15‐626
NYSA Series Trust, et al. v. Dessein, et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER
JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER
THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 25th day of November, two thousand
fifteen.
PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE,
CHESTER J. STRAUB,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
Circuit Judges.
______________________
NYSA SERIES TRUST, LEW RUMSMOKE,
LEAH GABELMAN, TRUSTEE,
GABELMAN TRUST, GERALD E. FUESS,
RICHARD MARTIN, RICHARD B. ABBOTT,
TERI MARTIN, CHRISTOPHER MORRIS,
JACOB HULLER, SUSAN SCHWEITZER,
TRUSTEE, SCHWEITZER LIVING TRUST,
EDWIN L. OLMSTEAD, ALTON PROSSER,
MICHAEL CUDDY, MICHAEL & ELIZABETH
PFOHL, ANDREW MERRITT, BRIAN
LETCHER, WILLIAM PATTERSON, TRUSTEE,
PATTERSON WAREHOUSE EMPLOYEE AND
PROFIT SHARING PLAN,
Plaintiffs‐Appellants,
‐v.‐ No. 15‐626
PATRICK DESSEIN, BRETT GREENKY,
M.D., SETH GREENKY, M.D.,
GLENN AXELROD, M.D., RICHARD
ESPOSITO, JOHN SACCO, M.D.,
Defendants‐Appellees,
ESPSCO SYRACUSE, LLC,
Defendant.1
______________________
FOR PLAINTIFFS‐APPELLANTS: JAY SHAPIRO (Patricia C.
Foster, Patricia C. Foster, Esq.
PLLC, Pittsford, NY, on the
brief), White and Williams LLP,
New York, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS‐APPELLEES
PATRICK DESSEIN, BRETT GREENKY
M.D., SETH GREENKY, M.D.,
GLENN AXELROD, M.D.,
RICHARD ESPOSITO: DANIEL B. BERMAN (Janet
D. Callahan, on the brief),
Hancock Estabrook, LLP,
Syracuse, NY.
1 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption to conform to
the above.
2
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLEE
JOHN SACCO, M.D.: MATTHEW VAN RYN,
Melvin & Melvin, PLLC,
Syracuse, NY.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York (David N. Hurd, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the case is REMANDED for further
proceedings pursuant to procedures set forth in United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d
19, 21–22 (2d Cir. 1994).
Plaintiffs‐Appellants appeal from the dismissal of their claims against
Defendants‐Appellees under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); Rule 10b‐5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b‐5; and state
law. The action arises out of Plaintiffs‐Appellants’ purchase of debt securities in
a private placement offering (the “Offering”) made by Defendant ESPSCO
Syracuse, LLC (“ESPSCO”) to “accredited investors,” as that term is defined in
Rule 501(a) of Regulation D under the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
Plaintiffs‐Appellants allege that the informational materials included with the
Offering (the “Offering Materials”) contained material misrepresentations that
fraudulently induced them into making this investment. For the reasons that
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follow, we lack jurisdiction to entertain the appeal in the present circumstances,
and we remand for further proceedings.
With exceptions not pertinent here, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(a) and (b), this
Court has jurisdiction over appeals only from decisions of the United States
district courts that are “final.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A decision is “final” if it
“conclusively determines the pending claims of all the parties to the litigation,
leaving nothing for the court to do but execute its decision.” Citizens Accord, Inc.
v. Town of Rochester, N.Y., 235 F.3d 126, 128 (2d Cir. 2000). “An order that . . .
adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the remaining parties[] is
not a final order unless the court directs the entry of a final judgment as to the
dismissed claims or parties ‘upon an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
In the present case, Plaintiffs‐Appellants’ complaint (“Complaint”) asserts
claims not only against the individual defendants but also against defendant
ESPSCO. The individual defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them,
and the District Court granted their motions. There is no indication in the
record, however, that such a motion was made by ESPSCO, and although the
order of the District Court from which Plaintiffs‐Appellants appeal instructed the
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clerk of court to “close” the case, none of the rulings of the District Court
addressed ESPSCO. At oral argument, Plaintiffs‐Appellants informed us that
ESPSCO has not responded to the Complaint, but that no default has been
entered; no further proceedings have been held on their claims against ESPSCO,
and the claims against ESPSCO remain pending. We note that the District Court
has not entered an order pursuant to Rule 54(b) certifying its dismissal of the
complaint against the individual defendants for entry of a partial final judgment
so as to permit an immediate appeal of that decision; nor do we mean to suggest
that the District Court should do so.
