NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NOV 20 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
GREGORY MARCELL JOHNSON, No. 13-16802
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:12-cv-01580-PJH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Gregory Johnson appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the final
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that Johnson was not eligible for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
social security disability benefits. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and affirm.
In his opening brief, Johnson raises a variety of reasons why he believes the
ALJ should have awarded him benefits. In his reply brief, however, Johnson
concedes that all but one of his challenges to the ALJ’s decision are waived
because he failed to raise them before the district court. Warre v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2006). The only remaining issue is
whether Johnson, who is functionally illiterate, is capable of performing his past
relevant work as a cook supervisor.
“We may set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by
substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466
F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). The ALJ’s determination that Johnson was capable
of performing his past relevant work was supported by substantial evidence
because Johnson had, in fact, performed that work without being required to read
or write.
The agency is governed by a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether Johnson is eligible for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a). In steps one through four, the burden is on the claimant to prove
that he is disabled. Valentine v. Comm’ r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689
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(9th Cir. 2009). At step four in the disability analysis, an ALJ compares the
claimant’s residual functional capacity with his past relevant work, and if the
claimant can still perform that work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). Johnson testified that he worked regular eight-hour days
as a cook supervisor, a job that did not require him to read or write. In addition to
Johnson's testimony, the ALJ specifically asked the vocational expert whether a
hypothetical individual with Johnson's physical and mental limitations (including
his illiteracy), could perform Johnson's past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2). The
vocational expert responded that yes, a claimant could perform the work as
Johnson had described it (i.e., with no requirement that he read or write). Johnson
has not pointed to any contrary evidence in the record.
Johnson also contends that the ALJ erred because he did not consult the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to determine whether Johnson’s past
relevant work, as generally performed in the national economy, would require
literacy. This is not required. An ALJ can find the claimant not disabled at step
four by finding either that the claimant retains the capacity “to perform the
particular functional demands and job duties peculiar to an individual job as he or
she actually performed it” or “the job as ordinarily required by employers
throughout the national economy.” SSR 82–61, 1982 WL 31387 (January 1, 1982).
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An ALJ may refer to the DOT in order to ultimately determine whether a particular
claimant can do his or her actual past relevant work, but is not required to do so. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2).
Because the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and free
from legal error, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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