling and cursing at D.H.-R. Id.
Following a hearing, the Children were adjudicated dependent on
November 10, 2010. The trial court ordered Mother to undergo a drug
screen and assessment at the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU). Id. An
Individual Service Plan (ISP) was established for Mother and the goal of
reunification was set for the family. The trial court aptly described Mother’s
service plan goals as follows.
Mother’s first goal was to stabilize her mental health
by attending therapy with an anger management
____________________________________________
1
At the termination hearing the trial court indicated “as far as [M]other.
The children are released for adoption, although they won’t - - the case
won’t be transferred to the adoption unit until we complete all the fathers.”
N.T., 2/10/15, at 182. Accordingly, Mother’s appeal is limited to reviewing
the decree involuntarily terminating her parental rights.
2
The trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of D.H.-R.’s
putative father by decree dated April 16, 2015. He has not filed a notice of
appeal, and he is not a party to this appeal. With respect to D.R.H.’s father,
the certified record before this Court indicates his parental rights are not
terminated.
-2-
J-S57001-15
component. Mother’s second goal was to maintain
recovery from drug and alcohol abuse. In order to
do so, Mother had to participate in drug and alcohol
abuse evaluations, to comply with all treatment and
all recommendations. Furthermore, Mother had to
sign authorization to allow DHS to track her
progress. Mother’s third goal was to provide
Children with adequate and safe living conditions by
locating and occupying suitable housing for her
family with suitable space and other operative
utilities. Mother’s fourth goal was to provide
Children with a safe environment with appropriate
supervision and maintain Children’s health needs.
Mother’s fifth goal was to maintain her relationship
with her Children by participating in placement
activities, regular visitation, and meeting regularly
with the agency social worker. Mother’s sixth goal
was to improve communication and her relationship
with Children by attending counseling. Mother’s final
goal was learn and use non-violent and non-physical
discipline methods by learning and understanding at
least two non-physical discipline methods and refrain
from any physical method. Mother also had to
attend [Family Service Plan] meetings, complete
parenting classes, and understand and protect the
Children from sexualized victimization and
understand the trauma behind it.[3]
Id. at 6-7 (citations to record omitted).
By June 2011, Mother tested positive for phencyclidine (PCP) and
marijuana. Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/15, at 3. Mother tested positive for
marijuana again on June 5, 2012, and for cannabinoid on July 18, 2012,
October 30, 2013, and December 6, 2013. Id. at 4-5.
____________________________________________
3
This goal arose from a report made by D.H.-R. that she was sexually
molested by D.R.H.’s father while she was living with Mother. N.T., 2/10/15,
at 20-21. DHS substantiated the child’s report. Id. at 21.
-3-
J-S57001-15
On October 18, 2013, DHS filed petitions for a goal change to
adoption. On October 22, 2013, DHS filed petitions for the involuntary
termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), and (b).4 A termination and goal change hearing occurred on
February 10, 2015, during which DHS presented the testimony of the DHS
caseworker, Roya Paller, and the DHS program analyst, Carla Gardner.
Mother testified on her own behalf.
On February 10, 2015, the trial court involuntarily terminated Mother’s
parental rights. On March 11, 2015, Mother filed timely notices of appeal
and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), which this Court consolidated sua sponte.5 See
generally Pa.R.A.P. 513. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion on
May 18, 2015.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review.
1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating
the parental rights of [ ] Mother[] under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and § 2511(a)(8)?
____________________________________________
4
On February 3, 2015, DHS filed amended petitions, which it withdrew at
the time of the hearing. N.T., 2/10/15, at 5-6, 8.
5
On March 11, 2015, Mother, acting pro se, filed timely notices of appeal.
On the same day, Mother’s counsel filed notices of appeal. As such, this
Court dismissed Mother’s pro se notices of appeal as unnecessary and
duplicative. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/15, at 5.
-4-
J-S57001-15
2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by finding, under
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), that termination of
[Mother’s] parental rights best serves the Children’s
developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare?
Mother’s Brief at 5.
We are guided by the following standard of review.
The standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record. If the
factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error
of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s
decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result.
We have previously emphasized our deference to
trial courts that often have first-hand observations of
the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent.
The party seeking termination must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
-5-
J-S57001-15
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The
burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights
are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Instantly, we conclude that the trial court properly terminated Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as
follows.6
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard
to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on
any of the following grounds:
…
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the
____________________________________________
6
This Court need only agree with any one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a), along with Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of
parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). Therefore, in light of our disposition as to Section 2511(a)(2), we
need not consider Mother’s arguments with respect to Section 2511(a)(1),
and (8).
-6-
J-S57001-15
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
…
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first initiated
subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the
petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b). “The grounds for termination [of parental
rights under Section 2511(a)(2),] due to parental incapacity that cannot be
remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (internal
citations omitted).
With respect to Section 2511(b), the requisite analysis is as follows.
