December 2 2015
DA 13-0686
Case Number: DA 13-0686
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2015 MT 336
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JACKIE LEE FAVEL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Hill, Cause No. DC-12-122
Honorable Daniel A. Boucher, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
James Reavis, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Brenda K. Elias, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Gina Dahl, Hill County Attorney, Ed Hirsch, Deputy County Attorney,
Havre, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 30, 2015
Decided: December 2, 2015
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Jackie Lee Favel appeals her felony conviction from the Twelfth Judicial District
Court, Hill County, for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). We affirm.
¶2 Favel raises the following issue on appeal, which we restate as follows:
Did the prosecution improperly comment upon the inference of intoxication
contained within § 61-8-404(2), MCA, and assert that Favel was responsible for
establishing her innocence, thereby denying Favel her due process right to a fair
and impartial trial?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 On September 21, 2012, the Havre Police Department received a report of an
intoxicated driver traveling from Chinook to Havre in a green Cadillac. Soon thereafter,
Sergeant Andrew Poulos observed a vehicle matching this description turn southbound
onto 12th Avenue in Havre. Sergeant Poulos began to follow the vehicle. He observed
the vehicle drift from the north side of the street to the south side and nearly hit two
pedestrians. Sergeant Poulos noted that the vehicle came “within feet” of the pedestrians
and that the driver failed to apply the brakes.
¶4 Sergeant Poulos initiated a traffic stop and identified Favel as the driver. He
noticed that Favel’s eyes were red and glassy; she was slurring her speech; and a strong
odor of alcoholic beverage was coming from her breath. After Favel exited the vehicle,
Sergeant Poulos asked her to count from 11 to 23, count down from 33 to 21, and recite
the alphabet. Favel failed to complete any of these exercises correctly.
2
¶5 Next, Favel was asked to complete standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs),
including the walk-and-turn test and the one-leg stand test. On the walk and turn, Favel
committed seven out of eight mistakes, including losing her balance, stepping off the line,
and taking an incorrect number of steps. On the one-leg stand, Favel committed three out
of four mistakes, including swaying, raising her arms, and putting her foot down. Based
on his observations, Sergeant Poulos asked Favel to submit to a preliminary breath test.
Favel refused.
¶6 Following the SFSTs, Sergeant Poulos placed Favel under arrest and transported
her to the Hill County Detention Center. At the Detention Center, Favel was asked to
submit to a breath sample for screening using the Intoxilyzer 8000. Favel again refused
to submit to a breath test. After Favel’s refusal, Sergeant Poulos applied for and received
a search warrant authorizing him to obtain a sample of Favel’s blood. Subsequent testing
at the Montana State Crime Lab determined that Favel had a blood alcohol concentration
of 0.13 percent.
¶7 The State charged Favel by Information with felony DUI, fourth or subsequent.
The State later filed an Amended Information to include an alternative charge of
operating a noncommercial vehicle with an alcohol concertation of 0.08 percent or more,
also a felony.
¶8 Prior to trial, Favel filed a motion in limine requesting the court exclude evidence
of preliminary breath test results and any argument by the prosecution that may shift the
3
burden of proof from the state to the defense. In regard to the second part of her motion,
Favel stated:
[A]lthough a failure to give a breath or blood test is admissible, any
argument or comment by the State that Ms. Favel could have “proved his
[sic] innocence” by giving a breath or blood test would be shifting of the
burden to Ms. Favel to show his [sic] lack of criminal culpability.
In its response, the State did not object to the exclusion of the preliminary breath test
results as Favel did not submit to a preliminary breath test. Regarding Favel’s
burden-shifting argument, the State contended that discussing the inference of
intoxication is admissible evidence and does not shift the burden of proof onto the
defendant. The State reasoned that § 61-8-404(2), MCA, “states that a refusal creates a
rebuttable inference that the Defendant was under the influence” and “[s]uggesting to the
jury that the Defendant refused because she was aware the result would be positive is
exactly the type of inference a prosecutor may propose, and precisely the situation Mont.
Code Ann. § 61-8-404(2) contemplates.”
¶9 On the day of trial, prior to voir dire, the District Court considered and ruled from
the bench on several outstanding motions. The court granted Favel’s request to exclude
evidence of the preliminary breath test. However, the court did not address the
burden-shifting argument raised by Favel in the motion in limine. Instead, the court
turned to other motions unrelated to this appeal. Favel did not bring the burden-shifting
issue to the attention of the court or seek a ruling from the court.
¶10 At trial, the State called Sergeant Poulos to testify in its case-in-chief concerning
the events of September 21, 2012. During direct examination with Sergeant Poulos, the
4
prosecutor asked: “[D]id you give her an opportunity to provide a [breath] sample to clear
her of driving under the influence?” Sergeant Poulos replied, “I did.” Favel did not
object to the prosecutor’s question or move to strike.
