J-S57002-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: E.D., FATHER
No. 1053 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered March 12, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001912-2014
FID-51-FN-002124-2010
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.S.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: E.D., FATHER
No. 1054 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Decree March 12, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000152-2013
CP-51-DP-0000855-2010
FID-51-FN-002124-2010
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2015
J-S57002-15
Appellant, E.D. (Father), appeals from the March 12, 2015 order
adjudicating dependent his daughter, L.C.1; and the March 12, 2015 decree
involuntarily terminating his parental rights, and changing the permanency
goal to adoption, with regard to his son, S.T.S.D.2 After careful review, we
affirm.
The certified record reveals the following factual and procedural
history. L.C. and S.T.S.D. are the biological children of Father and V.F.C.
(Mother). On October 23, 2010, Mother left S.T.S.D., along with his half-
sisters, N.C., age three, and S.C., age one, in the care of Father while she
was at work.3 N.T., 6/20/11, at 39, 74, 80. S.C. died that day while in
Father’s care. The medical examiner ruled her death a homicide as a result
of multiple severe blunt impact soft tissue injuries that caused fat emboli to
develop in her lungs. Id. at 38, 46-48, 55. The medical examiner explained
that, upon performing the autopsy, he found old and new injuries on S.C.’s
body,4 and that the fat emboli would have developed “within a day or two …
from the onset of the injury.”5 Id. at 44-45, 62.
____________________________________________
1
L.C. was born in January 2014.
2
S.T.S.D. was born in August 2010.
3
Neither N.C. nor S.C. was a biological child of Father.
4
Besides the severe soft tissue injuries found on a significant portion of
S.C.’s body, the medical examiner also found multiple fractured ribs, some
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On the date of S.C.’s death, S.T.S.D. was two months old. He was
placed, along with his half-sister, N.C., with his maternal grandfather, where
he remained at the time of the subject proceedings. Trial Court Opinion
(S.T.S.D.), 5/18/15, at 1.6 On October 28, 2010, the trial court issued a
shelter care order, which also included a provision ordering Father not to
have any contact with S.T.S.D. On November 8, 2010, the trial court
adjudicated S.T.S.D. dependent. Id. at 2.
Following a permanency review hearing in S.T.S.D.’s dependency
matter on June 20, 2011, the trial court issued an aggravated circumstances
order finding, based on the injuries and death of S.C., that aggravated
circumstances and child abuse existed as to Father and Mother. Id.
Further, the trial court ordered “that no reasonable efforts were to be made
to … reunify S.[T.S.]D. with [ ] [F]ather.” Id.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
of which occurred recently, and others that he opined occurred a maximum
of five to seven weeks before the date of death. N.T., 6/20/11, at 44-45.
5
Father pleaded “no contest” to the criminal charge of endangering the
welfare of a child. Father served a term of incarceration and probation,
although the record does not reveal the term length. N.T., 3/12/15, at 22.
Based on a stay-away order issued by the criminal court, described below,
we infer that Father was released from prison in early 2012.
6
Instantly, the trial court has authored two separate opinions, each dated
May 18, 2015. We have distinguished the opinions by the child it
references. Further, the trial court opinions do not contain pagination.
Therefore, we have supplied corresponding page numbers for each page.
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Nevertheless, on June 20, 2011, the trial court also issued a
permanency review order directing monthly visits between Father and
S.T.S.D., then ten months old, at the prison where Father was incarcerated.
Permanency Review Order, 6/20/11. A total of three visits occurred, during
which S.T.S.D. was accompanied by a social worker from the foster care
agency, John Mack, who testified that the visits were “traumatic for
[S.T.S.D.].” N.T., 3/12/15, at 28. There were no additional prison visits
ordered due to Mr. Mack’s recommendation. Id. at 28-30.
Thereafter, at some time before April 19, 2012, a criminal stay-away
order was issued prohibiting Father from contact with the family. By a
permanency review order dated April 19, 2012, the trial court denied Father
visits with S.T.S.D. due to the criminal stay-away order. See Permanency
Review Order, 4/19/12. Further, on August 8, 2013, the trial court issued
an order, effective for one year, in the dependency matters of S.T.S.D. and
another child of Father and Mother, S., prohibiting Father from having any
contact. See Order, 8/8/13. By permanency review order dated January 7,
2015, the trial court included a directive for Father to stay away from
S.T.S.D. See Order, 1/7/15.
