J-S57040-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JULIUS A. EDWARDS
Appellant No. 563 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order dated January 30, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0810902-1998
BEFORE: MUNDY, OTT, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 10, 2015
Appellant Julius A. Edwards appeals from an order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (PCRA court), which dismissed as
untimely Appellant’s request for collateral relief under the Post Conviction
Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-46. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the facts and procedural history of this
case as follows:
On September 22, 1999, [Appellant] was found guilty in a
bench trial before the Honorable Willis Berry of [s]econd degree
murder, [r]obbery, and [c]riminal [c]onspiracy, and [p]ossessing
an [i]nstrument of [c]rime (PIC).[1] He was sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole for [m]urder, with [r]obbery
merging, and the PIC and [c]onspiracy convictions running
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1
The record reveals that Appellant was 21 years old on July 15, 1998 when
he committed the murder in this case.
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concurrent. [Appellant] appealed, and [this Court] affirmed the
judgment of sentence on June 20, 2001. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal on
December 19, 2001.
On March 10, 2003, [Appellant] filed his first pro se PCRA
petition. Counsel was appointed, and a hearing was held. After
review, the [PCRA court] dismissed his first PCRA petition on
September 24, 2004. [This Court] affirmed the denial of his first
PCRA petition on August 25, 2006. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal on April 24,
2007.
On April 30, 2012, [Appellant] filed the instant PCRA
petition[, which he amended on July 17, 2012 to challenge his
sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)2].
After conducting an extensive and exhaustive review of these
filings, the record and applicable case law, [the PCRA court]
found that [Appellant’s PCRA petition] was untimely filed.
Therefore, [the PCRA court concluded that it] did not have
jurisdiction to consider [Appellant’s] PCRA petition and it was
dismissed.
PCRA Court Opinion, 3/18/15, at 1-2. Appellant timely appealed to this
Court.
On appeal,3 Appellant argues only that the PCRA court erred in
dismissing as untimely his petition for collateral relief because he overcame
the PCRA’s time-bar pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). In support
of this argument, Appellant points out that Miller applies sub judice,
because his brain was “immature” at the time he perpetrated the murder in
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2
The Court in Miller held that “[m]andatory life without parole for those
under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Miller, 132
S. Ct. at 2460.
3
“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA
court’s determination ‘is supported by the record and free of legal error.’”
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa. 2007)).
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this case. As a result, Appellant argues that his sentence of life
imprisonment is unconstitutional.
The PCRA contains the following restrictions governing the timeliness
of any PCRA petition.
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with
the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right
that was recognized by the Supreme Court of
the United States or the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this
section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1)
shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have
been presented.
(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in
the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b) (emphasis added). Section 9545’s timeliness
provisions are jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa.
2014).
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Instantly, it is undisputed that Appellant’s second PCRA petition was
facially untimely. Appellant’s argument that he overcomes the PCRA’s time-
bar because of Miller fails for the following reason. Appellant has failed to
plead and prove that Miller created a constitutional right applicable sub
judice. Instantly, there is no dispute that Appellant was twenty-one years
old when he committed the murder. As we noted earlier, however, the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Miller was clear in that only
mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of
eighteen at the time of their crimes was unconstitutional. Moreover, to the
extent Appellant argues that the condition of his brain at the time of the
crime brings this case within the purview of Miller, we disagree. In
Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013), two appellants, who were nineteen and
twenty-one years of age at the time of their underlying crimes, and
sentenced to life imprisonment, claimed:
[T]hat because Miller created a new Eighth Amendment right,
that those whose brains were not fully developed at the time of
their crimes are free from mandatory life without parole
sentences, and because research indicates that the human mind
does not fully develop or mature until the age of 25, it would be
a violation of equal protection for the courts to treat them or
anyone else with an immature brain, as adults. Thus, they
conclude that the holding in Miller should be extended to them
as they were under the age of 25 at the time of the murder and,
as such, had immature brains.
Cintora, 69 A.3d at 764. In rejecting the argument, we concluded that “[a]
contention that a newly-recognized constitutional right should be extended
to others does not render their petition timely pursuant to [S]ection
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9545(b)(1)(iii).” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, as in Cintora, Appellant’s
claim that Miller applied to the case sub judice based on his mental
development is without merit. Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court
did not err in dismissed as untimely Appellant’s second PCRA petition.4
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/10/2015
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4
Based on our conclusion, we need not address the retroactivity of Miller.
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