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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-15319
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cv-00558-BJD-PDB
JOHNNY L. CLARIDY and JANIE H. CLARIDY,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
JASON M. GOLUB, in his individual capacity,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(November 30, 2015)
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Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant Jason Golub, a Lake City police officer, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified and
state official immunity. Defendant arrested Plaintiff Johnny Claridy in May 2009,
after responding to a reported disturbance at the Claridy residence. Following his
arrest, Plaintiff was charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, disorderly
conduct, and two counts of culpable negligence, all of which charges were
ultimately dismissed. He and his wife, Janie Claridy, sued Defendant in his
individual capacity, asserting a § 1983 excessive force claim and state law claims
for malicious prosecution and loss of consortium. 1 As to the § 1983 claim,
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. As
to the state law claims, he moved for summary judgment on the ground of
individual immunity under Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a). Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we agree with the district court that Defendant
is not entitled to summary judgment based on either type of immunity. We
therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
1
Janie Claridy’s loss of consortium claim is derivative of the other claims asserted in the
complaint, and requires no separate analysis. Thus, for simplicity, we refer to Johnny Claridy as
“Plaintiff” and to Janie Claridy as Mrs. Claridy.
2
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I. Factual Background
On May 16, 2009, Defendant and fellow officer Rebecca Miles responded to
a request by animal control authorities to assist with the capture of three pit bull
terriers that were running loose outside the Claridy residence and allegedly
terrorizing a neighbor, Ronald King. Plaintiff’s wife, Janie Claridy, was the only
person home at the time. The officers spoke to Mrs. Claridy about the dogs, then
helped to impound them, and left the scene.
After speaking to the officers, Mrs. Claridy called Plaintiff, who was at a
picnic with family members, and told him that the dogs had gotten loose and were
being impounded. Along with his four children and his brother Jeffrey Claridy,
Plaintiff returned home to deal with the situation. By the time they arrived, the
dogs had been taken away and no officers were present. As Plaintiff and Jeffrey
were walking around the house trying to determine how the dogs had gotten loose,
the neighbor, Ronald King, began arguing with them. The argument escalated, and
King called the police.
Around this time, Defendant received a call over his police radio that there
was a disturbance at the Claridy residence, that Plaintiff was threatening his
neighbor, and that there might be a gun in Plaintiff’s car at the scene. Defendant
returned to the residence, and was the first officer on the scene. When he arrived,
several people were standing on the porch and on the sidewalk in front of the
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residence. Plaintiff and Jeffrey were talking, and Jeffrey was also talking loudly
on the phone to another family member. Defendant judged the situation to be
hostile and immediately called for back-up.
The parties dispute what happened next. Construing the facts in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendant exited his vehicle and told Plaintiff and
Jeffrey to “calm down.” Jeffrey responded, “Calm down? We calm [sic]. We’re
the victims. He threatened us.” Shortly thereafter, Defendant told Plaintiff he was
under arrest for disorderly conduct and screamed, “Get your hands up!” Plaintiff
responded, “Hold up. What’s going on? We was [sic] just talking. Where did all
of that come from?” Defendant again instructed Plaintiff to get his hands up, and
Plaintiff responded, “Sir, my hands are up.” Mrs. Claridy urged Plaintiff to stay
calm and keep his hands up, and also advised Defendant that Plaintiff had just been
released from the hospital following knee surgery.
As Defendant continued yelling for Plaintiff to get his hands up, Plaintiff
started backing away toward his car, which was parked in front of the Claridy
residence. Defendant followed, until finally Plaintiff reached the car and leaned
back against it. Based on the information he had received on his police radio,
Defendant believed there was a gun in the car and that Plaintiff was trying to open
the car door to get it. Defendant deployed his taser, causing Plaintiff to fall
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forward, striking his knees, stomach, and face on the sidewalk. Plaintiff then lay
immobile on the ground.
Because he was momentarily “out” after the tasing, Plaintiff did not
immediately hear Defendant’s instruction for him to put his hands behind his back.
