UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4345
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIE ANTHONY SAXBY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:11-cr-00132-NCT-1)
Submitted: November 4, 2015 Decided: December 2, 2015
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert L. McClellan, IVEY, MCCLELLAN, GATTON & SIEGMUND, LLP,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Michael
Hamilton, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In 2013, Willie Anthony Saxby pled guilty to passing and
possessing counterfeit currency, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472
(2012), and the district court sentenced him to 36 months’
imprisonment, to be followed by a 3-year term of supervised
release. The district court found that while Saxby was on
supervised release, he violated the terms of his release by (1)
failing to notify the probation officer ten days prior to moving
from his approved residence, and (2) testing positive for
marijuana and using alcohol in excess. The district court
sentenced Saxby to 12 months’ imprisonment and an additional 24
months’ supervised release. In accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Saxby’s counsel has filed a
brief certifying that there are no meritorious grounds for
appeal. Saxby has filed a supplemental brief raising several
issues. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
To revoke supervised release, a district court need only
find a violation of a condition of release by a preponderance of
the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012). “We review a
district court’s ultimate decision to revoke a defendant’s
supervised release for abuse of discretion.” United States v.
Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). A district court’s
factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. We conclude
that the district court’s factual findings are not clearly
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erroneous and that the court did not abuse its discretion in
revoking Saxby’s supervised release.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will affirm a
revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is
not plainly unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Saxby’s sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment to be
followed by 24 months’ supervised release is within the
statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(3), 3583(b)(2),
(e)(3), (h) (2012).
“When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable
at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir.
2010). A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the
district court adequately explains the sentence after
considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter Seven policy
statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors. Id. at 546-47; see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012).
“Regardless of whether the district court imposes an above,
below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on the
record an ‘individualized assessment’ based on the particular
facts of the case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552
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U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). “A court need not be as detailed or
specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when
imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a
statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595
F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted). A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the court states a
proper basis for concluding that the defendant should receive
the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006). Only if we
find a sentence to be unreasonable will we consider whether it
is plainly so. Id. at 439.
While the district court did not explicitly refer to the
Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter Seven policy statements, Saxby’s
policy statement range, or the relevant § 3553(a) factors, the
district court’s rationale is apparent from the context
surrounding its decision. See United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006). Defense counsel advised the
district court of Saxby’s correct policy statement range of 8 to
14 months’ imprisonment, and the sentence imposed falls within
that range. Additionally, the district court’s explanation of
its sentence, while not explicitly mentioning § 3553(a),
referred to the nature and circumstances of Saxby’s violations
and the need for the sentence to deter future violations. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B). Moreover, the district court
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offered an individualized explanation of why it was sentencing
Saxby to serve a term of imprisonment and an additional term of
supervised release. Thus, we conclude that Saxby’s sentence is
reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case, including the issues raised in Saxby’s pro
se brief, and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment and deny as moot
Saxby’s motion to expedite. This court requires that counsel
inform Saxby, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Saxby
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Saxby.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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