J-S56042-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DWAYNE ALLAN HOLLINGER,
Appellant No. 519 MDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 4, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-38-CR-0001372-2011
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2015
Appellant, Dwayne Allan Hollinger, appeals from the order of March 4,
2015, which dismissed, following a hearing, his first, counseled petition
brought under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546. On appeal, Appellant claims he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at all stages of the underlying proceedings. We affirm.
We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter
from the PCRA court’s March 4, 2015 opinion and our independent review of
the certified record.
On July 19, 2011, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with rape,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), burglary, two counts each of
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S56042-15
false imprisonment and simple assault for an incident that occurred on July
17, 2011. The Lebanon County Public Defender’s Office accepted Appellant’s
case on July 19, 2011. (See Motion for Appointment of Conflict Counsel,
10/13/11, at 1).
On October 13, 2011, Chief Public Defender Brian Deiderick moved to
withdraw, citing a conflict of interest. (See id.). On October 14, 2011, the
trial court appointed Mark Schappell, Esquire to represent Appellant.
Trial was originally scheduled to commence on January 12,
2012 before the Honorable Charles T. Jones. Prior to the
commencement of trial, however, it was called to the [trial
c]ourt’s attention that the victim . . . had not appeared despite
the issuance of a subpoena. Detectives from the Lebanon City
Police Bureau went to [the victim’s] home and she then
appeared before Judge Jones. [The victim] informed Judge
Jones that she did not wish to testify or press charges. She
insisted that the sexual acts involved in the case were
consensual and that she loved [Appellant]. Due to [the victim’s]
statements, Judge Jones directed that the Public Defender’s
Office be appointed to represent her and continued [Appellant’s]
trial in this matter.
A jury trial was then conducted in this matter on April 12,
2012 at which [the victim] appeared. At trial, [she] testified
that she was nineteen years of age. She explained that she and
[Appellant] had lived together at some point prior to July 17,
2011, but that she lived alone at the time of the incident. [The
victim] resided in an efficiency apartment where she had her
own room but shared kitchen and bathroom facilities with other
tenants. On the evening of July 17, 2011, [the victim] arrived
home at approximately 10:00 p.m. Soon afterward, [Appellant]
knocked on her door. When she answered it, [Appellant] told
her “I am here now and I am going to fuck you up.” He then
shut the door and began to slap [the victim’s] face and choke
her. After a brief period of time, [the victim] was able to
convince [Appellant] to walk with her to a nearby Turkey Hill
store. After going to the Turkey Hill, the two returned to [the
victim’s] porch. [Appellant] was looking for a place to stay that
-2-
J-S56042-15
night. After he finally left, [the victim] also left and spent the
night at the home of a friend.
The following morning, [the victim] arrived back at her
apartment at approximately 10:30 a.m. When she walked in,
[Appellant] jumped out from behind her dresser, causing her to
fall. He told her “now I am going to fuck you in your apartment.
Other dudes—other guys sleep in my bed,” and “you should be
my girl.” [Appellant] shut and locked the door, pushed [the
victim] onto the bed and pulled her pants down. When [the
victim] said “no,” [Appellant] said “we are going to either fuck
the easy way or the hard way.” Despite [the victim’s] continued
efforts to resist him, [Appellant] performed oral sex on her and
also engaged in vaginal sexual intercourse with her. [The
victim] was five-months pregnant at the time and throughout
this incident, [Appellant] repeatedly made threats to her. He
also directed at least one threat to her unborn child.
[The victim] was ultimately able to escape from
[Appellant] after he allowed her to go to the bathroom. [She]
hid her cellphone in her towel and called for help. [The victim]
was later examined at Good Samaritan Hospital where she
exhibited facial swelling, tenderness and discoloration on her
neck, a 6-centimeter bruise on her left breast, dried secretions
on her right inner thigh, and tenderness to her vaginal wall and
perineum.
When police later questioned [Appellant], he admitted that
he did not have permission to enter [the victim’s] apartment and
had gained access by crawling through a window. He also
admitted that he had slapped [the victim], that [she] had told
him to stop when he was having sex with her, and that he had
ignored her pleas to stop. [Appellant] made a recorded
statement of the incident and a redacted version of that
statement was played for the jury at trial.