When Plaintiff awoke, he saw a commotion and heard his children crying. He told
his wife to get the children in the house, and, while still lying face-down on the
ground, placed his hands behind his back and submitted to arrest. Nevertheless,
Defendant tased Plaintiff a second time, and then handcuffed him while he was on
the ground. As Plaintiff was unable to stand after falling on his injured knee,
Defendant pulled him up and dragged him down the sidewalk by his handcuffs.
Defendant’s supervisor then called an ambulance, and the paramedic staff removed
the taser barbs from Plaintiff and took him to Lake City Medical Center for
treatment.
Later that evening, Defendant completed an offense report indicating that
Plaintiff had committed the offenses of battery of a law enforcement officer and
disorderly conduct. An attorney from the State Attorney’s Office subsequently
contacted Defendant and asked if he would agree to a reduction of the battery
charge to resisting arrest without violence. Defendant had no other
communications with the attorney regarding the charges. A warrant was issued
and Plaintiff was arrested on the charges of resisting arrest without violence and
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disorderly conduct. The State Attorney then modified the charges again to battery
of a law enforcement officer, disorderly conduct, and two counts of culpable
negligence. Those charges ultimately were dismissed.
II. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this action in May 2013, asserting a § 1983 excessive force
claim and state malicious prosecution and loss of consortium claims against
Defendant in his individual capacity. 2 Defendant moved for summary judgment on
the ground of qualified immunity on the federal § 1983 claim, and on the ground of
individual immunity, under Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a), on the state law claims.
The district court granted qualified immunity as to the first tasing, but otherwise
denied Defendant’s motion.3 Construing the evidence in favor of Plaintiff, the
court found that Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity as to the second
tasing, and that he was not entitled to immunity under § 768.28(9)(a) on the state
claims. Defendant appeals both rulings.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“We review de novo a district court’s denial of summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, applying the same legal standards that governed the district
court.” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2013).
2
Plaintiffs also asserted claims against Lake City. Those claims are not at issue in this appeal.
3
Plaintiff does not contest the district court’s ruling as to the first tasing.
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In conducting our review, we construe the evidence in favor of the plaintiff and
decide whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity under the plaintiff’s
version of the facts. Id. See also Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014)
(noting, in a qualified immunity case, “the importance of drawing inferences in
favor of the nonmovant”). We acknowledge that the “facts, as accepted at the
summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may not be the actual facts of the
case.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, we view the facts from the plaintiff’s
perspective because the determinative issue on appeal is “not which facts the
parties might be able to prove” but rather, whether “certain given facts”
demonstrate a violation of clearly established law. Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d
1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2009). The same standard of review applies to the district
court’s denial of individual immunity under Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a). See
Cummings v. DeKalb Cnty., 24 F.3d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir. 1994).
II. Qualified Immunity
Examining first Plaintiff’s federal excessive force claim, qualified immunity
“protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suits in
their individual capacities unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope v.
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Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). It is undisputed that Defendant was engaged in
a discretionary duty when he arrested Plaintiff. It is thus Plaintiff’s burden to show
that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Id. at 995. To meet this burden,
Plaintiff must show that Defendant’s conduct during the arrest (1) violated a
constitutional right that (2) was clearly established at the time of the incident. See
McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1205. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, both prongs are satisfied here as to the second tasing.
A. Constitutional Violation
Assuming Plaintiff’s factual assertions to be true, the district court held that
the second tasing constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. A Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is analyzed under the
“objective reasonableness” standard. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020
(2014) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) and Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985)). Reasonableness in this context depends on all the
circumstances relevant to an officer’s decision to use force and the amount of force
used. Id. We view the circumstances “from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). And we allow for the fact that
officers are often required to make “split-second judgments—in circumstances that
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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The district court concluded that Defendant had arguable probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff for disorderly conduct, and Plaintiff does not challenge that ruling
on appeal. When making an arrest, an officer may constitutionally use such force
as is “necessary in the situation at hand.” Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272,
1288 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). To determine
whether a particular use of force was necessary during an arrest, we consider “the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to
the safety of the officer[] or others, and whether he [wa]s actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Assuming, as the district court did, that Plaintiff was lying face-down on the
sidewalk, with his hands behind his back and submitting to arrest, all of the
relevant factors suggest that Defendant’s second use of the taser against him was
unreasonable. The crime for which Plaintiff was being arrested was not serious.
