J-A23010-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
NAME OF: D.A.C., A MINOR, FOR A : PENNSYLVANIA
NAME CHANGE TO: TO D.A.B., :
:
:
:
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.C., :
:
Appellant : No. 1456 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered on August 7, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Family Division, No. FD 10-007364-016
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 03, 2015
S.B. (“Mother”) appeals the Order granting A.B.’s (“Father”) Motion for
Special Relief requesting that the name of the parties’ minor child, D.A.C.
(“Child”),1 be changed to D.A.B. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history in
its Opinion, which we incorporate herein by reference. See Trial Court
Opinion, 10/31/14, at 1-4.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred and committed an abuse of
discretion in granting Father’s name change Petition[,] where
the evidence of record was insufficient to support a change of
name?
1
Child was born on November 3, 2009.
J-A23010-15
2. Whether the trial court erred and committed an abuse of
discretion in following a tradition of patrilineal naming[,] and
applying the best-interest standard in a gender-biased
manner[?]
Mother’s Brief at 4.
The standard of review in cases involving a petition for change of
name is whether there was an abuse of discretion. See In re Change of
Name of Zachary Thomas Andrew Grimes, 609 A.2d 158, 159 n.1 (Pa.
1992).
An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court has rendered a
judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious, has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. A finding by an appellate
court that it would have reached a different result than the trial
court does not constitute a finding of an abuse of discretion.
Where the record adequately supports the trial court’s reasons
and factual basis, the court did not abuse its discretion.
Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah, 756 A.2d 1116, 1123 (Pa. 2000)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The court of common pleas of any county may, by order, change the
name of any person resident in the county. See 54 Pa.C.S.A. § 702. There
are no prescribed criteria for a trial court to consider when exercising its
discretion upon a petition for change of name. Regarding the statutory
provisions for a change of name, our Supreme Court has stated the
following:
The focus of the statute and the procedures thereunder indicate
a liberal policy regarding change of name requests. The
necessity for judicial involvement centers on governmental
concerns that persons not alter their identity to avoid financial
-2-
J-A23010-15
obligations. Beyond requiring compliance with the notice
provisions, the statute provides no additional guidance for courts
considering petitions for change of name. Absent any legislative
criteria, courts reviewing petitions for change of name exercise
their discretion “in such a way as to comport with good sense,
common decency and fairness to all concerned and to the
public.”
In re Grimes, 609 A.2d at 160 (citation omitted); see also In the Matter
of Robert Henry McIntyre, 715 A.2d 400, 402 (Pa. 1998).
As Mother’s claims are related, we will address them together. In her
first issue, Mother contends that the trial court erred and abused its
discretion by finding that Father had met his burden of establishing that the
name change was in Child’s best interest. Mother’s Brief at 8. Mother
asserts the trial court’s Order granting the name change was based on its
determination that (1) granting the name change would solidify the bonds
between Child and Father’s family; (2) there is a social stigma associated
with Mother’s surname (which is the surname of her ex-husband
(“Stepdad”); and (3) Child understood the significance of the name change.
Id. at 9. Mother claims that the trial court’s findings are not supported by
the record. Id.
Mother argues that Child is aware of the identity of both Mother and
Father, and shares a close bond with both of them, regardless of Child’s
surname. Id. at 10, 11. Mother points out that Father’s wife (“Stepmom”)
testified that (1) Child is not treated differently at Father’s family reunions
because of his surname; and (2) Father and Stepmom never introduce Child
-3-
J-A23010-15
to others using Mother’s surname. Id. at 11. Mother claims that such
testimony does not support the trial court’s determination that changing
Child’s name would positively impact the bond between Child and Father’s
extended family. Id.
Mother also argues that no testimony or evidence was presented
regarding a social stigma associated with Mother’s surname. Id. at 12.
Mother contends that the only testimony presented regarding Stepdad’s
history of violence was the testimony of Mother, that Stepdad was criminally
charged based on an incident against her; and the testimony of Father, who
testified regarding his awareness of what Mother had told him about
Stepdad. Id. Mother asserts that no evidence was presented that Father’s
surname has a higher regard in the community. Id. at 13.
Mother also claims that the trial court based its finding, that Child
understood the significance of his name change, on Father’s testimony that
Child understood the distinction between step-siblings and half-siblings. Id.
Mother points out that Child did not testify at the hearing, and argues that
Child’s understanding of familial relationships in a blended family does not
signify that he understands the significance of changing his name. Id.
Mother contends that Child knows how to spell her surname, but Child
becomes confused after spending time with Father and Stepmom, who refer
to Child using Father’s surname. Id. at 13-14. Mother asserts that Child
-4-
J-A23010-15
will be further confused by having a different surname than Mother’s other
children, who attend the same school as Child. Id. at 15.
In her second issue, Mother claims that the trial court’s decision to
grant the name change was improperly based on the tradition of patrilineal
naming. Id. at 15-16. Mother argues that each of Father’s reasons for
requesting the name change were based on his belief that a man should
share the same surname as his father. Id. at 16. Mother contends that this
was not a sufficient basis for the trial court to conclude that the name
change was in Child’s best interest. Id. Mother asserts that the trial court’s
Opinion reflects its bias towards the tradition of patrilineal naming. Id.
The trial court addressed Mother’s claims and concluded that they lack
merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/14, at 6-12. We concur with the
reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on this basis. See id.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/3/2015
-5-
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM
Circulated 12/02/2015 02:42 PM