¶11 During argument, the prosecutor discussed Favel’s refusal to submit to a breath
test by commenting on the circumstances of Favel’s stop, her performance on the SFSTs,
and the results of her blood test. The prosecutor argued:
These are all the signs of impairment that an officer is looking for in a DUI
investigation. He saw them all. At this point, he turned to an instrument, a
portable Breathalyzer test to determine the alcohol in her system. It is an
instrument that could prove how much alcohol is in her system, could
exonerate her, could prove her innocence.
The prosecutor then argued from the perspective of Sergeant Poulos:
He went to the next part of the investigation which was taking her to the
Hill County Detention Center . . . . He said, I’m going to have you retake
these tests. I will give you another opportunity to prove to me you’re not
impaired. She refused. He said, well, all right, I’m going to read to you the
Montana Implied Consent law. It’s basically another iteration of you have
the right to provide a breath—basically, you have given consent to provide
a breath sample. At the same time, the Montana Implied Consent says you
have the right to get your own independent blood draw. You can
double-check our work. She refused again an instrument which could
prove her innocence and she refused.
Lastly, the prosecutor addressed the inference of intoxication in rebuttal, stating:
The next inference is that if a person refuses, you can infer that they are
impaired, of course, obviously. Defense said the reason . . . she refused
was because she is fiercely protective of herself. She’s fiercely protective
of a blood sample that can prove her innocence? It’s completely illogical,
makes no sense.
Favel did not object to any of the prosecutor’s statements during closing or rebuttal.
5
¶12 After a two-day trial, a Hill County jury found Favel guilty of felony DUI. The
District Court sentenced Favel to the Montana Department of Corrections for a term of 13
months, followed by a suspended term of 3 years.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶13 Generally, this Court does not address issues raised for the first time on appeal.
However, when a defendant’s fundamental rights are invoked, we may choose to invoke
the common law plain error doctrine where failing to review the claimed error may result
in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the question of the fundamental
fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial
process. State v. Taylor, 2010 MT 94, ¶ 12, 356 Mont. 167, 231 P.3d 79. Plain error
review is discretionary, and we apply it on a case-by-case basis. State v. Reim, 2014 MT
108, ¶ 29, 374 Mont. 487, 323 P.3d 880.
DISCUSSION
¶14 Did the prosecution improperly comment upon the inference of intoxication
contained within § 61-8-404(2), MCA, and assert that Favel was responsible for
establishing her innocence, thereby denying Favel her due process right to a fair and
impartial trial?
¶15 Favel argues that the prosecutor’s comments suggesting that she could have
proven her innocence by providing a breath test to law enforcement were impermissible
and constitute prosecutorial misconduct. She contends that the comments diluted her
presumption of innocence and effectively shifted the burden of proof to her, reasoning
that the comments go beyond discussing the rebuttable inference of a refusal contained
within § 61-8-404(2), MCA.
6
¶16 In response, the State does not dispute that the prosecutor’s comments were
improper, but argues instead that Favel failed to preserve the issue for appeal because she
did not contemporaneously object to the prosecutor’s statements. The State asserts that,
while a motion in limine may preserve an issue on appeal in some instances, Favel’s
motion in limine did not do so because the District Court did not definitively rule on her
motion. Consequently, the State argues that Favel needed to object to the prosecutor’s
improper comments during trial in order to preserve her claims of prosecutorial
misconduct.
¶17 Generally, “[a] defendant must make a timely objection to properly preserve an
issue for appeal.” State v. Paoni, 2006 MT 26, ¶ 35, 331 Mont. 86, 128 P.3d 1040; see
also § 46-20-104(2), MCA. However, we have carved out an exception to the general
rule under which a motion in limine may “preserve an issue for appeal in some instances
even though a contemporaneous objection to an alleged error is not made at trial.” State
v. Ankeny, 2010 MT 224, ¶ 35, 358 Mont. 32, 243 P.3d 391. Although not provided for
by statute or the Montana Rules of Evidence, “[a]uthority for the granting of a motion in
limine rests in the inherent power of the court to admit or exclude evidence and to take
such precautions as are necessary to afford a fair trial for all parties.” Wallin v. Kinyon
Estate, 164 Mont. 160, 164-65, 519 P.2d 1236, 1238 (1974).
¶18 Favel maintains that her motion in limine adequately preserved the issue for
appeal. She argues that, contrary to the State’s assertions, “this Court’s preservation
7
analysis has focused on whether the trial court was ‘given an opportunity to consider’ the
issue,” rather than whether the trial court issued a final ruling.
¶19 We agree with the State that Favel needed to object at trial to preserve her claims
of prosecutorial misconduct. As a general proposition, Favel is correct in regard to the
focus of this Court’s analysis in previous cases involving motions in limine; however, in
each of our prior cases in which we have permitted a motion in limine to preserve an
issue on appeal, the district court provided a definitive ruling. See, e.g., Anderson v.
