United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
Revised May 27, 2003
May 12, 2003
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Charles R. Fulbruge III
For the Fifth Circuit Clerk
No. 02-40686
BOBBY EVETT; CHRISTINA GEE; ANGELA GEE, Individually and in
behalf of BRANDON GEE, a Minor,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
VERSUS
DETNTFF, ET AL,
Defendants
KENT GRAHAM, Nacogdoches County Sheriff; RAM MENDIOLA,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
Before DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE, District
Judge.1
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellee Bobby Evett ("Evett") filed a civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against law enforcement
1
The Honorable F. A. Little, Jr., District Judge for the
Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
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officers Kent Graham ("Graham") and Ramiro Mendiola ("Mendiola")
for unlawful arrest. Graham and Mendiola filed motions for summary
judgment based upon qualified immunity, which the district court
denied as a matter of law. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August 2000, members of the Deep East Texas Regional
Narcotics Trafficking Task Force ("Task Force"), a state and local
funded task force comprised of officers of several law enforcement
agencies, obtained and executed a search and arrest warrant at the
home of Angela and Richard Gee, Sr. ("Gee premises"). As a result
of the search, a large number of weapons and methamphetamine
materials were found. Richard Gee, Sr. ("Gee, Sr."), and his son
Richard Gee, Jr. ("Gee, Jr."), were arrested for possession of a
controlled substance.
On January 25, 2001, more than 20 members of the Task Force
executed a second search and arrest warrant for the Gee premises
based on probable cause to believe that the Gees were continuing to
manufacture and sell methamphetamine. Among the officers executing
the warrant were Sergeant Graham and Lieutenant Mendiola, both from
the Nacogdoches County Sheriff's Department. Graham and Mendiola
were Task Force supervisors. Mendiola was the senior supervisor
during the execution of this warrant. At the time of the raid,
there were 14 non-law enforcement persons present at the Gee
premises. Among those present were Gee, Sr. and his wife Angela
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Gee; his son, Gee, Jr. and his girlfriend Tonya Jones, and their
daughter Chelsea Gee; his son Brandon Gee; his daughter Christina
Gee and her common law husband, Evett, and child Calley Evett; and
a family friend, Angela Griffin ("Griffin").
Upon arriving at the Gee premises, members of the Task Force
busted down the door with a battering ram, yelled at the occupants
of the house to get down and kept their weapons aimed at the
occupants until the premises was secured. Outside of the house,
officers detained Evett and Brandon Gee at gun point as other
officers secured the garage area. The raid lasted more than one
hour and resulted in the arrest of Gee, Sr., Gee, Jr., Evett, and
Griffin. There was no warrant for Evett's arrest, and ultimately
no charges were filed against him.
Evett filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Graham and Mediola, among others, for unlawful arrest.
In his complaint, Evett alleged that he and others were
"terrorized" by law enforcement officers, among whom were Graham
and Mendiola, who were conducting a raid on the premises.
According to Evett, Mendiola was "the officer in charge" and was
responsible for the supervision of all of the officers who
participated in the raid. Evett asserted that Graham made the
decision to arrest him for possession of a controlled substance
with Mendiola's approval. Evett alleged that there were no
outstanding warrants for his arrest and that Graham and Mendiola
did not have probable cause to arrest him.
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Graham and Mendiola pleaded qualified immunity as an
affirmative defense in their answer to Evett's complaint. The
district court ordered limited discovery on the facts relevant to
the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Subsequently,
Graham and Mendiola filed a motion for summary judgment based upon
qualified immunity.
In reviewing the evidence submitted by both parties on the
issue of whether Graham had probable cause to arrest Evett, the
district court noted that Graham submitted an affidavit and
deposition testimony that drug residue and paraphernalia were
located on the seat of Griffin's truck and that Graham received
information that Evett had ridden in the truck with Griffin. The
district court further noted that based on this information and the
fact that both Griffin and Evett were at a "high-traffic
clandestine methamphetamine lab," Graham testified that he believed
that Evett was aware of the contraband in the truck and made the
decision to arrest him.
