MEMORANDUM DECISION
Nov 25 2015, 6:08 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Aaron Isby Gregory F. Zoeller
Carlisle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Aaron T. Craft
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Aaron Isby, November 25, 2015
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
77A01-1504-PL-132
v. Appeal from the Sullivan Superior
Court.
Bruce Lemmon, as The Honorable Christopher Newton,
Special Judge.
Commissioner of the Indiana Cause No. 77D01-1102-PL-47
Department of Correction, and
the Indiana Parole Board,
Appellees-Defendants.
Shepard, Senior Judge
[1] Though he is in the course of serving a forty-year sentence for attempted
murder, Aaron Isby contends in this proceeding that the trial court should have
ordered him released from prison. We affirm the court’s denial of what Isby
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characterized as an action for declaratory judgment. The trial court rightly
entertained it as a habeas.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Isby’s record of convictions, sentences, and pro se petitions makes outlining his
status something of a challenge, but rather than elaborate on his seven
convictions and a contempt sentence, we think the crucial timelines are these:
(1) a thirty-year sentence for class A robbery, imposed in 1988, from which he
was released in 2008; (2) a ninety-day sentence for contempt of court, which he
began serving after finishing his sentence for robbery; and (3) a forty-year
sentence for an attempted murder he committed while in prison, a sentence that
began to run in 2009 after he finished his sentence for contempt.
[3] In 2010, Isby filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, contending
that he was entitled to immediate release. The case was transferred to Sullivan
County, where Isby is presently confined. After an appeal which produced a
change of judge, Special Judge Christopher Newton granted the State’s motion
for summary judgment.
Discussion and Decision
I. Was Judge Newton Properly Appointed?
[4] As a preliminary matter, Isby contends that Judge Newton was wrongly
appointed. After the change of judge was granted, a panel was named and the
parties struck. The judicial officer who remained after striking declined to
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serve, so the appointment was referred to the judicial district’s presiding judge,
under the district plan created pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 79. The presiding
judge designated Judge Newton, who presided over the case for several years
and entered the decision now under appeal.
[5] Isby now contends, for the first time, that Newton could not serve because Isby
struck Judge Newton from the panel. The State correctly replies that a party
must object to a special judge’s authority at the time of the appointment, or the
issue is waived. Bivins v. State, 485 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. 1985). Moreover, judges
who were struck during the panel process are eligible for appointment under
district plans. Ind. Trial Rule 79(J).
II. Was It Correct to Treat Isby’s Action as a Habeas?
[6] Isby’s contention has been that he was not seeking to challenge the validity of
his sentence or conviction or to seek “immediate discharge,” such that his case
is not properly treated as a habeas matter. The State points out that Isby’s
prayer for relief has always been “release from prison.” Appellees’ Br. p. 23.
[7] Examining the relationship between the Declaratory Judgment Act and habeas
corpus, the Supreme Court has held that the former is not available to a
prisoner who has an adequate remedy in habeas. Hinkle v. Howard, 225 Ind.
176, 73 N.E.2d 674 (1947). Accord Madden v. Houck, 403 N.E.2d 1133, 1135
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (the Declaratory Judgment Act “was not intended to
eliminate well-known causes of action, where the issues are ripe for litigation
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through the usual processes”). Isby’s request to be released from prison was
properly treated as a habeas request by the trial court.
III. Was Judgment for the State an Error?
[8] In 2008, the Indiana Parole Board replied to a letter from Isby by saying that his
projected parole date was in 2009. Isby says that this letter estops the State
from arguing that he has not completed his sentence obligations, that his
tendering of the letter in this proceeding creates a question of fact making
summary judgment improper, and that the State’s failure to release him thus
violates Equal Protection.
[9] The Parole Board’s letter to Isby was correct, as far as it went. In early 2009,
Isby completed the executed portion of his robbery sentence and the ninety days
he owed on the contempt. The Board’s letter made no mention of the fact that
Isby was to begin serving his sentence for attempting to murder a prison guard
after these two obligations ran their course. It may be that Isby’s letter to the
Board did not mention his sentence for attempted murder, just as he has argued
here that it was improper for Judge Newton to take cognizance of that
conviction in deciding that Isby was not entitled to an order releasing him from
prison. Or, it may be that the Board responded to Aaron Isby thinking that he
and Aaron Israel were two different people, as appellant has used both names.
[10] In any event, the forty-year conviction and sentence for attempted murder
appear not actually to be under attack. There are no disputes of material fact,
and the trial court properly granted judgment to the State.
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Conclusion
[11] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[12] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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