Bradley's relationship with J.S., (3) J.S.'s biological parents retained legal
custody of him, and (4) Sherry was not acting in J.S.'s best interests.
The district court denied Bradley's motion to terminate child
support because it found that claim preclusion prevented the relitigation
of the issueS of Bradley's duty to pay child support. Bradley then appealed.
In 2014, this court ordered the appointment of pro bono appellate counsel
for each party.
Bradley raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the
district court erred by applying claim preclusion to deny Bradley's motion
to terminate child support, and (2) whether the district court abused its
discretion by not treating Bradley's motion to terminate child support as a
motion to modify the amount of child support. We conclude that the
district court correctly applied claim preclusion to deny Bradley's motion
to terminate child support because the divorce decree resolved the issue of
whether Bradley had a duty to pay child support. Additionally, recognized
exceptions to the doctrine of claim preclusion do not apply to this case, and
Bradley failed to demonstrate that this court should rely on public policy
to expand or create an applicable exception to the doctrine of claim
preclusion. We further conclude that Bradley waived the issue of whether
the district court abused its discretion by refusing to modify the amount of
child support that he owes by not raising this issue before the district
court.
The district court properly applied claim preclusion to deny Bradley's
motion to terminate child support
"Whether claim preclusion is available is a question of law
reviewed de novo." G.C. Wallace, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127
Nev., Adv. Op. 64, 262 P.3d 1135, 1137 (2011). Claim preclusion is a
defense that prevents the relitigation of a previously resolved claim.
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Elizondo v. Hood Mach., Inc., 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 84, 312 P.3d 479, 483
(2013). It "protect[s] the finality of decisions and prevent[s] the
proliferation of litigation" and applies "to defenses and compulsory
counterclaims" that could have been brought in the prior action. Holt v.
Reg'l Tr. Servs. Corp., 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 80, 266 P.3d 602, 605 (2011)
(internal quotations omitted). This doctrine can apply to divorce decrees
incorporating marital settlement agreements that resolve issues of
paternity and child support obligations. Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 575,
959 P.2d 523, 526 (1998); Willerton v. Bassham, 111 Nev. 10, 14, 889 P.2d
823, 825 (1995).
Claim preclusion applies when "(1) the final judgment is
valid, . . . (2) the subsequent action is based on the same claims or any
part of them that were or could have been brought in the first case, and (3)
the parties or their privies are the same in the instant lawsuit as they
were in the previous lawsuit, or the defendant can demonstrate that he or
she should have been included as a defendant in the earlier suit and the
plaintiff fails to provide a good reason for not having done so. Weddell v.
Sharp, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 28, 350 P.3d 80, 85 (2015) (emphasis omitted)
(citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
Here, Bradley does not dispute whether the second or third
elements of claim preclusion were fulfilled. Therefore, we limit our
analysis to whether the first element of claim preclusion is met.
The divorce decree is a valid prior judgment
The second element of claim preclusion is that there is a valid
prior judgment. See id. It is a "well settled rule that a judgment, not set
aside on appeal or otherwise, is equally effective as an estoppel upon the
points decided, whether the decision be right or wrong." Reed v. Allen, 286
U.S. 191, 201 (1932). Furthermore, "a judgment entered by the court on
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consent of the parties after settlement or by stipulation of the parties is as
valid and binding a judgment between the parties as if the matter had
been fully tried." Willerton v. Bassham, 111 Nev. at 16, 889 P.2d at 826.
Here, the parties executed a marital settlement agreement
which provided that Smith was to pay child support for the children,
including J.S., and identified a presumptive amount that Smith was to
pay. The terms of this agreement, including Smith's child support
obligations, were incorporated into the parties' divorce decree.
Accordingly, a judgment was entered by the court on consent of the parties
after settlement and is thus valid and binding between the parties. Id.
Existing exceptions to claim preclusion do not apply
This court has recognized two exceptions to the claim
preclusion doctrine that are relevant to the present dispute. The first
exception is that "[a] decision of paternity will not operate as res judicata
where extrinsic fraud existed in the original proceeding." Love, 114 Nev.
at 576, 959 P.2d at 526.
The second exception is the rule that this court applied in
Willerton. 111 Nev. at 21-22, 889 P.2d at 830. In Willerton, a mother, a
putative father, and the state, in its capacity as the child's guardian ad
litem, disputed the paternity of a child and the putative father's child
support obligations. Id. at 12, 889 P.2d at 824. All three parties then
entered into a settlement agreement whereby the putative father would
pay child support and the issue of paternity would not be resolved. Id.
Subsequently, the mother and child brought a second lawsuit
against the putative father to determine paternity. Id. at 13, 889 P.2d at
825. Although it recognized that the "stipulation-based judgment [was]
binding on the mother and precludes a later action asserting a claim or
cause of action to determine paternity," this court reasoned that claim
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preclusion was not binding on the child because "[a] minor child. . . has
legal interests that flow from a determination of paternity beyond the
right to collect support." Id. at 21-22, 889 P.2d at 830 (emphasis added).
