J-S65041-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JONATHAN GRANT
Appellant No. 755 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 3, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0003705-1991
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 10, 2015
Jonathan Grant (“Appellant”), appeals from the order dismissing his
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.
§§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.
In its opinion, the PCRA court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
facts and procedural posture of this case. Opinion, 9/24/2014, 2-4, 14-16.
Therefore, we have no reason to restate them beyond noting: (1) Appellant
filed the instant PCRA petition, his tenth, on October 31, 2014; (2) the
petition concerns Appellant’s 1992 life sentence for a murder committed in
1991; (3) the PCRA court denied the petition as untimely on March 3, 2015;
and (4) Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 16, 2015.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1). DID THE PCRA COURT ERROR ON DISMISSING
PETITIONER’S PCRA PETITION WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF
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PROPERLY CONDUCTING A EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO
DETERMINE IF PETITIONER’S PETITION IS RECOGNIZED UNDER
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), A CLAIM WAS RELEVANT TO THE DUE
PROCESS OF LAW WITH REGARDS TO A BRADY’S VIOLATION
THAT LED TO THE FILING OF THIS CLAIM OF THE SAID
PETITION, AND THEREFORE, BEING ABLE TO RENDER A FULLY
LEGAL OPINION:
2). PETITIONER SHOULD BE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE
THE COMMONWEALTH DID WITHHELD PREJUDICIAL
INFORMATION AND EVIDENCE OF TWO KEY WITNESSES “JOHN
HERIS AND RICHARD YOUNG” IN A SUCCESSFUL LAST MINUTE
AMBUSH ON THE DEFENSE WITHOUT GIVEN THE DEFENSE
NOTICE SO THAT THE DEFENSE COULD PROPERLY PREPARE A
DEFENSE FOR THE DEFENDANT, THUS, DEPRIVED HIM OF A
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE BRADY
DOCTRINE, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO DUE
PROCESS OF THE UNITED STATES AND PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION, WAS GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE WHICH
CAUSED THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO RAISE THESE ISSUES:
3). DID THE PCRA COURT ERROR ON DISMISSING
PETITIONER’S PCRA PETITION WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF
PROPERLY CONDUCTING A EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO
DETERMINE IF PETITIONER’S PETITION IS RECOGNIZED UNDER
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(i), GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE, THAT LED
TO THE FILING OF THIS ISSUE OF THE SAID PETITION”:
4). GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE DID OCCUR IN VIOLATION OF
COURT ORDERS WHEN FAILURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH TO
PRODUCE MATERIAL EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT
WHEN A STRONG PROBABILITY THAT THE RESULT OF
DEFENDANT’S APPEAL, AND SUBSEQUENT PCRA ISSUES WOULD
HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IF THE EVIDENCE HAD BEEN
PRODUCED:
5). DID PROSECUTING ATTORNEY COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN HE OMITTED FACTS AND ALTERED EVIDENCE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF PREVENTING PETITIONER FROM ADVANCING HIS
ISSUES AND HAVING THEM DECIDED ON THEIR MERITS IN
VIOLATION OF BRADY AND HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A
MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AND
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AS OPPOSITE ATTORNEYS WITH
A RECORD THAT HAD NOT BEEN ALTERED:
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6). DID PCRA COURT ERROR BY FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE
PETITIONER MEET THE REQUIRED 60 DAYS BECAUSE SAID
INFORMATION AND EVIDENCE WAS PRESERVED DURING THE
TIME PETITIONER FIRST STARTED REQUESTING IN 1996 FOR
SAID EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION:
Appellant’s Brief, p. iii (verbatim).1
In reviewing an order denying PCRA relief, our well-settled standard of
review is “to determine whether the determination of the PCRA court is
supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA
court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185,
191-192 (Pa.Super.2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
We note that, before addressing the merits of an Appellant’s claims,
we must first consider the timeliness of the PCRA petition because it
implicates the jurisdiction of both this Court and the PCRA court.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 52 (Pa.Super.2011) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa.2012). “Pennsylvania law makes
clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.” Id.
To “accord finality to the collateral review process[,]” the PCRA “confers no
____________________________________________
1
The Commonwealth restates Appellant’s claims as follows:
1-6. WHETHER THE PCRA COURT PROPERLY DENIED
APPELLANT’S TENTH REQUEST FOR POST-CONVICTION
COLLATERAL RELIEF AS HIS PETITION CHALLENGING HIS 1992
CONVICTION FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER WAS TIME BARRED?
Commonwealth’s Brief, p. 1.
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authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA
time-bar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa.2011).
“It is undisputed that a PCRA petition must be filed within one year of
the date that the judgment of sentence becomes final.” Commonwealth v.
Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa.Super.2013); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
“This time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the
court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of a petition.”
Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651 (citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d
201, 203 (Pa.2000)). “Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal
authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Seskey,
86 A.3d 237, 241 (Pa.Super.2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Albrecht,
994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa.2010)).
A judgment of sentence “becomes final at the conclusion of direct
review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time
for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). However, a facially
untimely petition may be received where any of the PCRA’s three limited
exceptions to the PCRA time bar are met. Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651
(footnote omitted). These exceptions include:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). As our Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated, the petitioner maintains the burden of pleading and proving that one
of these exceptions applies. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d
1263, 1268 (Pa.2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 916 (2008); see also
Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1146 (Pa.Super.2011) (“The
petitioner bears the burden to allege and prove [that] one of the timeliness
exceptions applies.”). Further,
[a] petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within
sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the
exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, the petitioner
must plead and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim
was raised within the sixty-day time frame under section
9545(b)(2).
Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651-652 (internal quotations omitted).
Finally, a heightened standard applies to a second or subsequent PCRA
petition to avoid “serial requests for post-conviction relief.”
Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1043 (Pa.2011). “A second or
subsequent request for relief under the PCRA will not be entertained unless
the petitioner presents a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of
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justice may have occurred.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248,
1251 (Pa.2006). Additionally, in a second or subsequent post-conviction
proceeding, “all issues are waived except those which implicate a
defendant’s innocence or which raise the possibility that the proceedings
resulting in conviction were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice which no
civilized society can tolerate occurred”. Commonwealth v. Williams, 660
A.2d 614, 618 (Pa.Super.1995).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Rea B.
Boylan, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The PCRA court
opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
presented. See PCRA Court Opinion, dated July 30, 2015, p. 8 (finding: (1)
Appellant’s petition was untimely and Appellant failed to demonstrate
entitlement to any of the PCRA’s enumerated time-bar exceptions; (2)
Appellant’s issues were previously raised and litigated in his second, third,
fourth, and sixth PCRA petitions; (3) even if not previously litigated,
Appellant waived issues by failing to raise them during trial, on direct
appeal, or in previous PCRA petitions; and (4) Appellant failed to allege
actual innocence in this, his tenth PCRA petition). Accordingly, we affirm on
the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/10/2015
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY -
CRIMINAL DIVISION
COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1991-3705
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JONATHAN GRANT
OPINION ?iB~ :,
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Defendant, Jonathan Grant, appeals the dismissal of his tenth pettfg~pursu~t to the Post
0
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S. § 9541 et seq. Defendant's PCRA petition was
denied and dismissed because it was untimely filed and all claims were previously litigated or
are deemed waived.
The following is a summary of the relevant facts and procedural history taken from a
prior Opinion:
On April 15, 1991, the victim, Nora Adderly, a 41-year old woman was found
dead by police in an apartment that she shared with her boyfriend, the defendant.
Adderly had been shot five times, three times with a pistol and twice with a
shotgun. Neighbors from the apartment below heard a man and woman arguing, a
woman's scream, and noises that sounded like gunshots. After a bullet came
through the ceiling of their apartment and lodged in their mattress, they called the
police. Defendant fled the scene of the crime, but was eventually captured and
arrested in Savannah, Georgia. He testified at his trial and admitted that he shot
the victim. He asserted various defenses including accident, self-defense,
diminished capacity, and intoxication.
On January 13, 1992, a jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder and
related offenses. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree
murder and received concurrent sentences of imprisonment for the remaining
charges.
On October 20, 1993, Defendant appealed to the Superior Court challenging the
admission of certain evidence and jury instructions. On December 15, 1993, the
Superior Court affirmed this Court's judgment of sentence. Defendant filed a
petition for allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which
the Court denied on September 12, 1994.
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On November 23, 1994, Defendant filed his first PCRA petition, alleging
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. On December 23, 1994, after
a hearing on the matter, this Court denied Defendant's first PCRA petition. On
October 27, 1995, the Superior Court affirmed this Court's judgment. Defendant
filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
which the Court denied on May 8, 1996.
On December 6, 1996, Defendant filed his second PCRA petition alleging
prosecutorial misconduct in the post-conviction process and ineffective assistance
of counsel. On December 23, 1996, Defendant's second PCRA petition was
denied and dismissed without a hearing. On February 18, 1998, the Superior
Court affirmed this 'Court's judgment.·
On October 14, 1998, Petitioner filed his third PCRA petition alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel, violation of constitutional rights, and prosecutorial
misconduct. On November 13, 1998, Defendant's third PCRA petition was
denied and dismissed without a hearing. On September 23, 1999, the Superior
Court affirmed this Court's judgment.