(PCRA Court Opinion, 3/04/15, at 2-4) (record citations omitted).
On April 12, 2012, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges. On
June 14, 2012, the trial court issued an order stating that trial counsel was
-3-
J-S56042-15
“unable to perform his duty” and appointed Kevin Dugan, Esquire, to
represent Appellant at sentencing. (Order of Court, 6/12/12, at 1).
On October 24, 2012, the trial court made a sexually violent predator
(SVP) determination and held a sentencing hearing. Dr. Robert Stein, of the
Pennsylvania Sexual Offender Assessment Board, testified as to the basis of
his recommendation that the trial court should designate Appellant a SVP.
(See N.T. Sentencing, 10/24/13, at 4-20). Following Dr. Stein’s testimony,
the trial court found Appellant was a SVP. (See id. at 21). The trial court,
after noting that it reviewed the pre-sentence investigation report (PSI),
sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of incarceration of not less than
eleven nor more than twenty-five years. (See id. at 28-30). On October
26, 2012, Attorney Dugan moved to withdraw his appearance, stating that
the trial court had appointed him to represent Appellant at sentencing only.
(See Petition to Withdraw Appearance, 10/26/12, at 1). On November 23,
2012, the trial court appointed Scott Stein, Esquire to represent Appellant.
Appellate [c]ounsel filed [p]ost-[s]entence [m]otions [nunc
pro tunc] on [Appellant’s] behalf on December 11, 2012. In his
[m]otion, [a]ppellate [c]ounsel raised several arguments, but
indicated that he had not yet received a transcript of the prior
proceedings and asked for leave to file additional bases for relief
within fourteen days of receiving the transcript. We issued a
[p]ost-[s]entence [s]cheduling Order which required that
[Appellant’s] [b]rief be filed by February 8, 2013. On February
7, 2013, [a]ppellate [c]ounsel requested additional time to file
his [b]rief as he had not yet received a copy of the transcript of
[Appellant’s] jury trial. We extended the time for filing a [b]rief
to March 15, 2013, with the [trial c]ourt’s [o]pinion due on May
10, 2013 in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 720.
-4-
J-S56042-15
The Commonwealth filed its [b]rief on May 8, 2013. Due
to some confusion [on the part of the trial court], the trial
transcript was not ordered until May 9, 2013 and [a]ppellate
[c]ounsel was therefore unable to review it and prepare a [b]rief.
Due to the time constraint for our decision on the [p]ost-
[s]entence [m]otions pursuant to Rule 720, [the trial court was]
required to file our [o]rder and [o]pinion on May 10, 2013. On
that date, we entered an [o]rder with an accompanying [o]pinion
in which we denied the [p]ost-[s]entence [m]otions.
(PCRA Ct. Op., at 17-18) (footnotes omitted).
On June 7, 2013, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal,
Appellant challenged the weight and sufficiency of the evidence and raised
two claims alleging the trial court deprived him of due process when the trial
transcript was not made available to counsel and that, therefore, he could
not amend his post-sentence motion. (See Commonwealth v. Hollinger,
1039 MDA 2013, unpublished memorandum at *3-*4 (Pa. Super. filed June
6, 2014). On June 6, 2014, this Court denied Appellant’s direct appeal on
the merits. (See id. at *4-*7). Appellant did not seek leave to appeal to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
On May 14, 2014, Appellant, acting pro se, filed a PCRA petition. On
May 19, 2014, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant. On
July 16, 2014, counsel filed an amended PCRA petition. On September 29,
2014, a PCRA hearing took place. Appellant and three of his prior counsel:
Mark Schappell, Kevin Dugan, and Scott Stein, testified at the hearing. On
March 4, 2015, the PCRA court denied the petition. The instant, timely
appeal followed. On March 20, 2015, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to
-5-
J-S56042-15
file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). Appellant filed his timely Rule 1925(b) statement on March 30,
2015. On May 15, 2015, the PCRA court issued an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a).
On appeal, Appellant raises the following questions for our review:
1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to fully discuss
the case with [Appellant]?
