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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIE MAURICE HARRIS
Appellant No. 525 WDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 25, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003121-1997
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2015
Appellant Willie Maurice Harris appeals from the order entered in the
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his petition for
relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
This Court previously set forth the underlying facts and procedural
history of this appeal as follows:
On August 9, 1996, the victim, Roderick McMahon,
(hereinafter referred to as “McMahon”), who was also
known by his street name of Rebel, was drinking beer with
his friend, Shawn Featherstone, (hereinafter referred to as
“Featherstone”), in an area near 7320 Fleury Way.
McMahon, Featherstone, and several other individuals,
continued to drink beer into the early morning hours of
August 10, 1996. Shortly after midnight on August 10,
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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1996, Susie Venson, (hereinafter referred to as “Venson”),
who lived at 7320 Fleury Way, came out of her house and
engaged McMahon in a discussion. Initially, the discussion
appeared to be friendly; however, it ultimately led to an
argument, which caused Venson to go back into her house
where she had a conversation with Appellant. As a result of
that conversation, Appellant then left Venson’s residence
and went out into the street calling for McMahon to identify
himself. When McMahon approached Appellant, an
argument ensued between them and Appellant produced a
gun and pointed it at McMahon. During their discussion, a
second gun was produced thereby preventing Appellant
from carrying out the threats that he was making.
Appellant then turned and left and returned to Venson’s
apartment. It is at this point that the testimony presented
by the Commonwealth and the defense differs.
The Commonwealth maintained at trial that once Appellant
returned to Venson’s residence, he went out the back door
of her residence and went into an alleyway, hiding himself
from view of McMahon and his friends and then fired
several shots at McMahon, one of which struck McMahon in
the abdomen and ultimately led to his death. Appellant
offered testimony that he expressed fear for his safety
when he returned to Venson’s apartment, that he called a
jitney, and that he was going to leave the area. Appellant
further testified that he went out the back door and he was
going to run across the backyard when he was fired upon
and he returned that fire in self-defense when he was
standing at the back of the alley, which abutted Venson’s
building. The physical facts found at the scene of the
accident including the casings from Appellant’s gun
contradicted Appellant’s testimony since all of the casings
were found in the front of the alley near Fleury Way and
not at the rear of Venson’s building where Appellant said
he was fired upon.
Appellant was charged generally with the crime of criminal
homicide and a jury trial was held on August 4, 1997
through August 7, 1997, when the jury convicted Appellant
for the crime of first-degree murder. On September 4,
1997, Appellant was sentenced to the mandatory sentence
of life without the possibility of parole. Appellant filed
timely post-sentence motions in which he alleged that his
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trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call two
witnesses. A hearing was held on those motions and after
that hearing, Appellant’s post-sentence motions were
denied. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to the
Superior Court and after the trial court filed its opinion,
Appellant’s appeal was dismissed for failure of his appellate
counsel to file a brief. In dismissing Appellant’s appeal,
the Superior Court acknowledged that it was without
prejudice with respect to Appellant’s rights to raise the
claims asserted in that appeal in any subsequent post-
conviction relief petition.
On October 1, 2001, Appellant filed a petition for post-
conviction relief seeking the reinstatement of his appellate
rights. Following the answer submitted by the
Commonwealth and an argument on that motion,
Appellant’s direct appeal rights were reinstated on March
26, 2002. Appellant filed a timely appeal and was directed
to file his concise statement of matters complained of on
appeal. Appellant requested several continuances to file
that statement and on March 18, 2003, he filed a concise
statement of matters complained of on appeal to which he
attached an alleged affidavit from Featherstone, the
Commonwealth’s [eyewitness] at the time of Appellant’s
trial, in which Featherstone allegedly recanted his
testimony.
On August 6, 2004, the Superior Court affirmed Appellant’s
judgment of sentence and after determining that while
post-conviction proceedings were timely filed and
dismissed without prejudice, the claims of the
ineffectiveness of Appellant’s counsel could be raised in a
subsequent petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant
filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme
Court, which petition was granted on February 11, 2005,
however on February 20, 2007, that appeal was dismissed
as being improvidently granted.
On October 1, 2007, Appellant filed a pro se petition for
post-conviction relief, claiming that he was entitled to have
his judgment of sentence vacated and be granted a new
trial. Thereafter, counsel was appointed by order dated
October 17, 2007 and an amended petition was filed on
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February 1, 2010. Following a hearing on the petition for
post-conviction relief, Appellant’s petition was denied….
Commonwealth v. Harris, No. 1404 WDA 2011, unpublished
memorandum at 1-3 (Pa.Super. filed June 20, 2012) (quoting the PCRA
court opinion, filed December 12, 2011, at 2-5).
This Court affirmed the order denying Appellant’s petition for PCRA
relief on June 20, 2012. Our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for
allowance of appeal on March 21, 2013.
