This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0458
Antoine Goodman, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed November 30, 2015
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-11-1560
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Katie Conners, Special Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Heather D. Pipenhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
In 2011, Antoine Goodman pleaded guilty to a first-degree controlled substance
crime. In 2014, he filed a petition for postconviction relief in which he challenged the
reliability of the laboratory tests of the substances he admitted to possessing. The district
court denied the petition, without an evidentiary hearing, on the grounds that Goodman’s
petition is untimely and that he cannot establish any exception to the statute of
limitations. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 16, 2011, Burnsville police officers stopped a vehicle in which Goodman
was sitting in the back seat, next to a small child. One of the officers found two baggies
where Goodman had been seated and a pistol on the floor nearby. A field test revealed
that one of the baggies contained crack cocaine.
The state charged Goodman with three offenses: (1) first-degree controlled
substance crime, see Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(1) (2010); (2) ineligible person in
possession of a firearm, see Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2010); and (3) child
endangerment, see Minn. Stat. § 609.378, subd. 1(c) (2010). In July 2011, Goodman
pleaded guilty to counts 1 and 2. Based on an agreement between the parties, the district
court dismissed count 3. In November 2011, the district court imposed concurrent
sentences of 94 months of imprisonment on count 1 and 60 months of imprisonment on
count 2. Goodman did not pursue a direct appeal.
In July 2014, Goodman filed a petition for postconviction relief in which he
moved to withdraw his guilty plea with respect to count 1. His petition is based on
revelations that the Saint Paul Police Department Crime Lab (“SPPDCL”), the laboratory
where the substances seized from the vehicle were tested, had inadequate training and
testing protocols. See generally Roberts v. State, 856 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn. App.
2
2014), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 2015). Goodman acknowledged in his petition that
he did not comply with the general two-year statute of limitations, but he sought to
invoke two exceptions to the two-year statute of limitations.
In January 2015, the postconviction court denied Goodman’s petition without an
evidentiary hearing. The postconviction court reasoned that Goodman cannot satisfy
either of the two exceptions to the two-year statute of limitations that he invoked in his
petition. Goodman appeals.
DECISION
Goodman argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition for
postconviction relief. Specifically, he contends that the postconviction court erred in its
analysis of the newly-discovered-evidence and interests-of-justice exceptions to the
statute of limitations.
A person seeking postconviction relief must file a postconviction petition within a
two-year limitations period. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2012). The limitations
period begins upon the latter of “(1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no
direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct
appeal.” Id., subd. 4(a)(1)-(2). If the two-year limitations period has expired, the
postconviction court nonetheless may consider the petition if any of five exceptions
applies. Id., subd. 4(b). But any petition relying on an exception to the two-year statute
of limitations is subject to another limitations period, which provides that the petition
“must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises.” Id., subd. 4(c); see also
Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Minn. 2012).
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Accordingly, “[a] postconviction petitioner is not entitled to relief or an
evidentiary hearing on an untimely petition unless he can demonstrate that ‘he satisfies
one of the [statutory] exceptions . . . and that application of the exception is not time-
barred.’” Roberts, 856 N.W.2d at 290 (quoting Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 168
(Minn. 2012)). “If the petitioner does not demonstrate that an exception applies and that
application of the exception is timely, the postconviction court may summarily deny the
petition as untimely.” Id. This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to
a postconviction court’s summary denial of a postconviction petition. Id.
In this case, Goodman invoked two exceptions to the general two-year statute of
limitations. He alleged that his petition should be considered, even though it was not
filed within two years, because of the statutory exceptions for newly discovered evidence
and the interests of justice. The postconviction court concluded that neither exception
applies.1 We will separately consider each of the exceptions on which Goodman relies.
A. Newly-Discovered-Evidence Exception
Under the newly-discovered-evidence exception, a postconviction petition that is
filed after the two-year statute of limitations may be considered if five requirements are
satisfied: (1) “the petitioner alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence,” (2) the
1
The postconviction court rejected Goodman’s arguments concerning the two
exceptions by analyzing whether the requirements of each exception were satisfied. The
postconviction court did not consider whether Goodman filed his postconviction petition
“within two years of the date the claim [arose].” See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c).