2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file any
pretrial motions on [Appellant’s] behalf?
3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly
cross-examine the alleged victim?
4. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the Commonwealth’s trial continuance when the alleged victim
changed her story?
5. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for abandoning
[Appellant] after his trial?
6. Whether sentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to
mention mitigating factors during sentencing?
7. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
post-sentencing brief?
8. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to timely
file [Appellant’s] Superior Court brief?
(Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).1
____________________________________________
1
While this Court understands the duty to be a zealous advocate, we note
that both the Federal and State Courts have longed stated that the raising of
a multiplicity of issues on appeal raises the presumption that none have
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-6-
J-S56042-15
Here, Appellant claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at
all stages of the proceedings below. (See id. at 9-25). It is long settled
that “[o]ur standard of review from the grant or denial of post-conviction
relief is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is
supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error. We
will not disturb findings that are supported by the record.” Commonwealth
v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 30 A.3d
487 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). “The court’s scope of review is limited to
the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA
court’s hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.”
Commonwealth v. Duffey, 889 A.2d 56, 61 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted).
Further, to be eligible for relief pursuant to the PCRA, Appellant must
establish that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the
enumerated errors or defects found in Section 9543(a)(2). See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). He must also establish that the issues raised in the
PCRA petition have not been previously litigated or waived. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). An allegation of error “is waived if the petitioner
could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary
review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b).
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
merit. See Commonwealth v. Small, 980 A.2d 549, 565 (Pa. 2009)
(citing United States v. Hart, 693 F.2d 286, 287 n.1 (3d Cir. 1982)).
-7-
J-S56042-15
Further, counsel is presumed effective, and an appellant bears the
burden to prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. McDermitt, 66 A.3d
810, 813 (Pa. Super. 2013). The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is
the same under both the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Commonwealth v.
Jones, 815 A.2d 598, 611 (Pa. 2002). An appellant must demonstrate that:
(1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of
conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to
effectuate his interests; and (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001),
abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726
(Pa. 2002). “A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will
require rejection of the claim.” Jones, supra at 611 (citation omitted).
In the first claim, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to discuss the case with him fully. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 9-12).
When questioned about this claim at the PCRA hearing, Appellant initially
appeared confused, complaining that appellate counsel failed to follow up
with him after the submission of his direct appeal. (See N.T. PCRA Hearing,
9/29/14, at 5). After being prompted by PCRA counsel, Appellant testified
that trial counsel had met with him prior to trial and explained things to him
but that he did not feel “it was enough time to prepare for it.” (Id. at 6).
-8-
J-S56042-15
He elucidated further that he did not feel he had enough time to speak with
counsel. (See id.). However, on cross-examination, Appellant admitted
that trial counsel answered any questions he had during their meetings, met
with both Appellant and his family members after his release from prison,
and that he had been able to communicate with trial counsel through letters
during his period of incarceration. (See id. at 14-18).
Appellant’s argument on this issue is undeveloped. After citing some
boilerplate on the general standards for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, Appellant quotes the above-cited testimony and ends with two
conclusory paragraphs stating that he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel because trial counsel did not properly communicate with him. (See
Appellant’s Brief, at 9-12). At no point does Appellant specify what further
communication was necessary, what trial counsel failed to explain to him, or
how trial counsel’s alleged failure to communicate with him prejudiced him.
Thus, Appellant has failed to set forth the ineffectiveness analysis required
by Strickland. See Strickland, supra at 687. Because Appellant has not
established any of the three prongs, we must deem counsel’s assistance
constitutionally effective. See Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398,
406 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that where appellant fails to address three
prongs of ineffectiveness test, he does not meet his burden of proving
ineffective assistance of counsel, and counsel is deemed constitutionally
-9-
J-S56042-15
effective). Thus, there is no basis to upset the PCRA court’s finding that
Appellant was not entitled to PCRA relief on this basis.2
In the second claim, Appellant avers that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to file any pretrial motions. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 12-13).
Appellant’s argument suffers from the same fatal flaws as his first claim. At
the PCRA hearing, when asked what pretrial motions he believed trial
counsel should have filed, Appellant replied, “I honestly don’t know.” (N.T.