BNSF Ry., 2015 MT 240, 380 Mont. 319, 354 P.3d 1248; State v. Crider, 2014 MT 139,
375 Mont. 187, 328 P.3d 612; Peterson-Tuell v. First Student Transp., LLC, 2014 MT
307, 377 Mont. 113, 339 P.3d 16; State v. Vukasin, 2003 MT 230, 317 Mont. 204, 75
P.3d 1284. In Vukasin, we considered our previous cases wherein we had concluded that
an issue had been properly preserved by a party’s pre-trial motion. Vukasin, ¶ 34. After
reviewing and analyzing these cases, we concluded that in “each of these cases, the pre-
trial motion in limine was denied by the district court.” Vukasin, ¶ 34. We explained that
“the district court was directly faced with the question and ruled against the defendant,
thereby preserving for appeal any evidentiary issue that was specifically addressed in the
motion.” Vukasin, ¶ 34. Thus, we have never allowed a party to preserve an issue based
on a motion in limine without the party having obtained a definitive ruling from the
district court on the issue.
¶20 Such an approach is consistent with other state courts which permit a motion in
limine to preserve issues. See, e.g., Milliken v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, 154 N.H.
8
662, 666, 914 A.2d 1226, 1230 (2006) (“[a] motion in limine is sufficient to preserve an
issue for appeal without an objection at trial if the trial court definitively rules on the issue
prior to trial.”) (emphasis added); Richmond v. State, 118 Nev. 924, 59 P.3d 1249 (2002);
Kobashigawa v. Silva, 129 Haw. 313, 300 P.3d 579 (2013). Similarly, the federal courts
require a party to renew an objection at trial unless the trial court provides a definitive
ruling on the motion. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a) (“Once the court makes a definitive ruling
on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not
renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”). (Emphasis
added.)
¶21 Moreover, a district court may justifiably wish to delay ruling on admissibility of
evidence until after the trial has begun. Motions in limine are frequently made in
anticipation of hypothetical circumstances that may not develop at trial and often times
on a record that is incomplete or only partially developed. See State v. Daniels, 2011 MT
278, 362 Mont. 426, 265 P.3d 623. Consequently, a trial court will often be in a better
position to rule on evidentiary issues in light of specific facts and circumstances that arise
during trial. See, e.g., State v. Franks, 2014 MT 273, ¶ 21, 376 Mont. 431, 335 P.3d 725
(“Based on the information and arguments presented to the District Court at the motion in
limine stage, and given the overwhelmingly prejudicial nature of child molestation
evidence, the wiser course would have been to withhold ruling on its admissibility.”).
Therefore, we conclude that in order for a motion in limine to sufficiently preserve an
9
issue on appeal without an objection at trial, a party must obtain a definitive ruling on the
issue from the district court.
¶22 Applying this approach, we conclude Favel has not preserved the present issue for
appeal. Here, the District Court did not provide a definitive ruling on Favel’s motion in
limine regarding whether the prosecutor could comment that Favel “could have proven
her innocence” and, as Favel contends, shift the burden of proof. While the court ruled
on the motion in limine to the extent it excluded evidence of the preliminary breath test,
the court did not rule on the propriety of any potential questions and argument from the
prosecutor. Favel failed to object during the prosecutor’s direct-examination and during
closing arguments and, as a result, the prosecutor continued to repeat her questions and
argument throughout the proceedings. We will not place “a district court in error for an
action in which the appealing party acquiesced or actively participated.” Reim, ¶ 28.
Favel failed to do “what [s]he could to raise the issue in the district court.” Vukasin, ¶ 30.
We hold that Favel did not properly preserve her allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
for appeal.
¶23 That, however, does not end our inquiry. Favel argues in the alternative that the
prosecutor’s comments are reviewable by this Court under the plain error doctrine. We
review an unpreserved claim, under the common law plain error doctrine, at our
discretion. Crider, ¶ 30. We invoke the plain error doctrine sparingly, on a case-by-case
basis. Daniels, ¶ 32. Before this Court will find plain error, the appealing party must:
“(1) show that the claimed error implicates a fundamental right and (2) ‘firmly convince’
10
this Court that failure to review the claimed error would result in a manifest miscarriage
of justice, leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or
proceedings, or compromise the integrity of the judicial process.” Daniels, ¶ 32. In
making this inquiry, “we consider the totality of circumstances of each case.” State v.
Lindberg, 2008 MT 389, ¶ 34, 347 Mont. 76, 196 P.3d 1252.
