FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 16 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AHMAD SHAPOUR ARIAN, an No. 13-56529
individual; DEENA ARIAN, an
individual, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-05261-RGK-
PLA
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF LOS ANGELES; CHARLES
BECK, as an individual and in his official
capacity as Chief of Police; JOSE
ANZORA, Serial No. 40848; DANIEL
BUNCH, Officer, Serial No. 37019;
DEXTER BARRAS, Officer, Serial No.
38028; GARY HANSEN, Officer, Serial
No. 39218; ROBERT CHAVIRA, Officer,
Serial No. 31281; ROBERT LUNA, Serial
No. 32963; ROY GUTHRIE, Sergeant,
Serial No. 26211; RYAN SHAFFER,
Officer, Serial No. 38771,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Argued and Submitted November 6, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: FARRIS, TROTT, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Ahmad Shapour Arian and Deena Arian appeal the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the City of Los Angeles, Chief of Police Charlie
Beck, and eight police officers (collectively “Defendants”) in a suit arising from
the shooting death of their son, Abdul Arian (“Arian”), on April 11, 2012. The
facts are known to the parties, and we repeat them here only as necessary to
explain our decision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and for the
reasons outlined below, we affirm.
First, the district court properly granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim. The officers’ actions were
objectively reasonable “in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). As is evidenced from the footage
captured by television news helicopters, Arian repeatedly pointed an object that
resembled a weapon towards police officers, and the officers had “probable cause
to believe” that Arian “pose[d] a significant threat of death or serious physical
injury” to the officers or to the civilians at the scene. Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 3 (1985); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–81 (2007). Even
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assuming, arguendo, that Defendants acted unreasonably under the Fourth
Amendment, they would nevertheless be entitled to qualified immunity. See
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. __, __ (2015) (per curiam) (slip. op., at 5–6, 12); see
also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam).
Next, because we do not believe Defendants’ use of force violated Arian’s
constitutional rights, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim fails as a matter of law. See City of
Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
Finally, the district court properly granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claims under California tort law. California Penal Code
§ 196 forecloses civil liability for justifiable homicide. See Martinez v. Cnty. of
Los Angeles, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 780 (Ct. App. 1996). As the district court
correctly recognized, the test to determine whether a homicide is “justifiable”
under California law parallels the reasonableness inquiry used to analyze federal
constitutional claims. See Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 207 P.3d 506, 514–16
(Cal. 2009). Because Defendants’ use of force was objectively reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, summary judgment was appropriate as to Plaintiffs’ state
tort claims.
AFFIRMED.
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