PCRA Hearing, 9/29/14, at 6). In his brief, Appellant also fails to identify
any pretrial motions that trial counsel should have filed and fails to explain
how the failure to file pretrial motions prejudiced him. Claims of ineffective
____________________________________________
2
Moreover, Appellant’s claim is without merit. The record reflects that the
PCRA court credited trial counsel’s testimony that he met with both
Appellant and his family on multiple occasions and spoke with Appellant’s
relatives on the telephone. (See PCRA Ct. Op., at 10). As the PCRA court
aptly stated:
[Appellant] was unable to give any specifics as to what [t]rial
[c]ounsel could have accomplished or how the outcome of his
case would have been different had he and [t]rial [c]ounsel had
more meetings and/or discussions about the case or if [t]rial
[c]ounsel had more time to prepare for trial. He has failed to
identify any issues or questions which were not addressed by
[t]rial [c]ounsel. In fact, he testified that he felt that all of his
questions had been answered satisfactorily after the meeting
with [t]rial [c]ounsel and [Appellant’s] family members. Thus,
[Appellant] has failed to point to any prejudice he suffered in
this regard. . . .
(Id. at 11). Because Appellant failed to show that he suffered any prejudice
as a result of trial counsel’s alleged failure to communicate, the PCRA court
was correct to deny relief on this basis. See Jones, supra at 611; Pierce,
supra at 213.
- 10 -
J-S56042-15
assistance of counsel based on mere speculation are not sufficient to
demonstrate the necessary degree of prejudice. See Commonwealth v.
Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 311 (Pa. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 975 (1999).
Further, because Appellant has not established any of the three prongs, we
must deem counsel’s assistance constitutionally effective. See Rolan,
supra at 406. Thus, there is no basis to upset the PCRA court’s finding that
Appellant was not entitled to PCRA relief on this basis.
In the third claim, Appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to adequately cross-examine the victim. (See Appellant’s Brief, at
13-15). Specifically, Appellant faults counsel for not cross-examining the
victim on the inconsistencies in her various statements regarding the
incident. (See id.). We disagree.
A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to confront witnesses
against him; this right includes the right of cross-examination. See
Commonwealth v. Buksa, 655 A.2d 576, 579 (Pa. Super. 1995), appeal
denied, 664 A.2d 972 (Pa. 1995). Cross-examination can be used to test a
witness’ version of the events, to impeach her credibility, or to establish her
motive for testifying. See id. Lastly, it is well settled that the scope and
vigor of any particular cross-examination is a matter of trial strategy that is
left to the sound discretion of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Molina,
516 A.2d 752, 757 (Pa. Super. 1986).
Here, the record belies Appellant’s claim. As the PCRA court stated:
- 11 -
J-S56042-15
Trial [c]ounsel . . . brought out the fact that [the victim]
and [Appellant] had previously lived together and that she had
given him the code to get into her apartment. He also brought
up [the victim’s] romantic relationship with another man at the
time of the incident and her fear that her sexual encounter with
[Appellant] would have a detrimental effect on that relationship.
He raised [the victim’s] failure to report the incident to police or
the Turkey Hill [c]lerk despite having the opportunity to do so.
Trial [c]ounsel fully questioned [the victim] about her
statements made on January 12, 2012, and several other
inconsistent statements she had allegedly made to other
individuals.
* * *
Clearly, the jury accepted [the victim’s] explanations and
found her to be a credible witness. Trial [c]ounsel conducted a
thorough and effective cross-examination of [the victim] and
[the PCRA court] can see nothing further that he could have
asked which could have aided [Appellant]. [The PCRA court]
believe[s] [t]rial [c]ounsel raised every[thing] possible
concerning [the victim’s] veracity and took every possible
opportunity to raise a question as to [the victim’s] truthfulness
in the minds of the jurors.
(PCRA Ct. Op., at 12-13).
Our independent review of the record confirms the PCRA court’s
description of trial counsel’s cross-examination of the victim. (See N.T.