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination
of parental rights would best serve the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d
1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs
and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
that the trial court must also discern the nature and
-7-
J-S57001-15
status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently
severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where
there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and
child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.
2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect
analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
the particular case. Id. at 763.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
On appeal, with respect to Section 2511(a), Mother argues that the
evidence is insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights.
Specifically, Mother asserts that she has completed two parenting classes
and an anger management class. Mother’s Brief at 12. In addition, Mother
argues that she has been consistently attending mental health treatment,
and that her last three drug screens were negative. Id. As such, Mother
argues that she has remedied the conditions that brought the Children into
care, and that she is capable of parenting them at this time. Id.
In contrast, the trial court found that, although Mother attended
mental health treatment, anger management therapy, and parenting
classes, Mother has not made acceptable progress. Trial Court Opinion,
5/18/15, at 7-9. With respect to her mental health and anger management,
the trial court found as follows.
Mother had a nervous breakdown and was
hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital [i]n December
2014. Mother attempted suicide due to a thyroid
problem. … Mother’s lack of anger control still
constitutes an obstacle to reunification. As
established by the record, Mother is aggressive,
-8-
J-S57001-15
reactionary, and does not use the skills learned in
anger management therapy. … Additionally, the
trial court observed Mother in the courtroom being
very disrespectful by interrupting the proceedings
numerous times.
Id. at 7-8 (citations to record omitted). Further, with respect to parenting,
the trial court made the following findings.
Mother is still far from achieving the necessary
parenting skills to assume her parental duties. As
the social worker testified, Mother inappropriately
stated that “she needed money and she was upset
with DHS, and she felt that DHS was failing her, and
she is telling the kids how it’s killing her and DHS is
lying to her and killing her. And, of course, to a
child, I’m sure they believe that DHS is killing her,
and so, now they’re afraid their Mother is dying.”
Mother’s inability to learn from her parenting and
anger management classes puts the Children at risk
because the Children present stress and anxiety.
Id. at 9 (citations to record omitted).
Upon review, the testimony of the DHS caseworker, Roya Paller,
supports the trial court’s findings. Indeed, Ms. Paller testified on cross-
examination by the Child Advocate that, although Mother’s drug screens on
November 25, 2014, and January 7, 2015, were negative, she is not in a
position to reunify with the Children. That testimony occurred as follows.
Q. So, even with those recent negative drug screens
for mom, do you believe that puts her in a position
to reunify with her children?
A. No.
Q. And why not?
-9-
J-S57001-15
A. I think mom’s anger management and parenting
skills and her [in]ability to handle stressors puts the
children at risk because the children present stress.
N.T., 2/10/15, at 89.7
With respect to Mother’s remaining goals, the trial court found that she
has been non-compliant for the life of the case, which was 52 months at the
time of the hearing. Regarding drug and alcohol treatment, the trial court
found as follows.
Mother has tested positive for PCP and Marijuana on
numerous occasions. Mother has not complied with
various court orders ordering her to provide drug
screens and assessment[] evaluations. As far back
as August 8, 2011, Mother was recommended to
attend and complete an outpatient intensive
treatment program. Although Mother completed a
drug treatment program, Mother continued to
provide positive drug screens on occasion. Mother
was ordered to attend another drug treatment
program, but she has refused. …. The trial court
had serious concerns that Mother is continuing to
abuse drugs.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/15, at 8 (citations to record omitted). Ms. Paller’s
testimony supports these findings.
Regarding maintaining her relationship with the Children, the trial
court found that “DHS provided Mother with transportation tokens … but
____________________________________________
7
With respect to the negative drug screen on November 25, 2014, the court
read on the record and in open court a portion of the report that stated
“‘Barbiturates: Negative 19.12,’ which is between the range of zero and 200
… milliliters.” N.T., 2/10/15, at 86. Similarly, the drug screen on January 7,
2015, although negative, still indicated traces of barbiturates, cocaine,
opiates, and PCP. Id. at 87.
- 10 -
J-S57001-15
Mother failed to take advantage of the services, failing to attend Children
visits during 2014. The record also established that Mother did not visit with
the Children between December 13, 2012, and March 13, 2013, as per
Mother’s regular ISP reviews.” Id. at 9 (citations to record omitted). The
testimony of Ms. Paller supports the trial court’s findings in that she testified
Mother had no visits at all in 2014 with the Children. N.T., 2/10/15, at 69.
Regarding Mother’s obligation to maintain contact with DHS, the trial
court found the following.
Mother’s efforts in contacting DHS were focused on
complaining about DHS services. Mother prioritized
leaving aggressive messages for DHS instead of
manifesting interest for her Children[]…. Mother’s
contact with DHS was poor….
Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/15, at 9 (citations to record omitted). Ms. Paller’s
testimony supports this finding by the court. In addition, the testimony of
Carla Gardner, the DHS program analyst whose job was to file complaints
made by people who have problems with the management of their cases,
supports this finding in that she spoke with Mother over twenty times
regarding her complaints. Id. at 124.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court noted the following with
respect to understanding the sexual abuse trauma suffered by D.H.-R.
Mother was referred to JJPI [Joseph J. Peters
Institute] once in 2014 and again in 2015. Other
previous referrals were also made before 2014. DHS
[s]ocial worker’s testimony established that an
annual referral to JJPI[] was enough for Mother to
attend the therapy. Mother was aware of this
- 11 -
J-S57001-15
objective through [the] DHS social worker and [the]
JJPI counselor. However, she did not comply with
this objective.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/15, at 9 (citations to record omitted). Ms. Paller’s
testimony supports these findings. In fact, she testified that Mother has
never addressed D.H.-R.’s sexual abuse. N.T., 2/10/15, at 48-49. Ms.
Paller explained that, because D.H.-R. made the complaint of sexual abuse
after she was in placement, Mother “gets mad, saying that it doesn’t need to
be addressed because [D.H.-R.] wasn’t with her … at the time of the
disclosure, but the alleged report talks about a time when she was living
with mom.” Id. at 47.
Finally, regarding housing, the trial court found that “Mother obtained
housing in October 2014, one year after the termination petition was filed.
However, Mother’s house is a one bedroom apartment, which is not
appropriate for two Children.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/15, at 8. Ms.
Paller’s testimony supports the court’s finding in that she testified on redirect
examination that Mother sleeps in the bedroom of the apartment, and that
she does not having bedding for the Children. N.T., 2/10/15, at 120-121.
As such, Ms. Paller testified that Mother is not in compliance with her
housing goal. Id. at 121.
We conclude that the record overwhelmingly supports the trial court’s
decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2). Indeed, Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
- 12 -
J-S57001-15
neglect, or refusal to comply with her family service plan goals and/or make
sufficient progress in the goals has caused the Children to be without
essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical
or mental well-being. Further, after a minimum of 52 months at the time of
the hearing that the Children had been in placement, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in concluding that the causes of Mother’s
incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
Therefore, Mother’s arguments with respect to Section 2511(a)(2) fail.
With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother argues that the Children are
bonded to her and that terminating her parental rights will not serve their
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. Mother’s Brief at
14. However, the trial court found that the “Children will not suffer any
irreparable harm by terminating Mother’s parental rights.” Trial Court
Opinion, 5/18/15, at 12. Ms. Paller’s testimony supports the court’s
conclusion.
Ms. Paller testified that the Children have been living with their
maternal grandmother in New Jersey since February 2014, and that they
desire to remain with her. N.T., 2/10/15, at 67, 81. She testified that
Mother had one visit with the Children sometime after December 18, 2014,
and before the termination hearing on February 10, 2015. Id. at 63-64.
Following the visit, Ms. Paller testified on direct examination that the
Children “felt uneasy.” Id. at 67.
- 13 -
J-S57001-15
They have a fear they’re being removed, that they’re
going to go back to mom, and they keep asking me
“Well, … why is she coming now? Are we going
back? Are we going home?” And there’s a lot of
reassurance that’s needed.
Q. Reassurance that’s needed for what?
A. To de-escalate them so that they know that
they’re remaining with grandmom at this point.
Id.
Moreover, Ms. Paller also testified as follows on cross-examination by
the Child Advocate.
Q. You testified that you do not believe that [D.R.H.]
would suffer irreparable harm if [M]other’s parental
rights were terminated. Why is that?
A. Well, because [M]other … doesn’t have a positive
bond with the child. Mother has not shown any
capacity for intaking the knowledge given at the
parenting capacity or anger management classes. …
The child is with maternal grandmother, and if
[M]other ever presents stable enough, maternal
grandmother would allow her daughter to see the
children.
Q. And is that also your testimony for [D.H.-R.]?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you believe that it would be safe to reunify the
[C]hildren with their mother today?
A. No.
…
I think [M]other is aggressive and I think [M]other
is reactionary and would put the [C]hildren at risk. I
think there’s no stable housing. Mother had a
- 14 -
J-S57001-15
mental health breakdown as recent as December. If
[the Children] were there with her, they would have
found her.[8]
Id. at 93-94.
Therefore, based on the foregoing testimony of Ms. Paller, we discern
no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that terminating
Mother’s parental rights serves the Children’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare. See J.M., supra. Thus, Mother’s issue fails
with respect to Section 2511(b).
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)
and (b). See T.S.M., supra. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s February
10, 2015 decrees.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/10/2015
____________________________________________
8
Ms. Paller testified that Mother’s nervous breakdown in December 2014
involved a suicide attempt for which she was admitted to a psychiatric
hospital. N.T., 2/10/15, at 55, 94.
- 15 -
J-S57001-15
- 16 -