As a result, this court concluded that the child could maintain an action to
determine paternity even if the child was a party to the initial action
whose resolution would have ordinarily precluded his or her claim. Id. at
24, 889 P.2d at 832.
Here, neither recognized exception to claim preclusion applies.
First, Bradley does not argue, and the record does not suggest, that
extrinsic fraud affected the divorce proceedings or caused him to believe
that he was J.S.'s biological or legal father. See Love, 114 Nev. at 576, 959
P.2d at 526. Instead, the record suggests the opposite: both Sherry and
Bradley pleaded that they had not completed the adoption of J.S. Thus,
Bradley has not demonstrated that this exception applies.
Second, the Willerton exception for a child's subsequent
paternity claim is not applicable because Bradley, not J.S., is the party
against whom the district court applied claim preclusion. See Willerton,
111 Nev. at 21-22, 889 P.2d at 830. Furthermore, paternity is not the
issue here. The judgment notes the non-biological relationship by
incorporation, as the marital agreement stipulated that the parties were
to complete the adoption of J.S.
Thus, Bradley has not demonstrated that this exception
applies. Therefore, these recognized exceptions to the doctrine of claim
preclusion do not prevent its application in the present case.
Bradley fails to demonstrate that public policy warrants a new
or expanded exception to the application of claim preclusion
Bradley argues that public policy should prevent him from
being liable for future child support payments for J.S. because being
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required to support someone else's child is fundamentally unfair. He also
argues that applying claim preclusion in this case would improperly
discourage people from caring for children that are not theirs.
"[U]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, we will not overturn
[existing precedent] absent compelling reasons for so doing. Mere
disagreement does not suffice." Miller v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 597, 188
P.3d 1112, 1124 (2008) (footnotes omitted). Thus, more than a preference
for a different policy is necessary for this court to overturn a prior
decision. Id.
We recognize that Bradley identifies a valid policy concern
about the unfairness of being compelled to support someone else's child.
However, this court has already established a balance between this policy
interest and the claim preclusion's policy of protecting the finality of
judgments because it recognizes an exception to claim preclusion for prior
judgments that were obtained by extrinsic fraud. See Love, 114 Nev. at
576, 959 P.2d at 526 (articulating the extrinsic fraud exception to claim
preclusion); see also Five Star, 124 Nev. at 1058, 194 P.3d at 715
(identifying claim preclusion's public policy rationale).
Bradley provides no analysis to show that this court has
unreasonably balanced these two public policies. Furthermore, he fails to
provide any meaningful analysis to suggest that the application of claim
preclusion in the present case would discourage a person from caring for
children to whom he or she does not have a legal obligation. Here, claim
preclusion arises from a district court order imposing child support
liability on Bradley and not from any provision of support that Bradley
actually made for J.S. Bradley has not demonstrated that a new or
expanded exception to the doctrine of claim preclusion is warranted.
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Therefore, Bradley fails to demonstrate a compelling reason to abandon
this court's prior jurisprudence limiting this exception to claim preclusion.
See Miller, 124 Nev. at 597, 188 P.3d at 1124.
Claim preclusion prevents Bradley from litigating the present
claim
The district court's prior order was a valid judgment
unaffected by extrinsic fraud, and Bradley does not contest the other two
elements of claim preclusion. Thus, all three elements of claim preclusion
are met. Neither potentially relevant exception to claim preclusion
applies. Finally, Bradley fails to demonstrate a compelling reason for this
court to abandon its prior caselaw and expand the exceptions to the
doctrine of claim preclusion. Therefore, the district court correctly applied
the doctrine of claim preclusion to deny Bradley's motion to terminate
child support.
Bradley waived the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion
by refusing to modify the amount of child support that he owes by not
raising this issue before the district court
"This court reviews the district court's decisions regarding
child support for an abuse of discretion." Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410,
438, 216 P.3d 213, 232 (2009). When considering a claim, this court "must
look at the substance of the claim[ ], not just the label[ ] used in
the . . . complaint." Nev. Power Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120
Nev. 948, 960, 102 P.3d 578, 586 (2004). However, "[a] point not urged in
the trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to
have been waived and will not be considered on appeal." Old Aztec Mine,
Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981).
In his motion to terminate child support for J.S., Bradley
alleged that (1) he was not J.S.'s legal or biological father, (2) Sherry
interfered with his relationship with J.S., (3) J.S.'s biological parents
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retained legal custody of J.S., and (4) Sherry was not acting in J.S.'s best
interests. Bradley concluded his motion by seeking relief from the legal
duty to pay child support. In this motion, Bradley did not seek to have the
amount of his child support obligation modified. Thus, he did not raise the
issue of modifying the amount of his child support obligation before the
district court and waived this issue on appeal. See id. Therefore, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
J.
Gibbons
J.
Pickering
cc: Hon. David Humke, District Judge
Karen K. Wong
Pisanelli Bice, PLLC
Washoe District Court Clerk
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