According to the district court, however, Evett adduced
evidence that he was told he would not be arrested unless there
existed an outstanding warrant for his arrest. In addition, the
court noted that Evett pointed to the testimony of Christina Gee to
suggest that his arrest was not based on probable cause, but rather
to "provide the proverbial slap in his father-in-law's face."
According to the district court, "[r]ather than investigate and
verify the accusation, Sergeant Graham made remarks in the house to
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the effect of 'How is Daddy going to feel now? We're taking the
daughter's husband.'" Further, the district court noted that the
evidence showed that Graham arrested Evett after acting upon
information he received "from an unsubstantiated source" who said
Evett had ridden with Griffin in her truck where the contraband was
found. However, according to the district court, the evidence
indicated Evett told officers at the scene that he had never ridden
in Griffin's truck.
The district court found that Evett's version of events was
supported by the deposition testimony of officer Barry Vance
("Vance"), another law enforcement officer who participated in the
raid. Vance, who is a member of the Lufkin Police Department,
testified that he had searched Griffin's truck and questioned her,
and that she told him she had come to the Gee premises by herself.
Vance testified that he believed Griffin was being truthful with
him. Vance also testified that he found methamphetamine and a
hypodermic needle on the seat of Griffin's truck, but the
hypodermic needle was in a closed opaque plastic makeup bag
belonging to Griffin. The district court found that Vance had
"conveyed this information to Sergeant Graham." The district court
further noted that Graham stated in his deposition that Evett was
released from jail the day after his arrest "for lack of probable
cause because of the makeup bag," but that he could not remember
whether Vance even talked to him about Griffin, or whether he knew
about the makeup bag, before Evett's arrest.
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Based on the evidence, the district court concluded:
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff
and assuming arguendo that Sergeant Graham lacked
probable cause to arrest Plaintiff Evett, the Court
finds, for purposes of this motion, that Sergeant Graham
indeed violated Evett's constitutional right. The law
could not be more clear that an individual has a clearly
established right to be free from unlawful arrest.
Therefore, the question remaining in this analysis is
whether Defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable
for qualified immunity purposes. The Court presumes that
defendants' facts are objectively reasonable unless all
reasonable officials in the defendants' circumstances
would have then known that the defendants' conduct
violated [Plaintiff Evett's] constitutional right.
The district court found that Graham's actions were not objectively
reasonable. The court noted that "other reasonable officials in
Sergeant Graham's circumstances believed, at the time of the
arrest, that he lacked probable cause to make an arrest." The
court examined the parameters of probable cause, defining it as
having "reasonably trustworthy information that would cause a
prudent person to believe that the suspect had committed or was
committing a crime." The court pointed out that Graham had based
his belief that Evett knew about the drug paraphernalia in
Griffin's truck on information received from an officer whose
identity he could not remember, and that Graham admitted that he
did not know "[w]hether I could prove it in a court of law," but
had a "feeling" that Evett knew about the contraband. The district
court determined that Graham should have investigated further
Evett's connection with the items in Griffin's truck, finding that
if Graham had done so, he would have learned from Vance, who had
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questioned Griffin and searched her truck, that: (1) Griffin denied
that Evett had been in her truck; (2) Vance believed that Griffin
was telling the truth; and (3) the hypodermic needle was inside a
closed makeup bag in Griffin's truck.
Furthermore, the district court found that Graham was not
forced to make a "split-second decision" to arrest Evett. The
court noted that the raid "lasted over an hour," giving Graham
"plenty of time" to investigate further before making the arrest.
The district court concluded that Graham lacked probable cause to
arrest Evett and deemed Graham's failure to further investigate the
facts related to Evett's connection with the controlled substance
in Griffin's car to be objectively unreasonable. Consequently, the
district court held that Graham was not entitled to the defense of
qualified immunity as a matter of law on Evett's claim of unlawful
arrest.
