J-S64026-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL PARKER
Appellant No. 309 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of January 23, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-22-CR-0002383-2013
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL PARKER
Appellant No. 310 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of January 23, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-22-CR-0005688-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 14, 2015
Michael Parker appeals his January 23, 2015 judgments of sentence.
Parker was found guilty of six charges in two separate dockets.1 Parker
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S64026-15
challenges the weight of the evidence regarding his conviction of criminal
attempt to commit robbery of a financial institution, 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a),
and the legality of his conviction of flight to avoid apprehension, 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 5126(a). We hold that Parker is not entitled to relief on those challenges.
However, because a portion of his sentence is illegal, we vacate that portion
of Parker’s sentence, and we remand for resentencing.
At docket number CP-22-CR-0005688-2013 (“5688-2013”), after a
jury trial, Parker was found guilty of criminal attempt to commit robbery of a
financial institution on September 16, 2014.2 At docket number CP-22-CR-
0002383-2013 (“2383-2013”), the trial court, from the bench, found Parker
guilty of burglary, criminal attempt to possess a controlled substance with
the intent to deliver (“PWID”), resisting arrest, flight to avoid apprehension,
and reckless driving on December 22, 2014.3
At docket number 5688-2013, the trial court provided the following
factual history of that case:
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
1
On March 3, 2015, this Court, sua sponte, consolidated Parker’s
separate appeals at both dockets. See Pa.R.A.P. 513 (affording discretion to
this Court to consolidate two or more appeals in different cases into a single
appeal).
2
18. Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 3701(a)(1)(vi).
3
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502(a)(1), 901(a), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18
Pa.C.S. §§ 5104, 5126(a), and 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a), respectively.
-2-
J-S64026-15
On the day of the incident, Randy Hall [] was working as a bank
teller for Members 1st Federal Credit Union (“Members 1st”) in
the Strawberry Square branch, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. When
he returned to his teller station after his lunch break, a man
walked up to his station that was located directly inside the
entrance and, in a low voice, said, “Give me all of your money.”
[Hall] described the man as wearing a black hat, black hoodie[,]
and jeans. While testifying, [Hall] identified the man from the
bank as [Parker]. [Hall] described [Parker’s] demand and
demeanor as firm, serious[,] and not joking in any respect.
[Hall] testified that, at the moment [Parker] approached and
made his demand, he was “caught off guard and [his] heart
dropped.”
When [Hall] responded that he was closed as he had no money
drawer, [Parker] repeated, “Give me all your money.” After the
second demand, [Parker] began to leave the bank but, stopped
and returned to [Hall’s] teller station. Upon his return, [Parker]
asked [Hall] if he could cash a money order to which he replied,
“If you’re a member with us.” [Parker] never produced the
money order he allegedly wanted to cash. [Parker] was not a
member so he left the branch. At this point in time, [Hall]
notified his assistant bank manager of what had happened and
the police were called.
During the trial, [Hall] identified the security video obtained from
the bank branch on the day of the robbery. He also described
the events depicted in the video. The description matched
[Hall’s] testimony about [Parker’s] actions and his own actions
during the attempted robbery. He acknowledged that [Parker]
did not visibly present a weapon.
Detective Richard Gibney [] of the Harrisburg Bureau of Police []
was assigned to investigate the attempted bank robbery.
[Detective] Gibney was assigned to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) Safe Streets Task Force and his duties
included investigating bank robberies.
When he arrived on the scene of the incident, [Detective] Gibney
described [Hall] as “shaken, visibly shaken.” [Detective] Gibney
interviewed Hall to gather the details of his encounter with
[Parker]. He also obtained a series of still photographs taken
from the bank security video which were disseminated to media
outlets in the hope that the suspect would be found.