¶24 Section 61-8-404(2), MCA, provides that the “trier of fact may infer from
[a defendant’s] refusal [to submit to a breath test] that the person was under the
influence.” We have on several previous occasions sustained the constitutionality of
§ 61-8-404(2), MCA, in the face of due process challenges that the statute improperly
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. City of Great Falls v. Morris, 2006 MT 93,
332 Mont. 85, 134 P.3d 692; State v. Michaud, 2008 MT 88, 342 Mont. 244, 180 P.3d
636; State v. Anderson, 2008 MT 116, 342 Mont. 485, 182 P.3d 80. We have further
permitted the prosecution to comment upon the inference of intoxication provided for by
the statute. State v. Slade, 2008 MT 341, ¶ 29, 346 Mont. 271, 194 P.3d 677 (“Because
the rebuttable presumption is constitutional and did not shift the burden of proof to Slade,
it was not improper for the prosecutor to comment upon it.”). We have also concluded
that evidence of a defendant’s refusal to take a sobriety test is probative evidence under
the statute and may be used by the State to argue the defendant’s consciousness of guilt.
Michaud, ¶ 55 (concluding that the defendant’s refusal to submit to a breath test was
admissible because “there is a rational connection between driving while intoxicated and
refusing to take a sobriety test.”).
11
¶25 In this instance, however, we agree with Favel that the prosecutor’s comments
were improper. “A fundamental principle of our criminal justice system is that the State
prove every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Daniels, ¶ 33.
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that “the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 363-64, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072-73 (1970). A court “must carefully guard
against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1693
(1976). A court must do so “based on reason, principle, and common human
experience.” Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503, 96 S. Ct. at 1693.
¶26 While we have made clear, as explained above, that the prosecution can introduce
evidence of a defendant’s refusal to take a breath test to argue the defendant’s
consciousness of guilt, the comments complained of in this case—that Favel could have
“proven her innocence” by submitting to a breath test—have the potential to blur the
distinction between a defendant’s state of mind and the State’s burden of proof. It is true,
of course, that the prosecutor’s comments and the inference contained within
§ 61-8-404(2), MCA, share a common thread. Underlying both is an assumption that the
person who believes that he or she is not intoxicated would likely be willing to provide a
breath test to demonstrate, show, or otherwise prove that he or she is, in fact, not
intoxicated. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance a prosecutor’s use of burden of proof
12
language to explain a defendant’s mental state. The risk is simply too great that the
State’s burden of proof in the mind of a juror will be diminished by the repeated use of
burden of proof language—such as demonstrate, show, and prove—in reference to what
the defendant could have done. Thus, we conclude the prosecutor’s remarks, indicating
that if Favel were innocent she would have proven her innocence by submitting to a
breath test, were improper.
¶27 That said, based on the record in this case, we conclude the prosecutor’s
comments do not rise to a level sufficient to find plain error. We are mindful that under
plain error review, unlike harmless error review, the appealing party carries the burden of
proof. State v. Hart, 2000 MT 332, ¶ 52, 303 Mont. 71, 15 P.3d 917. “The instances in
which we have exercised our common law power of plain error review are rare.” Hart,
¶ 51. We have similarly refused on numerous instances to conduct plain error review of a
prosecutor’s comments, “even in cases where we have concluded that the comments were
improper.” State v. Aker, 2013 MT 253, ¶ 29, 371 Mont. 491, 310 P.3d 506.
¶28 We are not convinced this is an appropriate case in which to invoke the plain error
doctrine to reverse a conviction. First, the court properly instructed the jury on the
State’s burden of proof regarding each element of driving while under the influence and
on the presumption of Favel’s innocence. We have explained that “American
jurisprudence depends on a jury’s ability to follow instructions and juries are presumed to
follow the law that courts provide.” State v. Sanchez, 2008 MT 27, ¶ 57, 341 Mont. 240,
13
177 P.3d 444. Prior to opening statements, the District Court instructed the jury on the
burden of proof as follows:
The State of Montana has the burden of proof of proving the guilt of the
Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . The defendant is not required to
prove her innocence or present any evidence.
The court again instructed the jury prior to deliberations:
The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charge against her. This
presumption remains with her throughout every stage of the trial and during
your deliberations on the verdict. It is not overcome unless from all
evidence in the case you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty.
By her plea of not guilty, the defendant denies all allegations of the charge
against her. The defendant is not required to prove her innocent or present
evidence.
The State of Montana has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, the prosecutor continually reminded the jury throughout the proceedings that the
State carried the burden of proof. The prosecutor reiterated during voir dire, opening,
and closing: “it’s the State’s job to prove a person guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” and
“the Defendant doesn’t have to prove anything.” Lastly, the prosecutor relied on
evidence other than Favel’s refusal to prove her case. The jury heard Sergeant Poulos’s
testimony in which he described observing indicators of alcohol impairment; the jury
heard Sergeant Poulos testify that Favel nearly hit two pedestrians with her vehicle; and
the jury watched Sergeant Poulos’s on-board video corroborating his testimony. Finally,
the State introduced evidence from the Montana State Crime Lab showing that Favel’s
blood alcohol content was 0.13 grams per 100 milliliters of whole blood.