Fils, 647 F.3d at 1288 (“Disorderly conduct is not a serious offense.”). Plaintiff
did not present a threat to Defendant or anyone else as he lay face-down on the
sidewalk with his hands behind his back. Finally, according to Plaintiff, he was
not resisting and had submitted to arrest when Defendant discharged his taser a
second time. We agree with the district court that the use of the taser under these
circumstances would violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 1289 (“unprovoked
force against a non-hostile and non-violent suspect who has not disobeyed
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instructions violates that suspect’s rights under the Fourth Amendment”). Cf.
Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that an
officer’s use of a taser once against a suspect who was “hostile, belligerent, and
uncooperative” during a traffic stop was not excessive).
B. Clearly Established Law
To be clearly established, the contours of a right must be “sufficiently
definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have
understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2023. “The salient
question is whether the state of the law at the time of an incident provided fair
warning to the defendant[] that [his] alleged conduct was unconstitutional.” Tolan,
134 S. Ct. at 1866 (quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). Fair warning
is commonly provided by materially similar precedent from the Supreme Court,
this Court, or the highest state court in which the case arose. See Terrell v. Smith,
668 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2012). However, a case directly on point is not
required as long as “existing precedent” placed the “constitutional question beyond
debate.” Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). See also Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“judicial precedent with materially identical facts is not essential for the law to be
clearly established”).
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In several decisions issued prior to this incident in May 2009, we held that
the “gratuitous use of force when a criminal suspect is not resisting arrest” is
unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment. Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d
1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008). See also See Fils, 647 F.3d at 1292 (holding that
officers should have known by 2003 that tasing a non-violent disorderly conduct
suspect, who was not resisting arrest and had not threatened anyone, was
unreasonable); Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002) (concluding
that an officer violated clearly established law when he slammed the plaintiff’s
head against a car after she was secured); Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1233
(11th Cir. 2000) (denying qualified immunity to officers who slammed the
plaintiff’s head on the pavement and kicked him even though he was handcuffed
and not resisting or struggling with the officers in any way). These cases gave
Defendant fair warning that the second tasing, which allegedly occurred while
Plaintiff was lying face-down on the sidewalk, complying with Defendant’s
instruction to put his hands behind his back, and submitting to arrest for, at most, a
minor offense, was unconstitutional. Thus, construing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on the §
1983 claim.
III. Individual Immunity Under State Law
A. Jurisdiction
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Turning to Plaintiff’s state law claims—and the district court’s denial of
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on those claims—our jurisdiction is
limited to appeals from “final decisions” of the district court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. Ordinarily, a district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment
does not qualify as a final decision. See Schmelz v. Monroe Cnty., 954 F.2d 1540,
1542 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Generally, an order denying a motion for summary
judgment is not an appealable final order.”). However, the courts have recognized
a “small class of interlocutory orders, referred to as ‘collateral orders,’ which are
offshoots of the principal litigation, and which are immediately appealable without
regard to the posture of the underlying case.” Id. (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Ind.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (citation and quotation marks omitted)). An
order denying summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity falls into
this category. Id. at 1543 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)).
As the Supreme Court has explained, qualified immunity protects public officials
from the burden of litigation rather than just liability. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
This protection is “irretrievably lost” when a district court denies qualified
immunity, justifying an immediate appeal prior to the entry of a final judgment.
Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2019.
We have, in several instances, extended the above principle to permit the
immediate appeal of an order denying summary judgment on the ground of official
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immunity under state law. See Griesel v. Hamlin, 963 F.2d 338, 341 (11th Cir.