-3-
J-S64026-15
On the next day, [Detective] Gibney was called to the Harrisburg
police station at approximately 6:45 p.m. as [Parker] had
voluntarily come in after learning of the dissemination of his
picture. He was accompanied by his girlfriend and his girlfriend’s
father. After [Parker] was Mirandized,[4] [Detective] Gibney
questioned him about the attempted robbery and [Parker]
replied that he knew nothing about it. [Detective] Gibney then
showed him the still photos taken from the video and asked why
he was in the bank. [Parker] spoke about being stressed out
and hitting a low point in life instead of providing him with an
explanation regarding his presence at Member’s 1st. Eventually,
[Parker] told [Detective] Gibney that he was probably just
passing through and never mentioned a money order. Through
his investigation, [Detective] Gibney discovered that [Parker] did
not have an account with Members 1st and never did. During
the interview, [Detective] Gibney recognized [Parker’s] hat as
the same type he was wearing in the security video.
Ms. Dolisa Underwood [], [Parker’s] girlfriend, testified on behalf
of [Parker]. According to [Underwood], on the day of the
incident she and [Parker] left the house together, took their
children to their grandparents’ house[,] and went to a check
cashing establishment to cash a money order for [thirty-seven
dollars]. The check[-]cashing store was closed so they
proceeded to Harrisburg together where [Underwood] went to
work and [Parker] “. . . went his separate way.”
Later that evening, [Underwood] was alerted to the incident at
Members 1st by a family [member] who had seen [Parker’s]
picture on a news clip. She convinced [Parker] to go to the
police station with her and her father to find out what had
happened and why his picture was on the news.
[Underwood] was in the interview room with [Detective] Gibney.
She stated that [Parker] had been acting abnormally or just “not
with it” when discussing the robbery. [Underwood] testified that
[Parker] kept denying that he committed the robbery and would
not give [Detective] Gibney a reason for being in the bank;
instead, [Parker] said 1. he didn’t know why he was there; 2. he
was passing through; and, 3. he was just joking with the teller.
____________________________________________
4
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-4-
J-S64026-15
According to [Underwood], [Parker] did not mention the money
order during the interview.
During [Underwood’s] testimony, the parties entered a
stipulation on the record that a money order in the amount of
[thirty-seven dollars] was found in [Parker’s] pocket on the day
of his arrest.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 6/22/2015, at 3-6 (bracketed material within
direct quotes in the original; footnotes and citations to the notes of
testimony omitted).
At docket number 2383-2013, the trial court provided the following
factual history of that case:
On April 9, 2013, Detective Nicholas Licata [] was working
undercover for the Harrisburg Bureau of Police [] with the vice
and organized crime unit. Around 10:15 a.m., he was patrolling
in the area of 16th and Putnam Streets in Harrisburg near a bar
called OD’s Plantation when he encountered [Parker]. [Parker]
passed [Detective] Licata while driving in the opposite direction
on 16th Street in a silver Chevrolet bearing a New York license
plate. [Detective] Licata testified that [Parker] made a waving
gesture to him signaling him to pull over into the nearby parking
lot.
Based on his experience and the fact that he was patrolling an
area known for high drug, high crime activity, [Detective] Licata
suspected that [Parker] was trying to sell him illegal drugs.
However, since he was alone on patrol, he decided to leave the
area by driving eastbound on Sycamore Street. [Parker] turned
his car around to follow [Detective] Licata. In response to
[Parker’s] actions, [Detective] Licata pulled over and rolled down
his driver’s side window. [Parker] pulled up next to him and
asked [Detective] Licata what he wanted to which the Detective
replied, “. . . I was looking for my friend Jay and I wanted some
hard.” [Detective] Licata explained that “Jay” is a common
name that drug dealers use and “hard” is a street slang term for
crack cocaine. After [Parker] told him that he had “hard,”
[Detective] Licata told him he did not like to deal with new
people so he would keep looking for his friend.
-5-
J-S64026-15
[Parker] would not take no for an answer. He kept insisting that
either [Detective] Licata come to his car or that [Detective]
Licata let him in his car. [Parker] then reversed his car, parked
behind the police vehicle[,] and approached the driver’s side
window with a plastic baggie containing what [Detective] Licata
suspected to be crack cocaine. [Detective] Licata tried to
convince [Parker] to give him his phone number so he could set
up a meeting later when he had a chance to call other officers
for support. [Parker] would not agree so [Detective] Licata
drove away.