14
¶29 Having reviewed the jury instructions, the trial transcripts, and the evidence
presented against Favel, we cannot say that the failure to review Favel’s claims will result
in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the fundamental fairness of Favel’s
trial, or comprise the integrity of the judicial process. We decline to reverse on Favel’s
claims of prosecutorial misconduct under the plain error doctrine.
¶30 Affirmed.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We concur:
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ JIM RICE
Justice Laurie McKinnon, specially concurring.
¶31 I write separately to address some issues that have arisen within our plain error
jurisprudence, which seem to be contributing to its state of disarray. First, we have
adopted two distinct lines of analysis for evaluating unpreserved claims of error under the
plain error doctrine. Second, adding to the confusion, we have been inconsistent with
respect to the meaning of the term “plain error review,” “plain error doctrine,” and “plain
error,” particularly as it relates to a decision declining to exercise, conduct, or otherwise
15
engage in the standard of review. Lastly, we have been unclear in our application of the
specific considerations or criteria relevant to plain error review.
¶32 Preliminarily, plain error review is a standard of review, closely related to
harmless error review. State v. Martinez, 188 Mont. 271, 279, 613 P.2d 974, 979 (1980);
§ 46-20-701, MCA; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776
(1993). When a defendant alleges an error in the trial court proceedings, a court may
apply either harmless error review or plain error review, depending upon whether the
claimed error is preserved on appeal. See Town of Columbus v. Harrington, 2001 MT
258, 307 Mont. 215, 36 P.3d 937. If a defendant preserves his claim of error by raising a
contemporaneous objection during the trial court proceedings or by submitting a motion
in limine, we apply harmless error review and the State has the burden of demonstrating
the error was harmless. Conversely, if a defendant fails to properly preserve his issue for
appeal, we apply the plain error standard of review and the defendant has the burden of
persuasion. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35, 113 S. Ct. at 1778; State v. Godfrey, 2004 MT
197, 322 Mont. 254, 95 P.3d 166.
¶33 Therefore, in general, we may either review under harmless error or plain error.
Although there may be instances in which we actually do decline to review under the
plain error standard of review; for example, a claim raised in the reply brief1 or the
1
State v. Johnson, 2010 MT 288, ¶ 13, 359 Mont. 15, 245 P.3d 1113 (“we previously have
refused to invoke the common law doctrine of plain error review when a party raises such
request for the first time in his reply brief.”).
16
doctrine of invited error2—in those instances we do not exercise appellate jurisdiction
over the claim and do not review the proceedings. Any time we review proceedings of
the trial court, we need to do so under a standard of review. If we are going to review
trial court proceedings based on an unpreserved claim of trial error, we cannot decline to
apply plain error review as this is the only applicable standard of review.
¶34 Montana’s plain error doctrine derives from our decision in State v. Finley, 276
Mont. 126, 915 P.2d 208 (1996). In Finley, we first enunciated our adoption of the
common law doctrine of plain error to “correct obvious, fundamental, constitutional, or
substantial errors” not objected to at trial which affect the “fairness, integrity, and public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Finley, 276 Mont. at 134, 915 P.2d at 213. Drawing
from federal precedent, we enunciated the doctrine as follows:
[W]e hold that this Court may discretionarily review claimed errors that
implicate a criminal defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights, even if
no contemporaneous objection is made . . . where failing to review the
claimed error at issue may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may
leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or
proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process. In so
holding, [we rely] on our inherent power of appellate review under
Montana’s Constitution.
Finely, 276 Mont. at 137-38, 915 P.2d at 215. The particular facts and circumstances of
each case dictate the applicability of the plain error doctrine. Finley, 276 Mont. at 134,
915 P.2d at 215.
2
Some courts have recognized a rule known as the doctrine of invited error, which prohibits
review in certain circumstances despite the otherwise applicability of plain error review. See,
e.g., United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“We have held
repeatedly that where the defendant himself proposes allegedly flawed jury instructions, we deny
review under the invited error doctrine.”).
17
¶35 In the wake of Finley, we began to apply two different analytical approaches for
conducting plain error review, using the Finley criteria in different ways. Our
inconsistent terminology has added to the confusion and appears inextricably intertwined
with the creation of these two divergent strains of plain error review. Justice Leaphart
recognized the problem in State v. Haagenson, 2010 MT 95, 356 Mont. 177, 232 P.3d
367, explaining “[w]e have not been consistent in our use of the verb ‘decline’ as it
relates to the ‘plain error doctrine’ versus ‘plain error review.’” Haagenson, ¶ 25
(Leaphart, J., concurring). Justice Leaphart noted that we have cases in which we simply
decline to exercise plain error review with essentially no explanation or indication that
we analyzed the appeal under the Finley criteria; cases in which we engage in the review
of the alleged plain error, but decline to invoke the plain error doctrine; and cases where
we discuss the merits of the claim and then decline to exercise plain error review.