1992) (finding jurisdiction to review an order denying a motion for summary
judgment based on sovereign immunity under Georgia law). The critical inquiry in
determining the appealability of such an order is whether the state law confers
“immunity from suit rather than simply a defense to substantive liability.” Id. at
340. Assuming the former, we have held that an order denying official immunity
under state law is immediately appealable. Id. at 341. See also Sheth v. Webster,
145 F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir. 1998) (exercising appellate jurisdiction over an
order denying “discretionary function” immunity under Alabama law).
We have not yet considered whether an order denying immunity under
Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a) is immediately appealable, but based on the
language of the statute and the case law interpreting it, we conclude that it is.4
Section 768.28(9)(a) states that:
No officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its
subdivisions shall be held personally liable in tort or named as a party
defendant in any action for any injury or damage suffered as a result
of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his
employment or function, unless such officer, employee, or agent acted
in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting
wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.
4
In Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999), we held that the denial of sovereign
immunity under Florida law was not immediately appealable, because “Florida sovereign
immunity is immunity only from liability or damages but not from suit itself.” Jones did not
consider the immunity granted by § 768.28(9)(a), and thus does not govern our decision here.
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Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) (emphasis added). The Florida Supreme Court
recently confirmed that § 768.28(9)(a), as suggested by its plain language,
provides immunity from suit rather than simply liability. See Keck v.
Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359, 366 (Fla. 2012) (“if a defendant who is entitled to
the immunity granted in § 768.28(9)(a) is erroneously named as a party
defendant and is required to stand trial, that individual has effectively lost
the right bestowed by statute to be protected from even being named as a
defendant”). Thus, under the reasoning of Griesel and Sheth, we will
assume that we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying
immunity under § 768.28(9)(a) for the state law claims.
B. Immunity under § 768.28(9)(a)
As quoted above, § 768.28(9)(a) protects an officer from personal liability
for acts within the scope of his employment, unless the officer “acted in bad faith
or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard
of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). In determining
whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment as a result of the immunity
provided by § 768.28(9)(a), the relevant inquiry is “whether a reasonable trier of
fact could possibly conclude that the [officer’s] conduct was willful and wanton, or
would otherwise fall within the exceptions to the statute.” Furtado v. Yun Chung
Law, 51 So. 3d 1269, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citation and quotation marks
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omitted). See also Thompson v. Douds, 852 So. 2d 299, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
(“Because the record shows that there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the officers acted with wanton and willful disregard of [the arrestee’s]
rights and safety, the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the basis
of statutory immunity was improper.”).
There is sufficient evidence in this case to raise a question of fact as to
whether Defendant acted willfully or with malice. Following Plaintiff’s arrest,
Defendant completed an offense report indicating that Plaintiff had committed
disorderly conduct by violently threatening Defendant as he tried to deescalate the
disturbance at the Claridy residence, and that Plaintiff had then committed battery
on a law enforcement officer by pushing Defendant with both of his hands.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant fabricated critical parts of the report, most
importantly the allegation that Plaintiff had threatened and pushed Defendant. His
contention is supported by testimony in the record.
The evidence suggests that the State Attorney relied on Defendant’s report in
deciding to prosecute Plaintiff, and in defining the charges against him. Assuming
the report was fabricated, a jury might reasonably find that Defendant acted
willfully or with malice. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. Valladares, 141 So. 3d 714,
718 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (noting that a person who reports a crime acts maliciously
when he “knows the report is false or recklessly disregards whether the report is
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false”); Lloyd v. Hines, 474 So. 2d 376, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (suggesting that
an officer’s use of fraud or corrupt means to obtain a warrant gives rise to
individual liability under § 768.28(9)(a)). Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled
to summary judgment on the state law claims based on immunity provided by §
768.28(9)(a).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we agree with the district court that, under
Plaintiff’s version of the events, Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on
the federal claim or to individual immunity under Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a) on
the state law claims. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court
denying summary judgment.
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