L.C. was born more than three years after S.C.’s death, in January
2014. In August 2014, L.C. was removed from Mother’s care due to Father
being found in her home in violation of the stay-away order. N.T., 3/12/15,
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at 47-51. L.C. resides in a foster home with two of Mother’s other children,
S. and D. Id. at 46, 67.
On March 13, 2013, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services,
Children and Youth Division (DHS), filed a petition for the involuntary
termination of Father’s parental rights and a petition for a goal change to
adoption with respect to S.T.S.D. On August 13, 2014, DHS filed a petition
for dependency with respect to L.C.
A combined hearing on all of the petitions occurred on March 12, 2015.
With respect to the involuntary termination and goal change petitions, the
following witnesses testified: Courtney Ransome, DHS caseworker; Father,
who by this time had completed his criminal sentence related to the death of
S.C.; John Mack, social worker at Friendship House; and J.C., the maternal
grandfather of S.T.S.D. In addition, the trial court admitted into evidence
the notes of testimony from the hearing on June 20, 2011, in S.T.S.D.’s
dependency matter, during which the following witnesses testified: Gary
Collins, M.D., an assistant medical examiner with the Philadelphia Medical
Examiner’s Office; Jade Powell, the DHS caseworker; Mother; and Father.
With respect to the dependency petition, the DHS caseworker, Courtney
Ransome, testified.
On March 12, 2015, the trial court involuntarily terminated Father’s
parental rights to S.T.S.D. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
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(8), and (b), and changed the child’s goal to adoption.7 On the same date,
the trial court adjudicated L.C. dependent.8 On April 8, 2014, Father filed
timely notices of appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i),
which this Court consolidated sua sponte. See generally Pa.R.A.P. 513.
On May 18, 2015, the trial court filed opinions relating to the appeals
pursuant to Rule 1925(a).
On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review.
1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in terminating Father’s
parental rights to S.[T.S.]D. and changing his goal to
adoption where the court inappropriately admitted
into evidence the medical examiner’s report[?]
2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in terminating Father’s
parental rights to S.[T.S.]D. and changing his goal to
adoption where [DHS] did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Father had not relieved the
circumstances which brought the child into care[?]
3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in changing S.[T.S.]D.’s
goal to adoption where there is not clear and
convincing evidence that Father has evidenced a
settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the
child or had refused or failed to perform parental
duties as Father was prevented from contact with
S.[T.S.]D. by Court Order[?]
4. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in terminating Father’s
parental rights to S.[T.S.]D. as there was insufficient
____________________________________________
7
Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to S.T.S.D. on
September 1, 2014.
8
Mother did not contest the dependency petition filed with respect to L.C.
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evidence to break the bond the child shared with
Father where there was not clear and convincing
evidence that the child would not be harmed by the
termination[?]
5. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law and
abuse its discretion when it terminated Father’s
parental rights to S.[T.S.]D. and changed the child’s
goal to adoption[?]
6. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in adjudicating L.C.
dependent where the court only used prognostic
evidence of prior court findings in making the
determination and [DHS] failed to present evidence
that Father was unable to safely care for his child at
the time of the hearing?
7. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in adjudicating L.C.
dependent where the [c]ourt inappropriately
considered the involuntary termination of Father’s
parental rights to another child, when that
termination was subject to appeal?
8. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in adjudicating L.C.
dependent where the testimony did not support the
facts alleged in the [d]ependency [p]etition?
9. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law and
abuse its discretion when it adjudicated L.C.
dependent?
Father’s Brief at 6.9
____________________________________________
9
In his brief, Father has failed to divide the argument section “into as many
parts as there are questions to be argued” in contravention of Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a). In addition, Father has failed to include any discussion and
analysis of pertinent authority related to his issues on the goal change order.
Therefore, Father has waived his claims regarding that order. See Giant
Food Stores, LLC v. THF Silver Spring Dev., L.P., 959 A.2d 438, 444 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (holding “[t]he Rules of Appellate Procedure state
unequivocally that each question an appellant raises is to be supported by
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We begin with our review of the involuntary termination decree, to
which we apply the following legal principles.
The standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record. If the
factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error
of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s
decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result.
We have previously emphasized our deference to
trial courts that often have first-hand observations of
the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent.