On October 23, 2002, Defendant filed his fourth PCRA petition alleging
prosecutorial misconduct. On November 14, 2002, Defendant's fourth PCRA
petition was denied and dismissed without a hearing. On August 28, 2003, the
Superior Court affirmed this Court's judgment. Defendant filed a petition for
allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which the Court
denied on February 20, 2004.
On February 23, 2007, Defendant filed his fifth PCRA petition alleging
interference of government officials, ineffective assistance of counsel, and denial
of the right to counsel. On March 5, 2007, Defendant's fifth PCRA petition was
denied and dismissed without a hearing. On November 14, 2007, the Superior
Court affirmed this Court's judgment. Defendant filed a petition for allowance of
appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which the Court denied on June
26, 2008.
On July 28, 2008 and February 4, 2009, Defendant filed his sixth PCRA petition
alleging prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and denial of
the right to counsel. On August 6, 2009, Defendant's sixth PCRA petition was
denied and dismissed without a hearing. On March 9, 2010, the Superior Court
affirmed this Court's judgment.
On March 19, 2010, Defendant filed his seventh PCRA petition alleging newly
discovered evidence and governmental interference. On July 15, 2010,
Defendant's seventh PCRA petition was denied and dismissed without a hearing.
Defendant did not file an appeal to the Superior Court.
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On January 5, 2011, Defendant filed [his eighth PCRA petition alleging]
governmental interference and ineffective assistance of counsel. . . . On March
24, 2011, this Court denied and dismissed Defendant's eighth PCRA petition
without a hearing.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/11. On November 1, 2011, the Superior Court affirmed this Court's
judgment. Defendant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, which was denied on April 5, 2012.
On December 24, 2012, Defendant filed "Petitioner's Petition Under the Post Conviction
Relief Act at No. 3705 of 1991," his ninth PCRA petition. On April 26, 2013, this Court denied
and dismissed Defendant's ninth PCRA petition without a hearing. On May 8, 2013, Defendant
filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court. The Superior Court affirmed this Court's
decision on May 22, 2014.
On October 31, 2014, Defendant filed his tenth PCRA petition. On February 4, 2015,
this Court issued a Notice oflntent to Dismiss pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 907. On February 23, 2015, Defendant filed "Defendant's Petition in Respond to the
Commonwealth's Notice oflntention to Dismiss Under PA Rule 907." On March 3, 2015, this
Court denied and dismissed Defendant's tenth PCRA petition without a hearing. On March 16,
2015, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court.
On April 13, 2015, Defendant filed a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on
Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Pa. R.A.P.) 1925(b), raising the
following issues on appeal, verbatim:
1. Did the PCRA court error on dismissing Petitioner's PCRA petition without
the benefit of properly conducting a evidentiary hearing to determine if
Petitioner's petition is recognized under Pa.C.S. § 9545 (b)(l)(i), a claim was
relevant to the due process of law with regards to a Brady's violation that led
to the filing of this claim of the said petition, and therefore, being able to
render a fully legal opinion:
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2. Petitioner should be granted a new trial because the Commonwealth did
withheld prejudicial information and evidence of two key witnesses "John
Heris and Richard Young" in a successfully last minute ambush on the
defense without given the defense notice so that the defense could properly
prepare a defense for the defendant, thus, deprived him of a fair and impartial
trial in violation of the Brady Doctrine, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to
Due Process of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitution, was
Government interference with caused the failure of Petitioner to raise these
issues:
3. Did the PCRA court error on dismissing Petitioner's PCRA petition without
the benefit of properly conducting a evidentiary hearing to determine if
Petitioner's petition is recognized under Pa.C.S. § 9545 (b)(l)(i), Government
Interference, that led to the filing of the issue of said petition:
4. Government Interference did occur in violation of court orders when failure of
the Commonwealth to produce material evidence favorable to the Defendant
when a strong probability that the result of defendant's appeals, and
subsequent PCRA issues would have been different if the evidence had been
produced:
5. Did prosecuting Attorney commit reversible error when he omitted facts and
altered evidence for the purpose of preventing Petitioner from advancing his
issues and having them decided on their merits in violation of Brady and his
Constitutional right to a meaningful Appellate review of the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitution as opposite attorneys with a record that had not
been material altered:
6. Did PCRA court error by failure to recognize Petitioner meet the required 60
days because said information and evidence was persevered during the time
Petitioner first started requesting in 1996 for said evidence and information:
Defendant's instant PCRA petition was denied and dismissed without a hearing because
(1) it was filed more than one year after the judgment of sentence became final; (2) Defendant
has failed to raise any statutory exception to the time bar to permit its review; and (3) all of the
issues raised have been previously litigated or are deemed waived.
The standard of review upon the appeal from the denial of PCRA relief is whether or not
the PCRA court's findings are supported by the record and are free oflegal error.