On appeal, the state does not contend that the exceptions do not apply because they are
barred by the secondary two-year limitations period in subdivision 4(c). Thus, we
assume without deciding that Goodman filed his postconviction petition “within two
years of the date the claim [arose].” See id.
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evidence “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the
petitioner or petitioner’s attorney within the two-year time period for filing a
postconviction petition,” (3) “the evidence is not cumulative to evidence presented at
trial,” (4) the evidence “is not for impeachment purposes,” and (5) the evidence
“establishes by a clear and convincing standard that the petitioner is innocent of the
offense or offenses for which the petitioner was convicted.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(b)(2); see also Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 168; Roberts, 856 N.W.2d at 290.2
The postconviction court reasoned that this exception does not apply because
Goodman cannot satisfy the second and fifth requirements. The second requirement asks
whether the evidence “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence
by the petitioner or petitioner’s attorney within the two-year time period for filing a
postconviction petition.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2). The postconviction court
noted that Goodman “could have challenged [the SPPDCL test results] but chose not to
for whatever reason.” Goodman contends that the problems at the SPPDCL could not
have been ascertained through due diligence because no one knew that there were
problems at the SPPDCL until 2012. Goodman’s contention is foreclosed by this court’s
2
The postconviction court rejected Goodman’s arguments concerning the newly-
discovered-evidence exception by analyzing whether the requirements of the exception
were satisfied. The postconviction court did not question whether the newly-discovered-
evidence exception is limited to cases in which an offender was convicted after a
contested trial. The state did not raise that issue in the district court and does not raise the
issue on appeal. Thus, we assume without deciding that the newly-discovered-evidence
exception may apply to cases in which an offender was convicted after a guilty plea. See
Roberts, 856 N.W.2d at 291 n.2 (“assum[ing] without deciding that the newly-
discovered-evidence exception is applicable to a request for postconviction relief in the
form of plea withdrawal, even though the plain language of the statutory exception
suggests that it only applies to convictions resulting from a trial”).
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opinion in Roberts, in which we concluded that the appellant could have challenged the
reliability of the SPPDCL’s test results before 2012 because he had access to the test
results under the rules of criminal procedure, which permit discovery. 856 N.W.2d at
291. We reasoned that, merely because the appellant did not actually discover the
problems at the SPPDCL does not mean the appellant could not have discovered them
with due diligence. Id. That reasoning necessarily applies to this case. Furthermore,
Goodman could have filed a postconviction petition after problems at the SPPCL were
revealed in 2012 and before the two-year limitations period lapsed in November 2013.
Goodman and his counsel had an opportunity to discover facts relevant to the SPPDCL
test results within two years of the date on which his conviction became final. Goodman
does not contend that his trial attorney tried to do so but was prevented from doing so.
Goodman attempts to distinguish Roberts by pointing to the evidence in this case.
Specifically, he relies on an affidavit executed by the criminal-defense attorney who first
discovered and exposed the problems at the SPPDCL. The attorney states that she was
able to ascertain evidence of problems at the SPPCDL because of her specialized
scientific training and that an attorney without such training (such as Goodman’s trial
attorney) could not be expected to identify the problems. The attorney’s affidavit is not
helpful if an objective standard applies. The second requirement of the newly-
discovered-evidence exception asks whether the new evidence “could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or petitioner’s attorney.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2). The language of this provision suggests that the
legislature intended to impose an objective standard. Cf. Sanchez, 816 N.W.2d at 558-60
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(concluding that objective standard applies to determination when claim arose for
purposes of section 590.01, subdivision 4(c)); State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 358
(Minn. 2012) (concluding that objective standard applies to determination whether
attorney provided effective assistance). Furthermore, to apply a subjective standard
would require courts to consider numerous factors about the capabilities of a particular
attorney, which would be particularly cumbersome and time-consuming. Accordingly,
we ask only whether an attorney exercising due diligence could have discovered the
problem. We already have answered that question in the affirmative because one
attorney did so through a process authorized by the rules of criminal procedure. See
Roberts, 856 N.W.2d at 291. Accordingly, we follow both the reasoning and the result in
Roberts. Moreover, Goodman easily could have challenged the test results between 2012
and November 2013. Thus, the district court properly determined that Goodman cannot
satisfy the second requirement of the newly-discovered-evidence exception.