The district court then examined Evett's claims against
Mendiola in his capacity as Graham's supervisor. The district
court concluded that Evett had "little difficulty in establishing
the existence of the causal connection between Defendant Mendiola,
Sergeant Graham and the alleged unlawful arrest of Plaintiff
Evett." The district court found that Evett had adduced sufficient
evidence to support the following allegations with regard to
Mendiola: (1) Mendiola was the highest-ranking officer at the
scene of the raid, and the decisions made at the scene "were
ultimately approved by him"; (2) Graham told Mendiola about his
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decision to arrest Evett; and (3) Mendiola approved the decision to
arrest Evett, based on the information that he received from
Graham.
Having found that Evett established the causal connection from
his arrest by Graham to Mendiola, the district court reasoned that
"[t]he question then becomes did Defendant Mendiola, by action or
inaction, act with deliberate indifference regarding the violation
of Evett's constitutional rights." The district court answered
that question in the affirmative, finding that Evett had presented
evidence that Mendiola, "by acting as overall supervisor at the
scene, personally took part in the events leading up to the arrest
of Evett." The court further found that "the record is devoid of
evidence" that Mendiola questioned other officers at the scene who
had searched the truck or talked to Griffin. Rather, the district
court noted, Mendiola admitted in his deposition that he approved
Evett's arrest based only upon the information that he received
from Graham. The district court, therefore, concluded:
Qualified immunity is only available to Lieutenant
Mendiola if all reasonable officers in his position would
not have realized that the actions taken by Defendant
Graham violated Evett's constitutional rights. The
summary judgment evidence shows that other officers
possessed information that called into question the
actions of Sergeant Graham. The Court finds Lieutenant
Mendiola's actions, and inaction under the circumstances
presented, to be deliberately indifferent to the rights
of Evett and objectively unreasonable so as to deny him
the protection of qualified immunity.
Consequently, the district court denied summary judgment to
Graham and Mendiola on Evett's unlawful arrest claim, concluding
8
that they were not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity as
a matter of law. Graham and Mendiola filed a timely notice of
interlocutory appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Before we can consider the issues of whether Graham and
Mendiola are entitled to qualified immunity, we must determine
whether this Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.
The district court's order denied Graham's and Mendiola's motions
for summary judgment based on qualified immunity "as a matter of
law." A denial of a motion for summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal if the denial
is based upon a question of law. Kinney v. Weaver, 301 F.3d 253,
262 (5th Cir. 2002). This Court, however, does not have
jurisdiction to review the district court's determination that
sufficient evidence existed to create a question of fact with
respect to a material issue. Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch and
Center, Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1999). Nevertheless,
the district court's determination that it cannot grant summary
judgment because genuine issues of fact exist does not necessarily
deprive this Court of jurisdiction. Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d
282, 284 (5th Cir. 1998). This Court may review the district
court's conclusion that those disputed issues are material to the
issue of qualified immunity. Lemoine, 174 F.3d at 634. This Court
does not apply the standards of Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of
9
Civil Procedure in this review, "because we do not determine
whether the record establishes genuine factual issues." Kinney,
301 F.3d at 262. "[O]ur review of the district court's conclusions
as to the materiality of the identified fact issues, a legal
determination, is de novo." Lemoine, 174 F.3d at 634.
Evett alleges that the officers arrested him without a warrant
and without probable cause. Graham and Mendiola do not dispute the
district court's factual findings, but, rather, they challenged the
materiality of those findings to the district court's ruling that
they are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.
They argue that, based on the facts actually known to Graham, and
conveyed to Mendiola by Graham, both officers had probable cause to
arrest Evett, and both officers acted in an objectively reasonable
manner in deciding to arrest Evett. Graham and Mendiola also argue
that the district court should not have based its ruling on the
facts known to other officers present at the raid, but not actually
known to Graham and Mendiola at the time of the arrest. They take
issue with the district court's failure to consider that the scene
of the raid was chaotic, but do not dispute the district court's
finding that the raid lasted over an hour, or the court's
conclusion that Graham had time to investigate the facts further.
