NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-3700
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DERRICK LAKEITH BROWN,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. No. 3-14-cv-01413)
District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 15, 2015
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 11, 2015)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Derrick Brown, a federal inmate, appeals an order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing without prejudice his petition
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons, we will
affirm.
In July 2014, Brown filed a § 2241 petition alleging that he has been subject to
prolonged confinement in the Special Management Unit (SMU) at USP-Lewisburg.1 In
particular, he claimed that his placement in the SMU deprived him of the opportunity to
obtain all possible good time credits and seek a lower custody classification. He also
alleged that he should have been transferred to another facility rather than have his time
in the SMU extended. Finally, he asserted that the prolonged SMU confinement
aggravated his mental illness. As relief, Brown sought damages, transfer to another
prison, medical and mental health evaluations, issuance of subpoenas, an evidentiary
hearing, and an investigation of his claims.
The District Court held that Brown’s claims were not cognizable within a habeas
corpus proceeding because he challenged only the conditions of his confinement.
According to the District Court, “there is no discernible contention by Brown that his
SMU placement resulted in any actual loss of good time credits or otherwise extended the
length of his confinement.” Therefore, the District Court dismissed Brown’s petition
without prejudice to his right to reassert his claims in a properly filed civil rights
complaint. Brown appealed.
1
According to the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Locator, Brown is currently incarcerated at
at the U.S. Penitentiary ADMAX, in Florence, Colorado.
2
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our
review of the District Court’s dismissal of Brown’s § 2241 petition is plenary. See
Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
We agree with the District Court that Brown’s claims were not properly brought
under § 2241. Section 2241 “confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal
prisoner who is challenging . . . the execution of his sentence.” Woodall v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005). While we have noted that “the precise
meaning of ‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy,” we have made clear that a challenge
under § 2241 must be to the manner in which the sentence is being “put into effect” or
“carr[ied] out.” Id. at 242-43; see also Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir.
2012) (explaining that, in order for a prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence
under § 2241, he must allege that the “BOP’s conduct was somehow inconsistent with a
command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment”). Brown’s allegations of
prolonged placement in the SMU and the resulting consequences, including the possible
loss of good time credits, concern the conditions of his confinement, not the manner in
which his sentence is being carried out. See id.; Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d
Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in
plaintiff’s favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, an action under
§ 1983 [and not habeas corpus] is appropriate.”). Therefore, the District Court properly
determined that Brown’s claims are not cognizable under § 2241, and properly dismissed
the petition.
3
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
4