When [Parker] began following [Detective] Licata in his car he
radioed for police back up [sic]. While driving north on 17th
Street, [Parker] passed him and gestured with his hands in a
way that [Detective] Licata described as asking “what are you
doing?” [Detective] Licata continued to drive in the area of 17th
Street around the Hall Manor public housing complex in order to
keep track of [Parker’s] whereabouts as he waited for police
back up [sic] to arrive. Eventually, [Parker] backed into a
parking spot in a lot by 32 Row Hall Manor. [Detective] Licata
parked in a spot about [two-hundred] yards west of the parking
lot at a point where he could still see [Parker]. [Parker] left the
lot and parked near [Detective] Licata’s vehicle, got out[,] and
walked towards his vehicle[,] which prompted [Detective] Licata
to drive away. As [Detective] Licata was driving away, [Parker]
yelled at him to “get out of the hood if [you] wasn’t [sic] going
to buy shit.”
[Detective] Licata drove away to get out of view, but shortly
returned to the area of the parking lot where [Parker] had been
parked and he was there again. The uniformed patrol back up
[sic] arrived and blocked [Parker] in from the front, but he
immediately reversed and swerved out of the parking lot and
fled west. As [Parker] was fleeing in his vehicle, a police cruiser
was coming from the opposite direction. Right where
[Detective] Licata was parked, [Parker] jumped out of his rolling
vehicle[,] which hit a parked car[] and ran through Hall Manor
toward the fence separating Hall Manor and the Park
Apartments. [Detective] Licata and another officer gave chase
on foot and spotted him running into an apartment building at
1405 South 15th Street. After checking the rear of the building,
the officers began looking for him in the apartments.
Officer Colin Kerns [] responded to [Detective] Licata’s radio call
for assistance. As he arrived in the area of 17th and Hanover
-6-
J-S64026-15
Streets, he observed another officer attempt to stop the silver
Chevrolet vehicle[,] which suddenly moved in reverse. Officer
Kerns saw the driver exit the vehicle and flee on foot prompting
him to give chase. Despite multiple officers chasing him and
commanding him to stop, [Parker] climbed over a fencing [sic]
separating Hall Manor and the Park Apartments. Once he was
over the fence, [Parker] paused and turned toward the direction
of Hall Manor[,] which allowed Officer Kerns to see his face. He
then observed [Parker] walk to the front door of the 1405 South
15th Street Park Apartments. Officer Kerns reported his
observation to the other responding officers by radio.
Responding officers surrounded the apartment building.
At the time of the incident[,] Latoya Carter [] lived at 1405
South 15th Street, Apartment 204, with her [six-year-old]
daughter. [Carter] had heard someone “fiddling” with her
doorknob[,] which caused her to go to the door where she found
[Parker]. She stated that the door opened as soon as she got to
it. [Parker] entered the apartment and asked her to hide him
because someone tried to “jump” him outside. [Carter] testified
that she played along by telling him to hide in her bedroom so
she could take her child and leave the apartment for safety.
As [Carter] ran from the building, officers were already inside
searching for the suspect. She told officers that an unknown
man had run into her apartment and she gave them permission
to investigate. Officers located [Parker] hiding in a bedroom
closet. Police gave [Parker] three warnings that if he did not
come out on his own, they were going in with a K-9 dog. He did
not comply, so the K-9 dog was released to retrieve him from
the closet.
After he returned to his patrol car, Officer Kerns learned that a
suspect was in custody at 1405 Park Apartments. When
[Officer] Kerns went to the apartment, he positively identified
[Parker] as the person he had been chasing. [Detective] Licata
also positively identified the person in the closet as the person
he had been interacting with since his attempt to sell him illegal
narcotics.
Id. at 11-14 (bracketed material within direct quotes in the original;
footnotes and citations to the notes of testimony omitted).