We find that a review of the existence of probable cause to
arrest Evett, and the objective reasonableness of the actions and
inactions of Graham and Mendiola in making that arrest, does not
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necessitate a determination of disputed factual issues in this
case. This Court, therefore, has jurisdiction to review the
district court's denial of summary judgment. Specifically, this
Court has jurisdiction to determine the materiality of the facts on
which the district court based its determination that Graham lacked
probable cause, given the facts actually known to Graham at the
moment of the arrest. This Court also has jurisdiction to review
the district court's finding that both Graham and Mendiola had a
duty to investigate the facts more fully prior to Evett's arrest,
as a matter of law. This Court, furthermore, may review the facts
that the district court determined would have been discovered upon
further investigation, and decide whether those facts are material
to the determination of probable cause and objective
reasonableness.
A. Whether Graham is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of
law.
Government officials acting within their discretionary
authority are immune from civil damages if their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. Mendenhall v. Riser,
213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000). This Court conducts a
bifurcated analysis to assess whether a defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity. Harper v. Harris County, Tex., 21 F.3d 597,
600 (5th Cir. 1994). First, the plaintiff must allege the
violation of a clearly established right. Here, Evett alleges a
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violation of his Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures resulting from a warrantless arrest without
probable cause, which implicates the clearly established
constitutional right. Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th
Cir. 1994). Second, the actions of the officer must be objectively
reasonable under the circumstances, such that a reasonably
competent officer would not have known his actions violated then-
existing clearly established law. Id. The question of whether an
official's conduct was objectively reasonable is a question of law,
to be decided by this Court. Id.
The district court based its holding that Graham lacked
probable cause to arrest Evett and that Graham's actions were not
objectively reasonable on the findings of material fact that Graham
did not further investigate Evett's connection with the items in
Griffin's truck. The district court determined that the
information that Vance possessed was material, on the grounds that
Evett was released from detention the next day, the point at which
Graham admits being certain that he was told about the makeup bag.
In addition, Evett was not charged with a crime, and Graham
admitted "with the benefit of hindsight" that he probably would not
have arrested Evett had he not been so busy at the scene of the
raid. Finally, the district court found it significant that the
raid lasted more than one hour, giving Graham "plenty of time" to
investigate further before making the arrest.
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"Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within
the arresting officer's personal knowledge, or of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to occasion a
person of reasonable prudence to believe an offense has been
committed." Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Probable cause is determined
on the basis of facts available to the officer at the time of the
arrest, and an officer may be shielded from liability even if he
"reasonably but mistakenly conclude[s] that probable cause is
present." Mangieri, 29 F.3d at 1017 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Furthermore, probable cause may be supported by
the collective knowledge of law enforcement personnel who
communicate with each other prior to the arrest. United States v.
Clark, 559 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1977). We must stress, however,
that while law enforcement personnel "may rely on the totality of
facts available to them in establishing probable cause, they also
may not disregard facts tending to dissipate probable cause."
Bigford, 834 F.2d at 1218.
Having reviewed the record in this case, we agree with the
district court that Graham lacked probable cause to arrest Evett.
Officers acting reasonably and prudently, based on all of the
available information at the time of the arrest, would not have
arrested Evett without further investigation. As already noted,
the district court's factual findings in this case are not disputed
13
by the parties. The court found that Graham had information from
an "unsubstantiated source," another officer participating in the
raid, who told him that Evett had ridden in Griffin's truck where
contraband was found. This information was all Graham had to form
a "feeling" that Evett knew about, and had something to do with,
the drug paraphernalia in Griffin's truck. Viewing the evidence in
a light most favorable to Evett, we find that such a "feeling"
based on the limited information that Graham had, is not enough to
create probable cause to make an arrest. Therefore, Evett's
constitutional rights were violated.
We must now consider whether Graham's actions were objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. We note that "the probable
cause standards for reasonableness differ from those for qualified
immunity." Whren v. Towe, 130 F.3d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1997). In
this part of the analysis, we are no longer concerned with the fact
that there was no probable cause for Evett's arrest. That mistake
alone cannot open Graham to liability. "Law enforcement officers
are only human, and these mistakes alone do not open officers to
personal liability." Id. at 1159. Rather, we must look to the
facts to determine whether a reasonably competent officer in
Graham's position could reasonably have thought his actions to be
consistent with the rights he is alleged to have violated. Id.