Haagenson, ¶ 25 (Leaphart, J., concurring). These semantic inconsistencies have been
difficult for the Court and litigants to interpret and have interfered with a consistent
application of analysis when addressing a claim of unpreserved error.
¶36 Our confusing terminology is due, in part, to the emergence in Montana’s
jurisprudence of two identifiable analytical approaches to a single standard of review. On
the one hand, what might be referred to as the traditional approach, we examine the
record and the merits of the claim to determine whether the Finley criteria are satisfied.
If they are, we next decide whether to invoke our discretion to reverse the trial court.
This approach allows for consideration of the Finley criteria independently or together,
18
depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, and also allows this
Court to consider whether there was any error in the first instance. If any one of the
criteria is not met, including that error has not actually occurred, then our analysis may be
shortened by simply affirming the trial court. Importantly, even if the Finley criteria are
satisfied, this Court still has the discretion to deny relief.
¶37 We have followed this traditional approach, although with incorrect terminology,
in many cases. See, e.g., State v. Crider, 2014 MT 139, 375 Mont. 187, 328 P.3d 612
(stating that “we decline to exercise plain error review,” after extensively reviewing the
proceedings and the merits of an unpreserved claim of error ); In re D.K.D., 2011 MT 74,
360 Mont. 76, 250 P.3d 856 (stating that “we decline to exercise plain error review here,”
after reviewing the proceedings and “conclud[ing] that there was no plain error here”);
State v. White, 2014 MT 335, 377 Mont. 332, 339 P.3d 1243 (stating that “[w]e decline to
exercise plain error review,” after reviewing the proceedings and concluding that “it was
an error to fail to comply with § 46-7-102, MCA”); State v. Norquay, 2011 MT 34, 359
Mont. 257, 248 P.3d 817 (stating, “[w]e decline to apply plain error review,” after
reviewing the proceedings and concluding that there was error); State v. Thorp, 2010 MT
92, 356 Mont. 150, 231 P.3d 1096 (after reviewing the record to determine whether the
State was improperly eliciting a response from its witness regarding credibility of the
victim, we concluded that the “response does not rise to the level of impermissible
vouching that would warrant plain error review”). In these instances, we are using the
term “plain error review” incorrectly as short-hand for whether reversing the trial court is
19
appropriate. Having already reviewed the proceedings and concluded that no error exists,
we are merely explaining that reversal is inappropriate under the plain error doctrine. In
other words, “we decline to exercise plain error review” translates to “we decline to
exercise plain error review to reverse.” While our terminology in the aforementioned
cases is incorrect and confusing, these cases demonstrate that we considered in the first
instance whether there was, in fact, any error.
¶38 In contrast, there have also been numerous cases where this Court has applied
what might be referred to as a “threshold” analytical approach—which appears unique to
Montana—requiring satisfaction of the Finley criteria as an initial inquiry prior to
addressing the merits of the alleged error. Instead of applying the Finley criteria to
determine whether reversing the trial court is appropriate, in these cases we apply the
Finley criteria as a threshold for determining whether we will even address the merits of
the claimed error. This approach embroils the Court in a review of the trial court
proceedings and inevitably leads to at least some consideration of the merits of the
alleged error. We then find ourselves in the unsound position of holding we will not
exercise plain error review to review the error even though we have already reviewed the
proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Legg, 2004 MT 26, 319 Mont. 362, 84 P.3d 648 (after
reviewing the record “Legg does not meet the narrow [Finley] criteria required to invoke
our discretionary plain error review, we decline to address the merits of Legg’s argument
under plain error review”); State v. Hart, 2000 MT 332, 303 Mont. 71, 15 P.3d 917 (after
reviewing the record, we determined that Hart failed to meet the second prong of Finley
20
and “decline[d] to address Hart’s contention” that the prosecutor’s statements violated his
right to confrontation, reasoning that “Hart has failed to demonstrate that this is an
appropriate use of our common law power of plain error review”).3 To use the harmless
error analogy, this threshold inquiry is akin to reviewing the proceedings under the
harmless error standard of review; concluding that the second prong of harmless error
review is not satisfied because the defendant was not prejudiced; declining to decide
whether there was error because the second prong is not satisfied; and then stating that
the harmless error standard of review is an inappropriate method of review. As was the
case under the traditional approach, we are using the term “plain error review”
incorrectly. When we use the Finley criteria as a threshold to our inquiry and state that
we “decline to engage in plain error review,” we are actually engaging in plain error
review, but are declining to resolve the merits of the claimed error; that is, we are
engaging in plain error review but declining to determine whether there is error.
