FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 30 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRENDA MOORE, No. 13-56979
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00341-JLS-
MDD
v.
TRI-CITY HOSPITAL FOUNDATION; MEMORANDUM*
et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2015**
Before: TASHIMA, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Brenda Moore appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her civil action alleging federal and state law claims in connection with medical
care provided at the Tri-City Hospital emergency department. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d
1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Moore’s claim under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPPA”) because “HIPAA . . . does
not provide for a private right of action.” Webb v. Smart Document Sols., LLC,
499 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007).
The district court properly dismissed Moore’s claim under the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd,
against the doctor defendants because “EMTALA does not allow private suits
against physicians.” Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th
Cir. 1995). The district court properly dismissed Moore’s EMTALA claim against
defendants Tri-City Hospital Foundation and Tri-City Healthcare District because
Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to show a violation of EMTALA. See
Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 246 F.3d 1248, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing
that EMTALA imposes no standard of care for screening patients; “the touchstone
is whether . . . the procedure is designed to identify an emergency medical
condition that is manifested by acute and severe symptoms[,]” which is determined
by whether an examination is comparable to that “offered to other patients
2 13-56979
presenting similar symptoms . . . .” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Moore’s damages claims against the
state court judge and commissioner because these defendants are immune. See
Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995) (commissioner is
entitled to judicial immunity from damages liability for claims arising out of
official acts or the performance of judge-like functions); Ashelman v. Pope, 793
F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Judges and those performing judge-like
functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their
official capacities.”). Moreover, to the extent that Moore sought to overturn these
defendants’ rulings, the district court properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Moore’s action is a
forbidden “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment and raised claims that
are “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d
1148, 1154, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Moore’s recusal
request as Moore advanced no factual or legal basis for recusal. See United States
v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review).
We reject Moore’s contention that the district court was biased against her.
3 13-56979
We reject Moore’s contention that her constitutional rights were violated by
not being able to cross-examine defendants. Because the district court properly
dismissed Moore’s action on the pleadings, Moore had no right to discovery or to
cross-examine defendants.
We do not consider Moore’s new allegation of slander raised for the first
time on appeal. See Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2004).
AFFIRMED.
4 13-56979