-7-
J-S64026-15
After deferring sentencing at both dockets, the trial court sentenced
Parker on January 23, 2015. At docket number 2383-2013, Parker was
sentenced to an aggregate term of five to ten years’ imprisonment for his
convictions of burglary, criminal attempt—PWID, resisting arrest, flight to
avoid apprehension, and reckless driving, which included a sentence of six to
twelve months’ imprisonment on the flight to avoid apprehension count and
a concurrent five to ten years’ imprisonment on the burglary count. At
docket number 5688-2013, Parker was sentenced to two to five years’
imprisonment for his conviction of criminal attempt—robbery of a financial
institution. As a result of both sentences, Parker received an aggregate
sentence of seven to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
Parker filed a post-sentence motion on docket number 5688-2013 on
January 29, 2015, which the trial court denied on February 2, 2015.
Regarding docket number 2383-2013, Parker filed a post-sentence motion
on February 2, 2015, which the trial court denied on February 10, 2015. On
February 17, 2015, Parker simultaneously filed a notice of appeal for both
dockets.
Parker filed a petition to proceed pro se on direct appeal for both
cases, which the trial court granted on March 2, 2015. The trial court
ordered Parker to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) for each docket. In response to the trial
court’s order, Parker filed a petition for an extension of time to file his
concise statements, which the trial court granted on March 17, 2015.
-8-
J-S64026-15
On April 17, 2015, the trial court appointed Parker new counsel and
provided him additional time to file an amended concise statement, which
Parker timely filed on May 19, 2015. On June 22, 2015, the trial court filed
an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Parker raises two issues for our review:
I. Whether [Parker’s] attempted robbery conviction was against
the weight of the evidence?
II. Whether as a matter of law [Parker] should not have been
convicted of both burglary and flight?
Brief for Parker at 7 (bold omitted).
In his first issue, Parker claims that the jury’s verdict regarding his
attempted robbery conviction was against the weight of the evidence.5 Brief
for Parker at 10-12. Accordingly, we review the weight of the evidence as to
only that conviction.
An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Dupre,
866 A.2d 1089, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing Commonwealth v.
Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 805–06 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751–52 (Pa. 2000))). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that “[a]ppellate review of a
weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying
____________________________________________
5
Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3), Parker preserved his weight
challenge in his post-sentence motion.
-9-
J-S64026-15
question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.”
Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753 (citation omitted). To grant a new trial upon the
basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, this Court has
explained that “the evidence must be ‘so tenuous, vague and uncertain that
the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.’” Sullivan, 820 A.2d at 806
(quoting Commonwealth v. La, 640 A.2d 1336, 1351 (Pa. Super. 1994)).
[This Court shall not undertake to reassess credibility of
witnesses, as] it is well settled that we cannot substitute our
judgment for that of the trier of fact. Commonwealth v.
Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 246 (Pa. Super. 2008). Further, the
finder of fact was free to believe the Commonwealth’s witnesses
and to disbelieve the witness for the Appellant. See
Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 517 A.2d 1256 (Pa. 1986) (the
finder of fact is free to believe all, none, or part of the testimony
presented at trial).
Commonwealth v. Bozic, 997 A.2d 1211, 1223-24 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citing Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 262 (Pa. Super. 2009))
(citations modified).
“A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft,
he[] takes or removes money of a financial institution without the
permission of the financial institution by making a demand of an employee
of the financial institution orally or in writing with the intent to deprive the
financial institution thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(vi). Further, “[a]
person commits an attempt when, with the intent to commit a specific crime,
he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission
of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).
- 10 -
J-S64026-15
In support of his weight of the evidence claim, Parker argues that the
trial court abused its discretion in finding him guilty of attempted robbery
because he “abandoned his criminal attempt and took further steps[,] which
prevented the commission thereof.” Brief for Parker at 12. Specifically,
Parker notes that “[a]fter the alleged criminal effort, he told the bank teller
that he had been joking and requested to cash a money order.” Id.
(citations to the notes of testimony omitted).
Renunciation is a defense to criminal attempt, which requires a
showing that the defendant avoided the commission of the crime attempted
by abandoning his criminal effort. Commonwealth v. Zingarelli, 839 A.2d
1064, 1072 (Pa. Super. 2003). Renunciation is defined as follows:
(1) In any prosecution for an attempt to commit a crime, it is a
defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and
complete renunciation of his criminal intent, the defendant
avoided the commission of the crime attempted by abandoning
his criminal effort and if the mere abandonment was insufficient
to accomplish such avoidance, by taking further and affirmative
steps which prevented the commission thereof.