¶39 In my opinion, the time has come to reconcile these two conflicting lines of
analysis. We should do so not only to promote internal consistency within our opinions,
but also to promote consistency in appellant arguments. For instance, in this case, the
State did not address the merits of Favel’s claim of error in its brief—likely
understanding our standard of review to require a threshold showing of the Finley criteria
before considering the merits of the alleged error.
3
See also Thorp, ¶ 45 (Nelson, J., concurring); Jackson, ¶ 75 (Nelson, J., concurring).
21
¶40 In my view, the traditional method provides the most fundamentally sound
analysis. First, the traditional approach is consistent with Finley and furthers the
purposes underlying the plain error doctrine. The plain error doctrine is “not a rule of
reviewability, rather, it is a rule of reversibility, i.e., it is a doctrine that a reviewing court
invokes in order to rectify a trial court ruling that, although either not properly preserved
or never raised at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal of the trial court’s
judgment, for reasons of policy.” 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 716 (2014)
(emphasis added). By using the Finley criteria to determine whether to review the
claimed error, rather than using the criteria to determine whether to reverse the trial court,
we necessarily lose focus on what should be the central inquiry: to discretionarily
“correct error not objected to at trial . . . [which] affects the fairness, integrity, and public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Finely, 276 Mont. at 134, 915 P.2d at 213. Our
exercise of discretion must be guided by whether the error necessitates reversal because it
has affected the fairness and integrity of the proceeding. In focusing on this inquiry, we
inevitably will have to consider the error itself.
¶41 Second, refusing to address the merits of the claim until after a party makes a
threshold showing is against the clear weight of authority. The overwhelming consensus
among appellate courts is that the “first step of plain-error review is to determine whether
any error occurred.” People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 43, 912 N.E.2d 1220, 1227
22
(2009).4 Indeed, Montana stands alone in its refusal to address the merits until a
preliminary plain error test has been satisfied. Uniformity with our sister jurisdictions
counsels heavily in favor of the traditional method, particularly in an area of the law that
is rooted in common law, where we stand to benefit from case law in these other
jurisdictions.
¶42 Lastly, in using the threshold method—with the Finley criteria inherently
requiring a certain amount of discussion on the merits and with the Court unable to
resolve the merits—we frequently find ourselves in the untenable position of attempting
to walk a fine line, leading to comments from this Court, such as: we find the
prosecutor’s comments “troubling,” State v. Lacey, 2012 MT 52, ¶ 24, 364 Mont. 291,
272 P.3d 1288, “we do not condone the prosecutor’s comments,” State v. Lindberg, 2008
MT 389, ¶ 34, 347 Mont. 76, 196 P.3d 1252, or worse yet, the defendant “fail[ed] to
demonstrate the prosecutor’s comments amounted to any error,” but we refuse to “set a
precedent.” State v. Daniels, 2003 MT 247, ¶¶ 27-28, 317 Mont. 331, 77 P.3d 224. Trial
courts and litigants deserve a clear statement on the standard of review and whether there
is error or not. While resolving the merits may necessarily require more effort by this
4
Accord State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 273-74 (Minn. 2014); State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C.
506, 511-12, 723 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2012); People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 765, 597 N.W.2d
130, 139 (1999); State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 18, 459 S.E.2d 114, 129 (1995); State v. Dotson,
450 S.W.3d 1, 49 (Tenn. 2014); People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 953 (Colo. 1987); State v.
Olander, 1998 N.D. 50, ¶ 14, 575 N.W.2d 658 (1998); Snow v. State, 2009 WY 117, ¶ 13, 216
P.3d 505 (2009); State v. Russell, 159 N.H. 475, 489, 986 A.2d 515, 527 (2009). Similarly,
under federal law the initial inquiry under the plain-error doctrine is to determine whether there
is error. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1548-49 (1997).
23
Court, the guidance that is provided to litigants and trial courts will generally outweigh
any effort saved by declining to address the merits of the alleged error.
¶43 In my opinion, we must remain consistent with Finley and the principles
articulated in federal precedent upon which Finley relied. In Finley we adopted the plain
error standard used by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Atkinson, 297
U.S. 157, 56 S. Ct. 391 (1936). Finley, 276 Mont. at 134, 915 P.2d at 213. See also,
State v. Reichmand, 2010 MT 228, ¶ 48, 358 Mont. 68, 243 P.3d 423 (Rice, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that “[o]ur Finley plain error test is nearly identical to the plain
error test announced in U.S. v. Atkinson”). In Olano, the Supreme Court clarified
Atkinson by explaining relevant considerations for plain error review; there must be:
(1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735-37, 113
S. Ct. at 1778-79. The Finley criteria and the federal test share common beginnings and
our analysis in practice, to the extent it conforms to any well-defined standard, follows
the federal test.
