FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 13 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EUGENIO COLON, No. 13-35875
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-05640-JLR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 15, 2015
Seattle, Washington
Before: KOZINSKI, W. FLETCHER and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Eugenio Colon appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
administrative law judge’s (ALJ) denial of his application for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social
Security Act. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
1. The ALJ provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons” supported by
substantial evidence for concluding Colon was not credible. See Molina v. Astrue,
674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ gave seven independent rationales
for her finding, all but one of which are valid. The six valid rationales constituted
specific, clear and convincing reasons to discount Colon’s credibility. See
Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).
2. The ALJ did not improperly reject the opinions of five examining sources
and one non-examining source. The ALJ provided “specific and legitimate reasons
that are supported by substantial evidence in the record” for discounting the
contradicted medical opinions of each examining source. See Lester v. Chater, 81
F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996). The opinion of the non-examining source was
ambiguous, and the ALJ properly resolved the ambiguity by citing “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Magallanes v.
Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)). The ALJ also considered Colon’s
GAF scores and, consistent with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c) and SSR
06-03p, discounted them because they provided little information on occupational
functioning.
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3. The ALJ did not err by failing to consider in her residual functional
capacity assessment medical evidence she determined to be noncredible because
she “was not required to incorporate evidence from . . . opinions . . . which were
permissibly discounted.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190,
1197 (9th Cir. 2004).
AFFIRMED.
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