| People v Marshall |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 09171 |
| Decided on December 10, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
Decided on December 10, 2015
Mazzarelli, J.P., Richter, Manzanet-Daniels, Kapnick, JJ.
16366 5534/12
v
Nathan Marshall, Defendant-Appellant.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Matthew Bova of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Hope Korenstein of counsel), for respondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Roger S. Hayes, J.), rendered July 8, 2014, as amended September 12, 2014, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of grand larceny in the fourth degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of two to four years, unanimously affirmed.
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are unreviewable on direct appeal because they involve matters not reflected in, or fully explained by, the record, with regard to trial counsel's reasoning and strategic choices (see People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709 [1988]; People v Love, 57 NY2d 998 [1982]). Accordingly, since defendant has not made a CPL 440.10 motion, the merits of the ineffectiveness claims may not be addressed on appeal. In the alternative, to the extent the existing record permits review, we find that defendant received effective assistance under the state and federal standards (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]). Defendant has not shown that counsel's choice of defenses fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or that the defense proposed by defendant on appeal had any greater chance of success than the defenses actually employed by counsel, which essentially sought to invoke the jury's unofficial power of nullification (see People v Zayas, 89 AD3d 610, 611 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 964 [2012]).
Defendant's challenge to the court's charge is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find that the charge, viewed as a whole, adequately explained larcenous intent as it related to criminal possession of stolen property.
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
ENTERED: DECEMBER 10, 2015
CLERK