UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-7233
TYRONE JOHNSON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
ROY COOPER,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:14-cv-00242-FDW)
Submitted: November 19, 2015 Decided: November 24, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tyrone Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III,
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tyrone Johnson, a North Carolina inmate, seeks to appeal
the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(2012) federal habeas petition. The district court’s final
order was entered on March 31, 2015. We construe Johnson’s
notice of appeal as having been filed, at the earliest, on
August 4, 2015, the date appearing on that document. See Fed.
R. App. P. 4(c)(1); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).
In his notice of appeal, Johnson stated that he did not receive
notice of the district court’s order until August 3, 2015.
Parties are accorded 30 days after entry of the district
court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal
period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal
period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a
notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
Johnson’s notice of appeal is clearly untimely. However,
under Rule 4(a)(6), the district court may reopen the time to
file an appeal if (1) the moving party did not receive notice of
entry of judgment within 21 days after entry, (2) the motion is
filed within 180 days of entry of judgment or within 14 days of
receiving notice from the court, whichever is earlier, and (3)
no party would be prejudiced. We remand for the limited purpose
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of permitting the district court to determine whether Johnson is
entitled to the benefit of Rule 4(a)(6) to reopen the time to
file an appeal. The record, as supplemented, will then be
returned to this court for further consideration.
REMANDED
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