The party seeking termination must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
discussion and analysis of pertinent authority. Failure to do so constitutes
waiver of the claim[]”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The
burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights
are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Instantly, we conclude that the trial court properly terminated Father’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as
follows.10
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard
to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on
any of the following grounds:
…
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
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10
This Court need only agree with any one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a), along with Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of
parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). Therefore, in light of our disposition as to Section 2511(a)(2), we
need not consider Father’s arguments with respect to Section 2511(a)(1),
(5) and (8).
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neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
…
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first initiated
subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the
petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b). “The grounds for termination [of parental
rights under Section 2511(a)(2),] due to parental incapacity that cannot be
remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (internal
citations omitted).
With respect to Section 2511(b), the requisite analysis is as follows.
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination
of parental rights would best serve the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d
1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs
and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
that the trial court must also discern the nature and
status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
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attention to the effect on the child of permanently
severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where
there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and
child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.
2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect
analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
the particular case. Id. at 763.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
On appeal, the crux of Father’s argument with respect to Section
2511(a)(2) is that he was limited in his ability to provide parental care for
S.T.S.D. because of the stay-away orders and because DHS did not provide
reunification services. Specifically, Father argues the following.
[He] did everything in his power … to be reunified
with his child without any assistance from or
cooperation with [DHS]. Father was limited in what
he could do as there was a stay-away order during
his incarceration and parole, as well as by DHS not
offering Father any assistance or cooperation in his
attempts to reunify with S.[T.S.]D. Father
completed parenting classes and anger management
classes despite never being offered any services by
DHS. Father has also actively engaged in therapy
both while incarcerated and after his release. Father
also tried to deliver gifts and clothing to S.[T.S.]D.
through his mother, however they were sometimes
rejected by the family caring for S.[T.S.]D.
Father’s Brief at 12.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court reasoned that Father’s
conduct warranted termination under Section 2511(a)(2) because the
stay-away order was issued due to Father’s own conduct, making him unable
to provide essential parental care, control, or subsistence to S.T.S.D. See
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Trial Court Opinion (S.T.S.D.), 5/18/15, at 4. The stay-away order “was
issued against [F]ather due to his role in the death of [S.C.]” Id. at 3.
Further, the trial court “found by clear and convincing evidence, child abuse
against [F]ather, and ordered no reasonable efforts be made to preserve the
family.” Id. at 4. The trial court relied on our decision in In re A.D., 93
A.3d 888 (Pa. Super. 2014), where we affirmed the order involuntarily
terminating the father’s parental rights to his three children pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(2). In A.D., as in this case, there was a no-contact order
preventing the father from communicating with the children and relieving
the agency from providing reunification services. This Court held that “[t]he
instant scenario, where a no-contact order renders Father incapable of
performing his parental duties, is analogous to the situation encountered by
parents subject to long-term imprisonment.” A.D., supra at 896.
We explained that our Supreme Court, in In re Adoption of S.P., 47
A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012), held as follows.
[I]ncarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a
determinative factor, in a court’s conclusion that
grounds for termination exist under § 2511(a)(2)
where the repeated and continued incapacity of a
parent due to incarceration has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence and that the causes of the incapacity
cannot or will not be remedied.
A.D., supra at 897, citing id. at 828. In A.D., we then made the following
conclusion.
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Just as our Supreme Court discussed a parent’s
incapacity relative to long-term incarceration in
[S.P.], parental incapacity caused by a no-contact
order is not only relevant to a court’s conclusion that
grounds for termination exist under § 2511(a)(2),
but where, as here, the order is required to protect
the children from further sexual abuse at the hands
of the excluded parent, we find that it is dispositive.
[The f]ather’s repeated behaviors and his failure to
be present for his children due to the no-contact
order has caused the children to be without essential
parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for
their physical and mental well-being.
Notwithstanding Father’s moderate compliance with
the few requirements [the agency] established for
him, the conditions and causes of his parenting
incapacity cannot be remedied as long as the no-
contact order remains in place. We agree with the
court’s refusal to put on hold the need for consistent
parental care and stability of [the children] simply
because [the f]ather must abide by the no-contact
order that was entered for their safety. Thus, we
reject [the f]ather’s premise that the trial court erred
in terminating his parental rights based upon his
inability to remedy his parental incapacity.
Id.