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 833 A.2d 719, 723 (Pa. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1048
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(2004). To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and prove by a
preponderance of the evidence all of the following:
(1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this
Commonwealth and is at the time relief is granted:
(i) Currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or
parole for the crime;
(ii) Awaiting execution of a sentence of death for the crime; or
(iii) Serving a sentence which must expire before the person
may commence serving the disputed sentence.
(2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the following:
(i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or
the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the
truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have taken place;
(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the
truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have taken place;
(iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the
circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused
the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent;
(iv) The improper obstruction by government officials of the
petitioner's right of appeal where a meritorious appealable
issue existed and was properly preserved in the trial court;
(v) [Deleted}
(vi) The unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory
evidence that has subsequently become available and
would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been
introduced;
(vii) The imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful
maximum; and/or
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(viii) A proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction.
42 Pa. C.S. § 9543(a)(l-2). Moreover, a defendant must plead and prove that an allegation of
error has not been previously litigated or waived. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9543(a)(3). Section 9544
defines "previous litigation" and "waiver" and provides:
(a) An issue has been previously litigated if:
(1) Deleted.
(2) The highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have
had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the
issue; or
(3) It has been raised and decided in a proceeding collaterally
attacking the conviction or sentence.
(b) An issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so
before trial, at trial, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.
42 Pa. C.S. § 9544.
Pursuant to the 1995 amendments to the PCRA, any PCRA petition must be filed within
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one year of the date that the defendant's judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa. C.S. §
9545(b )(3). If the judgment became final before the effective date ofthe amendments, a first
petition must be filed within one year of that effective date (January 15, 1996). 42 Pa. C.S. §
9545(b ). A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at
the expiration of time for seeking the review. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
The one-year time limitation is jurisdictional and a court has no power to address the
substantive merits of an untimely petition. Abu-Jamal, 833 A.2d at 723-24. This time restriction
is strictly constrned. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal (II), 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008); cert.
denied 555 U.S. 916 (2008). Our Supreme Court has held that "the PCRA places time
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limitations on such claims of error, and in so doing, strikes a reasonable balance between
society's need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted person's need to demonstrate that
there has been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his conviction." Commonwealth v.
Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 643 (Pa. 1998).
There are three exceptions to the one-year filing requirement. A defendant's petition is
not untimely if he can prove one of the following exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by
government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence; and/or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the
Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that
court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(l)(i-iii). Any petition asserting one of these exceptions must also establish
that the exception was raised within sixty days of the date the claim could have first been
presented. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b )(2). A petitioner can excuse his untimely petition to the one-
year limitation only if he is able to specifically plead and demonstrate to the court that one of
these three exceptions applies. Commonwealth v. Palmer, 814 A.2d 700, 706 (Pa. Super. 2002)
referencing Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 1999). Requests for review of a
second or subsequent post-conviction petition will not be entertained unless a strongprimafacie
showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Palmer, 814
A.2d at 709 referencing Commonwealth. v. Lawson, 549 A.2d 107 (Pa 1988).
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Here, Defendant's petition is untimely as it does not satisfy the standard set forth above.
Defendant's judgment of sentence became final on December 12, 1994 and he had one year from
that date, December 12, 1995, to file a PCRA petition. Pa. R.A.P. 903; U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1; 1
Pa. C.S.A. § 1908.1 Defendant did not file the instant petition until October 31, 2014, which is
well beyond the one-year time limitation, and Defendant has not demonstrated one of the three
exceptions enumerated above. Consequently, this Court does not have the authority to rule on
the merits of an untimely petition. Commonwealth v. Valentine, 928 A.2d 346, 349 (Pa. Super.
2007).
Defendant has previously raised the issues of constitutional violations and prosecutorial
misconduct in his second, third, fourth, and sixth PCRA petitions. Accordingly, the issues raised
in the instant petition were previously litigated. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9544(b), supra. Even if
Defendant raised issues not previously litigated, any remaining issues are waived for failure to
raise these issues during trial, on appeal, or in a prior PCRA petition. Further, Defendant fails to
allege his innocence in the petition. For these reasons, Defendant is not entitled to the relief
sought and his PCRA petition was dismissed.
BY THE COURT,
1
Although there is a grace period for filing petitions in cases where the judgment of sentence was final prior to the
effective date of the time bar, there is no such period for second or subsequent petitions. Commonwealth v. Crews,
863 A.2d 498, 501 (Pa 2004).
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Copies sent to:
Karen Diaz, Esq.
Bucks County District Attorney's Office
55 East Court Street
Doylestown, PA 18901
Counsel for the Commonwealth
Jonathan Grant, BT0945
SCI-ALBION
10745 Route 18
Albion, PA 16475-0001
Defendant
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Com. v. Grant, J.
Combined Opinion