[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-12238
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:14-cr-60316-JIC-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIE JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(December 7, 2015)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Willie Jackson appeals his sentence of 90-months imprisonment for one
count of Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and one count of
using a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). After Jackson pleaded guilty to both counts, the district
court imposed a sentence of 90-months imprisonment, which was at the low end of
the range provided by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal,
Jackson argues that this sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. He contends that the district court did not
properly consider his history of mental illness and the nature of the sting operation
that secured his conviction in refusing to grant him a downward variance from the
guideline sentence.
We review for abuse of discretion the substantive reasonableness of a
sentence, considering the totality of the circumstances. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). The party challenging the sentence bears
the burden of showing its unreasonableness in light of the record and the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
We ordinarily expect that a sentence imposed by the district court within the
guideline range is reasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
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A district court must consider a variety of factors under § 3553(a) when
imposing a sentence, including: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, the need to deter criminal conduct and protect the public
from future crimes of the defendant, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s policy
statements, and the advisory guideline range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The weight
given to each § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district
court, and we will not substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors.
United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2014). We will not
vacate a sentence unless we “are left with the definite and firm conviction that the
district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated
by the facts of the case.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir.
2008) (quotation omitted).
We find the sentence imposed by the district court to be reasonable. Jackson
argues that the district court did not adequately consider his mental illnesses and
their impact on his criminal conduct when imposing his sentence. However, the
district court clearly considered Jackson’s mental illnesses as required under
§ 3553(a). The court listened to Jackson’s mental health arguments at the
sentencing hearing and noted Jackson’s “documented history of serious mental
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disease.” The court explicitly stated that it was sympathetic to people with mental
health problems, but reasoned that it “ha[d] to be concerned primarily for the
safety of the community.” The court also stated that it had considered Jackson’s
presentence report and each of the § 3553(a) factors. Beyond that, the court
imposed a sentence at the bottom end of the guideline range and “strongly
recommend[ed] mental health treatment” for Jackson, in recognition of his mental
illnesses. The district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in deciding
how to weigh each § 3553(a) factor and imposing a sentence of 90-months
imprisonment. See Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1361.
After careful review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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