Trial, 4/12/12, at 32-48). The record supports the finding that the cross-
examination was consistent with a reasonable trial strategy and was
designed with Appellant’s best interest in mind. Counsel was not ineffective
for failing to cross-examine the victim properly. Thus, there is no basis to
upset the PCRA court’s finding that Appellant was not entitled to PCRA relief
on this basis.
- 12 -
J-S56042-15
In the fourth claim, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the Commonwealth’s request for a continuance when
the victim recanted her prior statements. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 15-17).
We disagree.
As discussed above, on January 12, 2012, the police brought the
victim to the trial court after she failed to respond to a subpoena. At an in-
camera hearing, she recanted her earlier statements to the police, stating
that she loved Appellant, did not wish to testify, and the incident in July
2011 was consensual. (See N.T. Hearing, 1/12/12, at 3-5). After her
statements, the parties agreed that her recantation might implicate Fifth
Amendment issues as she was essentially admitting to lying to the police
and filing a false report. (See id. at 5-8). At the PCRA hearing, trial
counsel testified that he would have liked to proceed that day but that the
trial court felt a continuance was necessary because of Fifth Amendment
concerns. (See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 9/29/14, at 24).
Initially, we note that Appellant’s argument again consists of
boilerplate references to Strickland, with absolutely no attempt to explain
why an objection in this case would have been meritorious. (See Appellant’s
Brief, at 17). Here, the victim recanted her previous testimony; our review
of the record demonstrates that she had no understanding of the possible
consequences of her actions. (See N.T. Hearing, 1/12/12, at 3-8).
- 13 -
J-S56042-15
In Commonwealth v. Nelson, 574 A.2d 1107 (Pa. Super. 1990),
Nelson, while pleading guilty to murder and related charges, implicated
another individual, one Thomas Eaton, in the crime. See Nelson, supra at
1109. He subsequently recanted his accusations. See id. Despite this, the
Commonwealth subpoenaed him to testify at Eaton’s trial. See id. The
recantation and subsequent testimony resulted in Nelson being charged
with, and ultimately pleading guilty to, perjury and related offenses. See id.
This Court found Nelson’s testimony to be constitutionally infirm, specifically
noting that Nelson was not represented by counsel, not advised of his right
against self-incrimination, and did not understand the possible consequences
of his testimony. See id. at 1111-13.
As Nelson suggests, once the victim recanted her testimony and
opened herself to possible criminal charges, the only means to protect her
constitutional rights was to do exactly what the trial court did, appoint
counsel and continue the matter. An objection to the continuance would
have been pointless. We will not find counsel ineffective for failing to make
a non-meritorious objection. See Commonwealth v. Floyd, 484 A.2d 365,
368 (Pa. 1984). Thus, there is no basis to upset the PCRA court’s finding
that Appellant was not entitled to PCRA relief on this basis.
In the fifth claim, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
“abandoning” him after trial. (Appellant’s Brief, at 17). We disagree.
- 14 -
J-S56042-15
To the extent that it can be determined from the incoherent argument
on this matter, Appellant appears to be claiming that trial counsel was
ineffective for withdrawing following trial because this necessitated the
appointment of new counsel who was unfamiliar with the case, resulting in
Appellant receiving ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel. (See id.).
Again, we note that this claim is completely undeveloped. Appellant points
to nothing in the certified record or notes of testimony from the PCRA
hearing that would suggest that there was anything improper with respect to
trial counsel’s withdrawal. (See id.).3 Thus, he has not demonstrated that
the underlying claim has any arguable merit. See Jones, supra at 611;
Pierce, supra at 213. Therefore, there is no basis to upset the PCRA
court’s finding that Appellant was not entitled to PCRA relief on this basis.
In the sixth claim, Appellant argues that sentencing counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise mitigating factors during sentencing. (See
Appellant’s Brief, at 19-22). Again, aside from some boilerplate law and a
lengthy quotation from the PCRA hearing, Appellant’s argument on this issue
consists of a single, conclusory paragraph. (See id.).
____________________________________________
3
The certified record does not contain an application to withdraw. As noted
above, the order permitting counsel to withdraw tersely stated that he “was
unable to perform his duty.” (Order of Court, 6/14/12, at 1). At the PCRA
hearing, Appellant did not question trial counsel about his withdrawal. (See
N.T. PCRA Hearing, 9/29/14, at 26-28).