The fifth requirement asks whether, “by a clear and convincing standard . . . the
petitioner is innocent of the offense or offenses for which the petitioner was convicted.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2). Goodman contends that evidence of the problems at
the SPPDCL likely would lead to a more favorable result. But Goodman admitted at his
plea hearing that one of the baggies contained powdered cocaine. A field test identified
the substance in the other baggie as crack cocaine, and Goodman has nothing more than
speculation that the substance was not actually crack cocaine. His speculation is
insufficient to satisfy the clear-and-convincing standard. In Roberts, we stated that
“‘[a]ctual innocence is more than uncertainty about guilt’” and that “‘establishing actual
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innocence requires evidence that renders it more likely than not that no reasonable jury
would convict.’” 856 N.W.2d at 292 (quoting Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 170). Given
Goodman’s admission to possessing powdered cocaine, the field-test result, and the
absence of any evidence that the substances tested were not actually controlled
substances, Goodman cannot prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is actually
innocent of the offense to which he pleaded guilty. Thus, the district court properly
determined that Goodman cannot satisfy the fifth requirement of the newly-discovered-
evidence exception.
B. Interests-of-Justice Exception
Under the interests-of-justice exception, a postconviction petition that is filed after
the two-year statute of limitations may be considered if “the petition is not frivolous and
is in the interests of justice.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5). This exception applies
only in extraordinary circumstances. Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Minn.
2010); Roberts, 856 N.W.2d at 292.
Goodman contends that this exception is satisfied in part because he has
meritorious claims. He refers to the substantive claims that he alleged in his
postconviction petition and continues to pursue on appeal: newly discovered evidence, a
Brady violation, a violation of procedural due process, manifest injustice, and ineffective
assistance of counsel. But the merits of Goodman’s postconviction petition have no
bearing on the applicability of the interests-of-justice exception to the statute of
limitations. The supreme court recently clarified that the interests-of-justice exception
“relate[s] to the reason the petition was filed after the 2-year time limit in subdivision
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4(a), not the substantive claims in the petition,” and that “the interests-of-justice
exception is triggered by an injustice that caused the petitioner to miss the primary
deadline in subdivision 4(a), not the substance of the petition.” Sanchez, 816 N.W.2d at
557 (cited in Wayne v. State, 866 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn. 2015), and Brown v. State,
863 N.W.2d 781, 788 (Minn. 2015)). Accordingly, we will not review the merits of
Goodman’s claims for purposes of determining the applicability of the interests-of-justice
exception.
Goodman also contends that the state should be held responsible for the problems
at the SPPDCL and the lack of earlier disclosure of those problems. But the problems
were revealed within Goodman’s two-year limitations period. Furthermore, in Roberts,
we reasoned that the petitioner “had the opportunity to investigate the validity of the test
results in his case, and he declined to do so,” which meant that he was “at fault for his
failure to discover the problems at the crime lab before he pleaded guilty.” 856 N.W.2d
at 293. We also reasoned that there is “no fundamental unfairness that needs to be
addressed” because “it is not fundamentally unfair to hold Roberts accountable for his
choice to accept the state’s scientific evidence at face value and resolve his case with a
guilty plea in exchange for a reduced sentence.” Id. We further reasoned that it was not
“necessary to act in the interests of justice to protect the integrity of the judicial
proceedings” because the problems at the SPPDCL did “not stem from a flaw in the
judicial process.” Id. Goodman’s attempt to apply the interests-of-justice exception in
this case fails for the same reasons.
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Before concluding, we consider Goodman’s alternative argument that the
postconviction court erred by not providing him with an evidentiary hearing to present
evidence in support of his postconviction petition. A postconviction petitioner is not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing if “the petition and files and records of the proceeding
conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 509.04,
subd. 1 (2012). An evidentiary hearing is required only if “there are material facts in
dispute that must be resolved to determine the postconviction claim on its merits.” State
v. Powers, 695 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 2005). The postconviction court’s analysis, and
our analysis, does not depend on the resolution of disputed facts. Goodman’s failure to
satisfy the second requirement of the newly-discovered-evidence exception is a sufficient
basis for concluding that the exception does not apply. Goodman cannot satisfy the
interests-of-justice exception because of this court’s precedential caselaw. Thus, an
evidentiary hearing would not have been beneficial to Goodman.
In sum, the postconviction court did not err by denying Goodman’s petition for
postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
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