Opinion issued December 1, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-15-00346-CV
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ARACELI ZAPATA D/B/A EL SUPER, VELJACO CORP., INC., D/B/A EL
SUPER MEAT MARKET & TAQUERIA, AND CARMEN GLORIA
VELJANOVICH, Appellants
V.
CLEAR CREEK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, THE CITY OF
WEBSTER, AND HARRIS COUNTY, Appellees
On Appeal from the 165th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2013-04925
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants, Araceli Zapata d/b/a El Super, Veljaco Corp., Inc., d/b/a El
Super Meat Market & Taqueria, and Carmen Gloria Veljanovich, appealed from
the trial court’s final judgment, signed on March 2, 2015, in this tax delinquency
case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(1). On June 23, 2015, this Court granted the
appellants’ motion for extension of time to file their notice of appeal, filed on April
16, 2015, because it was filed within the fifteen-day extension period and
appellants provided a reasonable explanation. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.5(b), 26.3.
On November 3, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss for
mootness. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1). The parties request that we dismiss the
appeal because the trial court recently granted appellee Clear Creek Independent
School District’s petition to vacate the judgment, filed under Tax Code Section
33.56, and signed an order on October 30, 2015, vacating the final judgment. See
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.56(a)(2) (West Supp. 2014). Thus, the parties contend
that this appeal has been rendered moot because there is no longer an issue in
controversy. See Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012).
Generally, this Court has civil appellate jurisdiction over final judgments or
interlocutory orders specifically authorized as appealable by statute. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.012, 51.014(a)(1)–(12) (West Supp. 2014);
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). After the trial court
vacated the final judgment, there is no appealable final judgment or interlocutory
order, and no exception applies here. See Cooper v. Hamilton Cnty., No. 10-03-
283-CV, 2003 WL 23122323, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 31, 2003, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (granting parties’ motion to dismiss appeal for want of jurisdiction after
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trial court granted taxing entities’ motion to vacate judgment under section
33.56(a)(1) of Tax Code). Also, the motion to dismiss is signed by counsel for the
appellants and appellees, Clear Creek Independent School District, The City of
Webster, and Harris County. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.1(a)(5), 10.3(a)(2). No other
party has filed a notice of appeal and no opinion has issued. See id. 42.1(a)(1), (c).
Accordingly, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal for want of
jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1), 43.2(f). We dismiss any other pending
motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Higley, Huddle, and Lloyd.
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