In general, with respect to civil cases there is a “‘historic federal policy
against piecemeal appeals.’” Curtiss‐Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S.
1, 8 (1980) (“Curtiss‐Wright”) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S.
427, 438 (1956) (“Sears Roebuck”)). The exception provided by Rule 54(b) gives
the district court authority to enter a final judgment as to fewer than all of the
claims by or against a given party, or as to fewer than all of the parties in a multi‐
party litigation “only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason
for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). This authority should “be exercised sparingly,”
Harriscom Svenska AB v. Harris Corp., 947 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1991)
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(“Harriscom”), for the “district court must take into account” not only the equities
involved but also “judicial administrative interests,” Curtiss‐Wright, 446 U.S. at 8.
“[T]he standard against which a district court’s exercise of [its] discretion” in this
regard “is to be judged is the ‘interest of sound judicial administration.’” Id. at 10
(quoting Sears Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 437).
In the present case, all of the defendants are alleged to have engaged in the
challenged conduct, see, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 83, 93–96, and the Complaint asserts
all six of Plaintiffs‐Appellantsʹ causes of action against all of the defendants, see
id. at pages 23–35. If the District Court were to certify the dismissals of the
claims against the individual defendants for immediate appeal and were
thereafter to proceed to dismiss the Complaint against ESPSCO on the same
grounds as it dismissed the claims against the individual defendants, the appeals
with regard to this case would require the attention of two panels of this Court.
Ultimately, the decision whether or not to enter a Rule 54(b) certification is
“left to the sound judicial discretion of the district court. At the same time, . . .
‘any abuse of that discretion remains reviewable by the Court of Appeals.’”
Curtiss‐Wright, 446 U.S. at 10 (quoting Sears Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 437 (emphasis in
Curtiss‐Wright)). Thus, in order to facilitate meaningful appellate review, a
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district court’s order for entry of a partial final judgment “must be accompanied
by a reasoned, even if brief, explanation of its conclusion.” O’Bert ex rel. Estate of
O’Bert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29, 41 (2d Cir. 2003). A statement by a district court only
of its conclusion, in the language of the Rule, that “there is no just reason for
delay,” unaccompanied by any explanation of the assessments that led to that
conclusion, would be insufficiently explained. See, e.g., Harriscom, 947 F.2d at 630
(“Absent an explanation by the district court, we have no basis for conducting a
meaningful review of the district courtʹs exercise of its discretion.”); National Bank
of Washington v. Dolgov, 853 F.2d 57, 58–59 (2d Cir. 1988) (given a certification that
only tracked the language of Rule 54(b), without an explanation, dismissing the
appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction); Arlinghaus v. Ritenour, 543 F.2d 461, 463–
64 (2d Cir. 1976) (same); Cullen v. Margiotta, 618 F.2d 226, 228 (2d Cir. 1980)
(same); see also id. (a “unified” appeal “is particularly desirable where . . . the
adjudicated and pending claims are closely related and stem from essentially the
same factual allegations”).
In the present case, rather than immediately dismissing the appeal for lack
of a final judgment, as was done in some of the cases discussed above, we
remand pursuant to the procedure set out in United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19,
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21–22 (2d Cir. 1994), for the District Court either to complete the proceedings
against ESPSCO before entry of a final judgment, or to enter an order certifying
the dismissals of the claims against the individual defendants for immediate
entry of a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), supplementing the
record with a reasoned, even if brief, explanation of its view as to why an
immediate appeal of the dismissals of the claims against those defendants is
appropriate.
The mandate shall issue forthwith. On remand, if the District Court enters
an order supplementing the record with a Rule 54(b) certification for the entry of
a partial final judgment, any party may have the appeal reinstated by filing with
the Clerk of this Court, within 30 days, a letter (attaching a copy of the relevant
supplemental order) advising the Clerk that the appeal should be reinstated. In
that event, no new notice of appeal or additional filing fee will be required. If on
remand the District Court instead delays entry of final judgment until Plaintiffs‐
Appellants’ claims against ESPSCO have been adjudicated, any party to the
present appeal may have the appeal reinstated either (a) by filing such a letter
and attachment with the Clerk of this Court if no rulings other than those
specified in the original notice of appeal are to be challenged, or (b) by filing a
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notice of cross‐appeal or an amended notice of appeal if the aggrieved party
seeks to challenge a ruling not listed in the original notice of appeal. A filing fee
will be required for any cross‐appeal. In the interest of judicial economy, any
reinstated appeal will be assigned to this panel.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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