This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1364
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Derik Chester Rekdal,
Appellant.
Filed November 16, 2015
Reversed and remanded
Connolly, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-11-1992
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Jessica Ann Bierwerth, Stacy Ann
St. George, Assistant County Attorneys, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer L. Lauermann,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
In this sentencing appeal, appellant challenges the district court’s imposition of
lifetime conditional release periods for two criminal sexual conduct convictions that
occurred virtually simultaneously in time when the record does not reflect that appellant
had any other previous or prior convictions for criminal sexual conduct. We reverse and
remand.
FACTS
In the fall of 2010 through the early months of 2011, appellant Derik Chester
Rekdal, 19 at the time, had sexual intercourse with two girls, ages 14 and 15. On August
15, 2011 appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of criminal sexual conduct in the third
degree as part of a plea agreement. At the plea hearing, the district court informed
appellant that once sentenced, he would be subject to a ten-year conditional release
period if he violated probation and was sent to prison.
On October 18, 2011, at the sentencing hearing, a different district court judge
ruled that if the sentences were to be executed, then appellant would be sentenced to
lifetime conditional release. At the sentencing hearing, the district court judge accepted
the guilty plea stating, “[W]ith respect to your pleas of guilty to, I believe it was, Count I
and II of the complaint, both Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Third Degree, I’m going to
accept your pleas of guilty on those offenses.” The district court stayed the imposition of
the sentence on both counts and placed appellant on probation for ten years.
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In 2012 and 2013, appellant admitted to several violations of his conditions of
probation. During this time, the district court continued appellant on probation. In May
of 2014, appellant admitted to a third probation violation. At the third probation violation
hearing, a third district court judge revoked appellant’s stay of imposition and imposed
executed prison sentences of 36 months on Count I and 48 months on Count II to run
concurrently. Additionally, the district court pronounced that appellant was subject to
lifetime conditional release on both counts.
DECISION
Consistent with the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in State v. Nodes, 863
N.W.2d 77, 82 (Minn. 2015), a defendant who, in a single hearing, is convicted of two
sex offenses, one immediately after the other, each arising out of separate behavioral
incidents, has a “prior sex offense conviction” under Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 1(g)
(2014), and is subject to lifetime conditional release. Appellant argues that the district
court simultaneously convicted appellant of two criminal sexual conduct offenses rather
than one conviction occurring immediately after the other. As a result, appellant argues
he was never convicted of any prior or previous sexual offense and can only be sentenced
to the ten-year conditional release period. The state agrees.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is subject to de novo review.
Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Minn. 2013). First, the court must
determine whether the statute is ambiguous. State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn.
2014). A statute is ambiguous “when the statutory language is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation.” State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012). If a
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statute is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, the court interprets the statute
according to its plain meaning. State v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Minn. 2014).
When a court commits an offender to the custody of the commissioner of
corrections for a violation of criminal sexual assault in the third degree, “the court shall
provide that, after the offender has been released from prison, the commissioner shall
place the offender on conditional release for ten years.” Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6
(2014). Alternatively, when the court commits an offender to the custody of the
commissioner of corrections for a violation of criminal sexual assault in the third degree
“and the offender has a previous or prior sex offense conviction, the court shall provide
that, after the offender has been released from prison, the commissioner shall place the
offender on conditional release for the remainder of the offender’s life.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.3455, subd. 7(b) (2014).
By statutory definition, an offender has a
‘prior sex offense conviction’ if the offender was convicted of
committing a sex offense before the offender has been
convicted of the present offense, regardless of whether the
offender was convicted for the first offense before the
commission of the present offense, and the convictions
involved separate behavioral incidents.
Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 1(g) (2014). By contrast, the definition of the phrase
“previous sex offense conviction” requires that the offender be “convicted and sentenced
for a sex offense before the commission of the present offense.” Minn. Stat. § 609.3455,
subd. 1(f) (2014).
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“Conviction” is defined as “any of the following accepted and recorded by the
court: (1) a plea of guilty; or (2) a verdict of guilty by a jury or a finding of guilty by the
court.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5 (2014). In State v. Nodes, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that Minn. Stat. § 609.02 “clearly and unambiguously provides that a
‘conviction’ occurs when the district court accepts the guilty plea and the acceptance is
on the record.” 863 N.W.2d at 81. “As long as one conviction is entered before the
second, it is a ‘prior conviction’ under the plain language of [Minn. Stat. § 609.3455].”
Id. at 82.
This appeal involves a similar issue to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in
State v. Nodes and thus, discussion of Nodes is warranted. Similar to the current case,
Nodes involved a defendant, who had never before been sentenced for a sex offense, and
who pleaded guilty to two sex offenses at the same hearing. On the record at the
sentencing hearing in Nodes the trial judge stated,
I will now formally accept the pleas, and on count one
adjudicate him guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree, a felony, in violation of Minnesota Statute 609.342,
[s]ubd. 1(a) and [s]ubd. 2(a), on or about February 26, 2013,
and also on count three, criminal sexual conduct in the second
degree, a felony, in violation of Minnesota Statute 609.343,
[s]ubd. 1(a) and [s]ubd. 2(a) on or about March 19, 2013.
Id. at 79. The Nodes court held, “[a] defendant who, in a single hearing, is convicted of
two sex offenses, one immediately after the other, each arising out of separate behavioral
incidents, has a ‘prior sex offense conviction’ under Minn. Stat. § 609.3455.” Id. at 77.
The court in Nodes ruled that at the time the judge accepted the guilty plea of count one,
the defendant was “convicted” and thus, even though the passage of time between the
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conviction of count one and count two was slight, the defendant had a prior conviction
under Minn. Stat. § 609.3455 and was sentenced to lifetime conditional release. Id. at 81.
By contrast, in the current case, at the original sentencing hearing, the district
court judge merely stated, “with respect to your pleas of guilty to, I believe it was, Count
I and II of the complaint, both Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Third Degree, I’m going
to accept your pleas of guilty on those offenses.” The acceptance of the guilty pleas
occurred simultaneously. Under Nodes, a conviction at the same hearing will only be
treated as a prior conviction if the defendant is “convicted of two sex offenses, one
immediately after the other, each arising out of separate behavior incidents.” Id. at 77
(emphasis added). The district court accepted the pleas simultaneously. As a result,
appellant was not convicted of one count before he was convicted of the other. By
definition, appellant had no previous or prior convictions at the time he was sentenced.
Because the district court erred in imposing lifetime conditional release on
appellant, we reverse and remand the case to the district court for imposition of a ten-year
conditional release period on each count.
Reversed and remanded.
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