Likewise, in the instant matter, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court in finding parental incapacity on the part of Father due to the
stay-away orders, which were required to protect S.T.S.D. from the same or
similar fate of his half-sister, S.C. The record demonstrates that stay-away
orders have been in effect continually since Father’s release from prison.
Father’s inability to be present for S.T.S.D. has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his
physical and mental well-being. Further, the conditions and causes of
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Father’s parenting incapacity cannot be remedied as long as the stay-away
order remains in place.
To the extent Father argues he was impeded in his ability to provide
essential parental care, control, or subsistence to S.T.S.D. because DHS did
not provide him with reunification services, we will not disturb the
termination decree on this basis. See Father’s Brief at 12. Our Supreme
Court, in In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662 (Pa. 2014), held that neither Section
2511(a)(2) nor 2511(b) “requires a court to consider the reasonable efforts
provided to a parent prior to termination of parental rights.” Id. at 672. As
such, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). See
A.L.D., supra.
With respect to Section 2511(b), the trial court found that S.T.S.D.
“would not suffer any irreparable emotional harm if [F]ather’s parental rights
were terminated.” Trial Court Opinion (S.T.S.D.), 5/18/15, at 5. The trial
court explained as follows.
The DHS social worker testified that she had never
seen any evidence of a bond between the child and
[F]ather. [F]ather was never able to bond with the
child because, due to his own conduct, a stay away
order was issued against him on behalf of the child
when the child was two and one-half months old.
Furthermore, the agency social worker testified that
when the child did visit the [F]ather at the prison [ ]
the child was “traumatized.” Moreover, the social
worker “basically had to force” S.[T.S.]D. to go to
[F]ather. Lastly, the child has not asked to see his
father again.
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Additionally, the child looks to the maternal
grandfather as the person who keeps him safe. …
The agency and the DHS social worker[] testified
that the child and the maternal grandfather share a
primary parental bond.
Id. (citations to record omitted).
The testimony of the DHS caseworker, Ms. Ransome, and the
Friendship House foster agency social worker, Mr. Mack, support the trial
court’s findings. Indeed, there is no evidence of a bond of any kind between
S.T.S.D. and Father. The record overwhelmingly demonstrates that
S.T.S.D.’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare will be
served by terminating Father’s parental rights. Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(b). See J.M., supra.
We next turn to Father’s argument regarding the medical examiner’s
report with respect to S.C.’s injuries and cause of death in 2010, which he
alleges the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence in the subject
proceedings. Father’s Brief at 10-11. In his brief, Father baldly asserts that
the medical examiner was available to testify, and therefore pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5934, the trial court erred in admitting the medical examiner’s
report.
Upon review, however, we note that Father has failed to develop this
argument. As previously noted, Rule 2119 requires that the “argument shall
be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued” and
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include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). “[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any
discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
waived.” Umbelina v. Adams, 34 A.3d 151, 161 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal
denied, 47 A.3d 848 (Pa. 2012), quoting In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 (Pa.
Super. 2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011). Therefore, Father’s
hearsay claim is waived.
Next, we review the order adjudicating L.C. dependent, pursuant to
the following standard.
[T]he standard of review in dependency cases
requires an appellate court to accept the findings of
fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record, but does not
require the appellate court to accept the lower
court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly,
we review for an abuse of discretion.
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).
A “dependent child” is defined as a “child” who
is without proper parental care or control,
subsistence, education as required by law, or other
care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or
emotional health, or morals. A determination that
there is a lack of proper parental care or control may
be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent,
guardian or other custodian that places the health,
safety or welfare of the child at risk….
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.
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A dependency hearing is a two-stage process. The first stage requires
the trial court to hear evidence and to determine by clear and convincing
evidence whether the child is dependent pursuant to the standards set forth
in section 6302. In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa. Super. 2013). If it finds
that the child is dependent, the trial court may move to the second stage, in
which it must make an appropriate disposition based upon an inquiry into
the best interests of the child. In re L.C., II, 900 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa.
Super. 2006). Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as testimony
that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact
to come to a clear determination, without hesitancy, of the truth of the
precise facts at issue.” A.B., supra at 349.
This Court has defined “proper parental care” as “that care which (1) is
geared to the particularized needs of the child and (2) at a minimum, is
likely to prevent serious injury to the child.” In the Matter of C.R.S., 696
A.2d 840, 845 (Pa. Super. 1997).
