NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOV 30 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
SAMUEL ROSEN, No. 15-56179
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-01669-WQH-
BGS
v.
BEATRICE NELSON, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2015**
Before: TASHIMA, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Samuel Rosen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a constitutional violation arising from a state
court’s dismissal of his defamation action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154
(9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Rosen’s action because it is a
“forbidden de facto appeal” of the state court’s order granting defendant Nelson’s
anti-SLAPP motion to strike and raises claims that are “inextricably intertwined”
with the order striking Rosen’s state court complaint. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704
F.3d 772, 777, 779 (9th Cir. 2012) (the Rooker–Feldman doctrine “bars a district
court from exercising jurisdiction not only over an action explicitly styled as a
direct appeal, but also over the ‘de facto equivalent’ of such an appeal,” and
explaining when claims are inextricably intertwined (citation omitted)).
Rosen’s motion for judicial notice, filed on September 3, 2015, is denied.
Rosen’s motion for appointment of counsel, filed on September 17, 2015, is
denied.
AFFIRMED.
2 15-56179