We agree with the district court that under the circumstances
of this case, Graham is not entitled to qualified immunity. First,
14
this is not a situation in which we must be concerned with second-
guessing an officer's decision that was required to be made in a
split second. As the district court noted, both parties agree that
the raid lasted over an hour.
Second, as already discussed, the only information that Graham
had concerning Evett was from an unidentified officer who told him
that Evett arrived at the scene with Griffin. Graham had nothing
further to support his "feeling" that Evett knew about or had
anything to do with the drug paraphernalia in the truck.
Nevertheless, based solely on that information, Graham arrested
Evett.
We cannot conclude that based on such minuscule information in
an unhurried setting such as in this case, that arresting Evett was
objectively reasonable. As the district court stressed, a
reasonable officer would have investigated further. Graham easily
could have sought out Officer Vance who had questioned Griffin and
searched her truck. Had Graham done so, he would have learned that
Griffin told Vance that Evett had not ridden in her truck, that
Vance believed Griffin was telling the truth about Evett not having
been in the truck, and that the hypodermic needle was in a closed
opaque plastic makeup bag belonging to Griffin. Therefore, we
affirm the district court and hold that Graham is not entitled to
qualified immunity as a matter of law.
B. Whether Mendiola is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter
15
of law.
The issue of whether a supervisor may be held liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 requires a separate analysis than that applied above.
Section 1983 does not create vicarious or respondeat superior
liability. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir.
1987). Rather, a plaintiff must show either the supervisor
personally was involved in the constitutional violation or that
there is a "sufficient causal connection" between the supervisor's
conduct and the constitutional violation. Thompkins, 828 F.2d at
304; see also Southard v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d
539, 550 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he misconduct of the subordinate must
be affirmatively linked to the action or inaction of the
supervisor."). A supervisory official is held to a standard of
"deliberate indifference," which requires proof that the supervisor
"disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action."
Southard, 114 F.3d at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted). A
supervisor will not be held liable for unintentional oversights.
Id.
With regard to Evett's claim against Mendiola in his capacity
as supervisor, the district court based its denial of summary
judgment on the findings of material facts that Mendiola was the
highest-ranking officer at the raid; that Graham told Mendiola he
16
was going to arrest Evett; and that Mendiola approved the arrest,
based on the information that he received from Graham. The
district court also found that Mendiola personally took part in the
events that led to the arrest of Evett by acting as overall
supervisor. As a result, the district court concluded that
Mendiola had acted with deliberate indifference concerning Evett's
constitutional rights because Mendiola did not question other
officers who were involved in searching Griffin's truck or
questioning her, and that those officers "possessed information
that called into question the actions of Sergeant Graham."
We cannot agree with the district court's conclusion that
Mendiola is not entitled to qualified immunity. The district court
found that "the evidence does not show that Defendant Mendiola
personally participated in the execution of the search warrant."
The district court also found that "Graham testified that he, and
not Lieutenant Mendiola, remained the officer in charge of the raid
and made the decision to arrest Evett." The court further found
that although Mendiola was appraised of Graham's decision to arrest
Evett, Graham's conversation with Mendiola about this decision "was
not detailed and, in fact, very brief."
We believe that, based on the facts of this case, requiring
Mendiola, as the supervising officer at the scene of the raid, to
personally seek out all available information from all
participating law enforcement officers before approving an arrest
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would not have been practicable. As a result, we find that
Mendiola did not act with deliberate indifference by ultimately
giving his approval of Evett's arrest. As noted above, Mendiola
cannot be held liable for unintentional oversights; particularly
when the evidence indicates Mendiola could not have consciously
believed his actions, based on the information made available to
him, would lead to a violation of Evett's constitutional rights.
We, therefore, reverse the district court and hold that Mendiola is
entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the district court as to its
ruling that Graham is not entitled to qualified immunity as a
matter of law. We, however, REVERSE the district court as to its
ruling that Mendiola was not entitled to qualified immunity as a
matter of law. Mendiola, as a supervisor, did not act with
deliberate indifference to Evett's constitutionally protected
rights.
AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judge Stewart joins in the judgment only.
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