In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15-‐‑1312
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-‐‑Appellee,
v.
JUAN MANUEL LARIOS-‐‑BUENTELLO,
Defendant-‐‑Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 13-‐‑cr-‐‑158-‐‑wmc — William M. Conley, Chief Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 17, 2015 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 23, 2015
____________________
Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and HAMILTON, Circuit
Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Juan Larios-‐‑Buentello has
been removed from the United States frequently in light of
his long criminal record (14 convictions in Florida alone). He
repeatedly returns and has been convicted three times of il-‐‑
legal reentry, which violates 8 U.S.C. §1326(a). The convic-‐‑
tion now under review arose when Wisconsin turned him
over to immigration officials after he had been caught flee-‐‑
2 No. 15-‐‑1312
ing the scene of an auto accident. The district judge sen-‐‑
tenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment. Larios-‐‑Buentello
maintains that the district judge wrongly rejected his defense
under §1326(d). (After the judge rejected the defense, Larios-‐‑
Buentello entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving ap-‐‑
pellate review of this issue.)
Subsection 1326(d) permits an alien to defeat a prosecu-‐‑
tion for illegal reentry by showing that “(1) [he] exhausted
any administrative remedies that may have been available to
seek relief against the order; (2) the deportation proceedings
… improperly deprived [him] of the opportunity for judicial
review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally un-‐‑
fair.” An immigration judge ordered Larios-‐‑Buentello re-‐‑
moved in 1998. (All later removals have been based on that
order.) He contends that this removal was “fundamentally
unfair” because the IJ did not advise him that he would be
eligible to seek discretionary relief from removal under
§212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8
U.S.C. §1182(c).
The IJ did not tell him this because §212(c) had been re-‐‑
pealed in 1996 by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-‐‑
grant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) (Sept. 30, 1996), and the
Department of Justice had taken the position that the repeal-‐‑
er applies to aliens whose convictions predate the IIRIRA’s
effectiveness in April 1997. The Supreme Court disagreed
with that position in 2001, as applied to aliens who pleaded
guilty to felonies before the enactment of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) (April 24, 1996),
which made §212(c) unavailable to aliens whose convictions
led to sentences exceeding five years’ imprisonment. See INS
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). The Justices observed that the
No. 15-‐‑1312 3
AEDPA’s changes were not expressly retroactive, while the
IIRIRA declared full retroactivity. St. Cyr therefore thought
that pre-‐‑AEDPA guilty pleas were not good reasons to elim-‐‑
inate §212(c) opportunities, for defendants’ willingness to
admit guilt might have been influenced by the fact that be-‐‑
fore April 24, 1996, no felony conviction (even one for an
“aggravated” felony) inevitably led to removal.
The district court held that Larios-‐‑Buentello had not es-‐‑
tablished a defense under §1326(d)—that, indeed, none of
the three paragraphs of subsection (d) had been met, and
every circuit that has considered the issue has held that an
alien must meet all three. See, e.g., United States v. Soto-‐‑
Mateo, 799 F.3d 117, 120 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Torres,
383 F.3d 92, 98–99 (3d Cir. 2004). Larios-‐‑Buentello had not
appealed the IJ’s removal order to the Board of Immigration
Appeals and thus had not satisfied paragraph (d)(1); he had
not been deprived of the opportunity for judicial review and
thus had not satisfied paragraph (d)(2); and it is not “fun-‐‑
damentally unfair” to refrain from advising an administra-‐‑
tive litigant of an opportunity to seek relief that the agency
sincerely believes to be unavailable. No one is entitled to
have an adverse litigant announce the opposite of its actual
legal position. See United States v. Santiago-‐‑Ochoa, 447 F.3d
1015, 1019–20 (7th Cir. 2006) (aliens do not have a constitu-‐‑
tional right to be notified even of those discretionary reme-‐‑
dies that the agency believes to be available); see also, e.g.,
Soto-‐‑Mateo, 799 F.3d at 123.
The second and third points follow directly from United
States v. Zambrano-‐‑Reyes, 724 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2013), which
rejected a §1326(d) defense by someone who, like Larios-‐‑
Buentello, was subject to a removal order entered before St.
4 No. 15-‐‑1312
Cyr. Larios-‐‑Buentello tries to distinguish Zambrano-‐‑Reyes on
the ground that he waived counsel during his removal pro-‐‑
ceedings, but that decision’s reasoning does not depend on
whether the alien retained counsel. What is more, Larios-‐‑
Buentello unquestionably fails to satisfy paragraph (d)(1).
He did not appeal to the BIA, which also prevented a re-‐‑
quest for judicial review. He offers an excuse for the failure
to exhaust administrative remedies—he maintains that
someone told him that an appeal would be futile—but the
statute requires exhaustion, not excuses.
The order of removal recites that he was told that he was
entitled to appeal and chose not to do so; he does not con-‐‑
tend that this recital is false. So an administrative appeal was
available, even if unlikely to succeed. A litigant’s unilateral
belief that an appeal would fail does not make the oppor-‐‑
tunity “unavailable” or excuse failure to use the procedure.
See, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622–23 (1998).
If the BIA had decided adversely to Larios-‐‑Buentello, he
could have sought judicial relief, with a reasonable prospect
of success. Before St. Cyr five courts of appeals had antici-‐‑
pated its holding. See 533 U.S. at 293 n.1. The St. Cyr decision
might have been the Zambrano-‐‑Reyes decision, or the Larios-‐‑
Buentello decision, had either alien pursued his administra-‐‑
tive and judicial remedies. See United States v. Roque-‐‑
Espinoza, 338 F.3d 724, 729 (7th Cir. 2003).
“Might have been” is a potentially important qualifier,
because it is unlikely that Larios-‐‑Buentello could have re-‐‑
ceived any benefit from the doctrine of St. Cyr even had he
used all administrative and judicial remedies. St. Cyr’s felo-‐‑
ny conviction was entered in March 1996, a month before the
AEDPA became law; Zambrano-‐‑Reyes’s conviction dates to
No. 15-‐‑1312 5
1993. But Larios-‐‑Buentello pleaded guilty in March 1997 to
three felonies (burglary, grand theft, and resisting a police
officer). He entered these pleas after both the AEDPA and
the IIRIRA were on the books, and he received concurrent
one-‐‑year sentences. (Larios-‐‑Buentello has many earlier con-‐‑
victions too, but we need not discuss them.)
Not until the IIRIRA took effect at the beginning of April
1997 was the qualification for an “aggravated” felony low-‐‑
ered to one year in prison and removal made mandatory by
the repeal of §212(c). (The opinions in St. Cyr and Zivkovic v.
Holder, 724 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2013), recount many of the
statutory changes and make it unnecessary for us to provide
a citation for each development.) But the fact that by March
1997 §212(c) had already been repealed in language that de-‐‑
clared full retroactivity for removal proceedings commenc-‐‑
ing the next month would have made it folly for a person in
Larios-‐‑Buentello’s position to plead guilty in reliance on an
option to seek §212(c) relief that was about to expire. Larios-‐‑
Buentello’s removal proceeding did not begin until 1998,
and he does not say that he thought that he would be placed
in removal proceedings immediately on pleading guilty.
Larios-‐‑Buentello is therefore less well situated than was
Zambrano-‐‑Reyes to assert a defense under §1326(d). The dis-‐‑
trict court did not err in entering a conviction.
AFFIRMED