UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4333
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL MARROQUIN-SANTIAGO,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-4346
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL MARROQUIN-SANTIAGO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:10-cr-00232-JAB-1; 1:14-cr-00459-JAB-
1)
Submitted: November 19, 2015 Decided: November 23, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Daniel Marroquin-Santiago
appeals the 24-month sentence imposed after he pled guilty,
pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of illegal reentry of
a felon, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012) (“reentry
case”), as well as the 12-month sentence imposed for violating
the supervised release terms of his prior illegal reentry
conviction (“revocation case”). In the reentry case, Marroquin-
Santiago asserts that the 24-month sentence was greater than
necessary to achieve the sentencing objectives of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012). In the revocation case, Marroquin-Santiago
asserts that imposing his 12-month sentence to run consecutively
to the 24-month sentence in the reentry case resulted in a
plainly unreasonable sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review Marroquin-Santiago’s 24-month sentence in the re-
entry case for reasonableness, using an abuse of discretion
standard of review. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The first step in this review requires the court to
ensure that the district court committed no significant
procedural error. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 160-61
(4th Cir. 2008). If, and only if, this court finds the sentence
procedurally reasonable will we consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. United States v. Carter, 564
F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). We presume that a sentence
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within a properly calculated Sentencing Guidelines range is
reasonable. United States v. Cobler, 748 F.3d 570, 582 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 229 (2014).
Although Marroquin-Santiago concedes that we may presume
his 24-month sentence is reasonable because it was within the
Guidelines range calculated at sentencing, he asserts that he
should have been sentenced to a lesser term based on his
personal history and characteristics. We conclude that the
district court properly exercised its discretion to reject
Marroquin-Santiago’s arguments in mitigation, and that it
imposed a sentence that reflects the nature and the
circumstances of the offense, as well as the other
considerations of § 3553(a). See Evans, 526 F.3d at 162
(recognizing that deference to a district court’s sentence is
required because the “sentencing judge is in a superior position
to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the
individual case” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because
Marroquin-Santiago has failed to rebut the presumption of
reasonableness this court affords his within-Guidelines
sentence, we affirm his sentence in the reentry case.
We also reject Marroquin-Santiago’s assertion that his 12-
month sentence in the revocation case is plainly unreasonable
because the district rejected his request to run the sentence
concurrent to his sentence in the reentry case. Sentences or
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breaches of supervised release are meant to sanction the abuse
of the court’s trust inherent in those violations, and not to
punish the underlying offense conduct. Therefore, these
sentences are intended to run consecutively to other sentences:
Any term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation
of probation or supervised release shall be ordered to
be served consecutively to any sentence of
imprisonment that the defendant is serving, whether or
not the sentence of imprisonment being served resulted
from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation
of probation or supervised release.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.3(f), p.s. (2014).
Accordingly, it was not error for the district court to impose
Marroquin-Santiago’s sentence in the revocation case to run
consecutively to his sentence in the reentry case. Because we
conclude that Marroquin-Santiago’s 12-month sentence is not
unreasonable, it necessarily follows that the sentence is not
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
440 (4th Cir. 2006).
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgments. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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