Instantly, the trial court adjudicated L.C. dependent based on the
order of June 20, 2011, finding aggravating circumstances and child abuse in
S.T.S.D.’s dependency case, as a result of S.C.’s injuries and cause of death.
See Trial Court Opinion (L.C.), 5/18/15, at 1. As such, the trial court found
that the “previous conduct of [F]ather placed [L.C.] at imminent risk.” Id.
In addition, in adjudicating L.C. dependent, the trial court found relevant its
decision to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to S.T.S.D. Id. at
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2. Finally, the trial court adjudicated L.C. dependent based on the stay-
away order in effect against Father with respect to S.T.S.D. Id.
On appeal, Father argues that the trial court erred in adjudicating L.C.
dependent “largely based on Father’s involuntary termination of parental
rights to S.[T.S.]D. The termination of Father’s parental rights was ordered
on the same day as L.C. was adjudicated dependent and was subject to
appeal. As such[,] it was improper to adjudicate L.C. dependent based on
an involuntary termination that could be appealed.” Father’s Brief at 16
(internal citation omitted).
We observe that Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act provides ten
definitions of a “dependent child.” With respect to the relevance of an
involuntary termination decree, Section 6302 provides that a “dependent
child” is a child who “is born to a parent whose parental rights with regard to
another child have been involuntarily terminated under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511
(relating to grounds for involuntary termination) within three years
immediately preceding the date of birth of the child and conduct of the
parent poses a risk to the health, safety or welfare of the child.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 6302. In this case, because the termination decree relating to S.T.S.D.
did not occur within three years immediately preceding L.C.’s birth, the trial
court improperly relied on the decree in adjudicating L.C. dependent.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the trial court’s reliance on the termination
decree was harmless in that the record evidence supports the court’s
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determination that L.C. is a “dependent child” because she “is without proper
parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other
care or control necessary for h[er] physical, mental, or emotional health, or
morals.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. See In re M.T., 607 A.2d 271, 281 (Pa.
Super. 1992) (recognizing that not all errors constitute reversible error, and
that a party must prove an error was harmful to warrant relief) (citations
omitted). For the reasons that follow, we conclude the trial court did not err
in adjudicating L.C. dependent.
Father argues in the alternative that the trial court erred in
adjudicating L.C. dependent as follows.
The [t]rial [c]ourt also relied on Father’s previous
conduct. Specifically the [t]rial [c]ourt mentions that
Father’s conduct resulted in the death of one of
L.C.’s siblings. Father was never criminally convicted
for the death of L.C.’s sibling. Father did plead no
contest to Endangering the Welfare of a Child.
However, even with this conviction, Father could still
provide the proper parental care and control for L.C.,
if it was demonstrated that he has been sufficiently
rehabilitated. At the time of the adjudicatory
hearing, Father had successfully completed his
probation and parole without incurring any
violations. He also completed parenting and anger
management classes while incarcerated. Father also
actively engaged in therapy both while incarcerated
and after being released. Father took these steps to
rehabilitate himself so that he may provide his
children with proper parental care and control.
Father’s Brief at 16-17 (internal citations omitted). We reject Father’s
argument.
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Specifically, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
adjudicating L.C. dependent based on Father’s past conduct, reflected in the
June 20, 2011 aggravated circumstances order in S.T.S.D.’s dependency
case. The record evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Father’s
past conduct relating to the multiple severe soft tissue injuries, rib fractures,
and death suffered by L.C.’s half-sister, S.C., for which Father served a
prison sentence for endangering the welfare of a child, places L.C. at
imminent risk of serious injury.
Further, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
adjudicating L.C. dependent based on the stay-away order in effect against
Father as this order, required by Father’s prior conduct, establishes that L.C.
“is without proper parental care or control, [or] subsistence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6302. Finally, it follows that the record evidence belies Father’s claim that
he “has been sufficiently rehabilitated” and can provide L.C. with proper
parental care and control. Father’s Brief at 16. In addition to the stay-away
order in effect against Father, Father did not testify in the portion of the
March 12, 2015 hearing related to the dependency petition. As such, there
is no evidence demonstrating Father’s rehabilitation.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it terminated Father’s parental rights to S.T.S.D., nor when
it adjudicated L.C. dependent. Accordingly, the trial court’s March 12, 2015
decree and order are affirmed.
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Decree affirmed. Order affirmed.
Judge Ott joins the memorandum.
Judge Stabile concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/17/2015
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