On May 28, 2013, Appellant filed the present PCRA petition, which he
subsequently amended on September 26, 2013.2 On July 2, 2014, the PCRA
court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s
petition without a hearing. On August 5, 2014, Appellant filed an answer to
the PCRA court’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice. On February 25, 2015, the PCRA
court dismissed Appellant’s petition. Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal3 and both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925.4
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2
On February 14, 2014, Appellant filed a notice of appeal, which the PCRA
court quashed as a nullity on February 13, 2015, because the PCRA court
had not yet issued a final order.
3
Although Appellant’s notice of appeal was not filed with the court until
March 31, 2015, we deem Appellant’s notice of appeal timely because he
mailed it from prison on March 23, 2015. See Commonwealth v.
Patterson, 931 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa.Super.2007) (“Pursuant to the prisoner
mailbox rule, we deem a document filed on the day it is placed in the hands
of prison authorities for mailing.”).
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant raises the following issue for our review.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GAVE A DEFECTIVE ORDER,
BY FAILING TO SPECIFY HOW APPELLANT’S PETITION WAS
UNTIMELY, THEREBY CONSTITUTING A VIOLATION OF
APPELLANT’S U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL AND PA
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND
COMMITTING FRAUD UPON THE COURT?
Appellant’s Brief at iii.
Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must determine
whether his PRCA petition was timely. The timeliness of a PCRA petition
implicates the jurisdiction of both this Court and the PCRA court.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 52 (Pa.Super.2011), appeal
denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa.2012). “Pennsylvania law makes clear that no
court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.” Id. To “accord
finality to the collateral review process[,]” the PCRA “confers no authority
upon [appellate courts] to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA
timebar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa.2011). With
respect to jurisdiction under the PCRA, this Court has further explained:
The most recent amendments to the PCRA...provide a
PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition,
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(Footnote Continued)
4
On April 13, 2015, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) by May 7,
2015. Although Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement was not filed with
the court until May 12, 2015, both the statement and the verification are
dated May 4, 2015. Thus, we decline to find Appellant’s issue waived for
failure to timely file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The PCRA court issued a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on June 11, 2015.
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shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying
judgment becomes final. A judgment is deemed final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of
time for seeking the review.
Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super.2010)
(citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 20 A.3d 1210 (Pa.2011);
see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545. This Court may review a PCRA petition filed
more than one year after the judgment of sentence becomes final only if the
claim falls within one of the following three statutory exceptions, which the
petitioner must plead and prove:
(i) the failure to raise the claim was the result of
interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Further, if a petition pleads one of these
exceptions, the petition will not be considered unless it is “filed within 60
days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(2).
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Additionally, a heightened standard applies to a second or subsequent
PCRA petition to avoid “serial requests for post-conviction relief.”
Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1043 (Pa.2011). A second or
subsequent PCRA petition will not be entertained unless “the petitioner
makes a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice may have
occurred.” Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1215
(Pa.Super.2014) (en banc), appeal granted, 105 A.3d 658 (Pa.2014).
“Appellant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief only if he
demonstrates either that the proceedings which resulted in his conviction
were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice occurred which no civilized
society could tolerate, or that he was innocent of the crimes for which he
was charged.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on May 21, 2007,
when his time for seeking review with the United States Supreme Court
expired. See Monaco, supra. Therefore, he had until May 21, 2008 to
timely file a PCRA petition. Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition,
his second,5 on May 28, 2013. Thus, his PCRA petition is facially untimely,
and we must determine whether Appellant has pled and proved any of the
exceptions to the PCRA time limitation. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
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5
The PCRA court states this is Appellant’s fourth petition for relief, however,
this is the second petition Appellant filed for relief after his judgment of
sentence became final.
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Appellant raises seventeen (17) claims in his pro se PCRA petition. He
claims he is entitled to relief for prosecutorial misconduct, improper jury
instructions, and ineffective assistance of counsel. He offers no reason why
he could not have raised these claims in his last PCRA petition or at his
evidentiary hearing on the petition, nor does he explain how he has raised
them within sixty (60) days of the date the claims could have been
presented.
Appellant also claims he is entitled to relief pursuant to Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (U.S.2012), in which the Supreme Court held that
the mandatory imposition of life in prison without the possibility of parole for
juveniles was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Even if the Supreme Court rules in Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 135 S.Ct. 1546, ___ U.S. ___ (2015) that this constitutional
right applies retroactively, Appellant would not be eligible for such relief.
Although Appellant claims he was seventeen at the time of the murder, the
record reflects that he was born on October 3, 1977, and he committed the
murder on August 10, 1996. Thus, Appellant was almost nineteen years old
when he murdered his victim, and this rule would not apply to him.
Appellant’s petition is time-barred, and the PCRA court properly denied
it. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/16/2015
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