¶44 For example, we have held it is axiomatic under our standard of review that there
needs to be error to reverse the trial court. State v. Arlington, 265 Mont. 127, 150, 875
P.2d 307, 321 (1994). Also consistent with federal precedent, we have held the error
must be “plain.” State v. Godfrey, 2004 MT 197, ¶ 38, 322 Mont. 254, 95 P.3d 166
(explaining that a “fundamental aspect of ‘plain error,’ is that the alleged error indeed
must be ‘plain.’”); State v. Upshaw, 2006 MT 341, ¶ 26, 335 Mont. 162, 153 P.3d 579
24
(“A fundamental aspect of ‘plain error,’ is that the alleged error must indeed be
‘plain.’”); State v. Tadewaldt, 2010 MT 177, ¶ 20, 357 Mont. 208, 237 P.3d 1273 (“A
prerequisite to plain error review is that it be plain that there was error at trial.”).5
¶45 We have on several previous occasions characterized the fundamental rights prong
of the Finley criteria in terms of substantial rights, which is similarly consistent with the
federal courts. Arlington, 265 Mont. at 152, 875 P.2d at 322 (“The ‘plain error’ doctrine
provides a remedy where substantial rights of a party have been infringed.”). See also,
State v. Wilkins, 229 Mont. 78, 746 P.2d 588 (1987); State v. McDonald, 2013 MT 97,
369 Mont. 483, 299 P.3d 799. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has
explained, “Normally, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make a
specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the ‘affecting substantial rights’” prong of plain
error review. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S. Ct. at 1778 (emphasis added). Here,
perhaps more than any element of the federal plain error test—other than whether there
need be error—we are in agreement. Prejudice permeates throughout our analysis in
nearly every plain error review case. See, e.g., State v. Schaeffer, 2014 MT 47, ¶ 24, 374
5
Here again, we have been inconsistent in our case law, but currently require that the error be
plain. In State v. Taylor, 2010 MT 94, ¶ 17, 356 Mont. 167, 231 P.3d 79, we overruled Godfrey:
“In short, the ‘error must be plain’ language is not an independent third requirement of common
plain error. Rather, it serves as a guide in determining whether the second prong of the Finley
test has been satisfied.” Nonetheless, we again reversed ourselves in Tadewaldt. As a general
proposition, since Tadewaldt, we have required that the error be plain, either expressly or
implicitly. Compare In re D.K.D., ¶ 16 (“We have recently held that, to apply the common law
plain error doctrine, the ‘error must be plain’ and we must be ‘firmly convinced’ that an aspect of
the proceeding, if not addressed, would result in one of the aforementioned consequences.”) with
State v. Ugalde, 2013 MT 308, ¶ 62, 372 Mont. 234, 311 P.3d 772 (“While we do not decide
whether the prosecution’s argument was objectionable, we conclude after a review of the record
and the District Court’s careful consideration of the issue that—in the context of the surrounding
statements—it did not rise to the level of plain error.”).
25
Mont. 93, 321 P.3d 809 (“Schaeffer has not demonstrated that the prosecutor’s reference
to rising insurance rates was prejudicial when viewed in this context.”); White, ¶ 36
(“White was not prejudiced by his absence from the fitness proceeding.”); State v.
Wagner, 2009 MT 256, ¶ 21, 352 Mont. 1, 215 P.3d 20 (“This inference of guilt caused
actual prejudice to Wagner constituting plain error.”); Arlington, 265 Mont. at 153, 875
P.2d at 322 (“we conclude that there is no evidence of any prosecutorial misconduct or
prejudice here at all”).
¶46 Finally, the language of the fourth element of the federal test corresponds to the
Finley criteria almost verbatim: “leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness
of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process.”
Finley, 276 Mont. at 137, 915 P.2d at 215.
¶47 It is my view that we have drifted from the principles and inquiry first enunciated
in Finley. We have infused into our opinions confusing semantics, and added further
confusion through the development of two analytical frameworks for the same standard
of review. As a result, we have provided little guidance or consistency in our precedent.
We do not address requests to exercise plain error review in a vacuum. When we review
a claim of unpreserved error it must be pursuant to a standard of review: plain error
review. When this Court looks at a claim of unpreserved error, no matter how minimal
the examination, we are conducting plain error review. Whether we exercise our
appellate authority to reverse is discretionary and will depend on consideration of the
relevant criteria. If the shortest path to resolution of the claim is to find that there was no
26
error, then we have the flexibility to make such a determination. I would not confuse
what is otherwise a straightforward and clear standard of review.
¶48 I offer the above analysis with the hope that, in due course, it will be seized upon
to provide consistency in our opinions and guidance for those litigating before this Court.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
27