- 15 -
J-S56042-15
Moreover, at the PCRA hearing, Appellant stated that he “was not all
right up in the head” and that he had “anger, depression[,]” used to take
medication, and had been in residential treatment. (N.T. PCRA Hearing,
9/29/14, at 20-21). However, Appellant has failed to provide any medical
evidence that, at the time of the incident and/or at trial, he suffered from
any mental health issues, was taking medication, or was being treated for
mental health problems.4 At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified that
Appellant never behaved in a manner that demonstrated any mental health
problems and, while Appellant informed him of his juvenile mental health
problems, he did not state that he had any recent diagnosis or other current
issues. (See id. at 27-28). Sentencing counsel agreed that Appellant never
behaved in a manner that demonstrated any mental health problems and
never informed him of any mental health issues. (See id. at 32-33).
We will not fault counsel for not bringing up mitigating circumstances
of which Appellant failed to inform him. Further, Appellant did not point to
any evidence to demonstrate that he had any current mental health issues
____________________________________________
4
We note that the Sexual Offenders Assessment discussed the exact same
juvenile mental health history detailed by Appellant at the PCRA hearing.
(See Sexual Offenders Assessment, 6/06/12, at 3-4). While the PSI is not
contained within the certified record, the Sexual Offenders Assessment cites
it as the source for its information on Appellant’s juvenile history. (See id.
at 3). At sentencing, the trial court stated that it had reviewed both the PSI
and the Sexual Offenders Assessment. (See N.T. Sentencing, 10/24/12, at
21, 28). Thus, at the time of sentencing, the trial court had information
about Appellant’s prior mental health issues.
- 16 -
J-S56042-15
that constituted a mitigating circumstance. Also, as noted above, the
sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI, which discussed Appellant’s
juvenile mental health history. We have stated, “Where the sentencing
court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report [PSI], we can
assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding
the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with
mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162,
171 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Lastly, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he suffered any
prejudice because of sentencing counsel’s failure to highlight his mental
health issues, therefore his claim must fail. See Jones, supra at 611;
Pierce, supra at 213. Thus, there is no basis to upset the PCRA court’s
finding that Appellant was not entitled to PCRA relief on this basis.
In the seventh claim, Appellant alleges that counsel was ineffective for
failing to file a post-sentence brief. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 22-24). This
claim is meritless.
Initially, we note that all of the cases cited by Appellant in support of
this claim concern the ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, not
the failure of counsel to file a brief in support of a post-sentence motion.
(See id. at 22-23). In fact, Appellant’s argument never discusses the failure
to file a brief in support of a post-sentence motion, containing solely a
conclusory discussion on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (See
- 17 -
J-S56042-15
id. at 22-24). Moreover, Appellant utterly fails to explain how counsel’s
failure to file a brief prejudiced him. (See id.). Therefore, Appellant has not
demonstrated that he is entitled to relief. See Rolan, supra at 406;
Pursell, supra at 311. Thus, there is no basis to upset the PCRA court’s
finding that Appellant was not entitled to PCRA relief on this basis.
In the final claim, Appellant argues that he received ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel, because counsel filed a late brief on direct
appeal. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 24-25). We disagree.
Appellant is correct that the appellate docket reflects that counsel did
file a late brief. (See Appeal Docket Sheet, 10/20/15, at 3). However, this
Court did not find waiver but rather decided Appellant’s appeal on the
merits. (See Hollinger, supra *1-*7 (Pa. Super. filed June 6, 2014)).
Accordingly, Appellant has not shown that the filing of a late brief prejudiced
him and, therefore, his claim must fail. See Jones, supra at 611; Pierce,
supra at 213. Thus, there is no basis to upset the PCRA court’s finding that
Appellant was not entitled to PCRA relief on this basis.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above we find that PCRA court’s
determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal
error. See Ousley, supra at 1242. Therefore, we affirm the denial of
Appellant’s PCRA petition.
- 18 -
J-S56042-15
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/17/2015
- 19 -