(2) A renunciation is not “voluntary and complete” within the
meaning of this subsection if it is motivated in whole or part by:
(i) a belief that circumstances exist which increase the
probability of detection or apprehension of the defendant or
another participant in the criminal enterprise, or which render
more difficult accomplishment of the criminal purpose; or
(ii) a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another
time or to transfer the criminal effort to another victim or
another but similar objective.
18 Pa.C.S. § 901(c).
- 11 -
J-S64026-15
After Parker demanded money from the bank teller, the bank teller
conveyed to Parker that he did not have access to any money. It is at this
point, Parker argues, that he withdrew from his criminal attempt and
proceeded to joke with the bank teller. Brief for Parker at 12. The bank
teller, however, maintained that Parker was not joking during this
interaction. In spite of these conflicting testimonies, Parker essentially asks
the Court to believe his account of this interaction with the bank teller.
Here, the jury found the bank teller’s testimony to be credible, and, as a
result, we may not reassess a witness’ credibility, as that determination lies
solely within the province of the fact-finder. See Commonwealth v.
Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 262 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Although some inconsistencies existed in the testimony produced at
trial, the jury was free to believe, or not to believe, all, none, or part of that
testimony. The record supports the jury’s verdict, specifically the jury’s
finding of a lack of renunciation on behalf of Parker, and we discern no basis
upon which to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by
concluding that the jury’s verdict failed to shock that court’s conscience.
In his final issue, Parker claims that the trial court erred as a matter of
law by convicting him of both burglary and flight to avoid apprehension.
Brief for Parker at 13. Parker argues that he could not have been convicted
of flight to avoid apprehension, the underlying offense to his burglary
conviction. Id. Parker relies upon the principle espoused by this Court in
Commonwealth v. Benedetto, 462 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. Super. 1983),
- 12 -
J-S64026-15
wherein we held that a defendant may not be convicted both for burglary
and for the offense which it was his intent to commit after the entry, unless
the additional offense constitutes a felony of the first degree or second
degree. Brief for Parker at 13. To that end, Parker notes that flight to avoid
apprehension, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5126(a), is only a third-degree felony. Id.
Parker’s reliance upon Benedetto, however, is misplaced. Several
years after our decision in Benedetto, this Court clarified any potential
confusion regarding 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(d), which prohibits multiple
convictions of both burglary and the underlying offense to that burglary.
Commonwealth v. Couch, 731 A.2d 136, 144 (Pa. Super. 1999). In
Couch, we explained that the term “conviction” refers specifically to
sentencing of those crimes and not merely a judgment of guilt, as Parker
suggests. Id. Accordingly, Parker may be found guilty of both burglary and
flight to avoid apprehension. For these reasons, Parker’s claim fails.
Even though we have determined that Parker is not afforded relief
upon his two substantive claims, we have detected a legal error in his
sentence. Specifically, his convictions for burglary and flight to avoid
apprehension should have merged. Issues implicating merger constitutes a
nonwaivable challenge to the legality of the sentence, and a claim that we
may raise sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 24 (Pa.
Super. 2007).
As previously mentioned, Parker was convicted of both burglary and
the underlying offense to that burglary, flight to avoid apprehension. Parker
- 13 -
J-S64026-15
was sentenced to five to ten year’s imprisonment on his burglary conviction
and six to twelve months’ imprisonment on his flight to avoid apprehension
conviction. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 1/23/2015, at 10-11.
Our Crimes Code precludes sentencing for both burglary and the
object crimes in the following circumstances:
(d) Multiple convictions.—A person may not be sentenced
both for burglary and for the offense which it was his intent to
commit after the burglarious entry or for an attempt to commit
that offense, unless the additional offense constitutes a felony of
the first or second degree.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(d). Accordingly, convictions for burglary and an
underlying offense that does not constitute a felony in the first or second
degree merge for sentencing purposes. Commonwealth v. Brown, 466
A.2d 1071, 1073 (Pa. Super. 1983). Here, Parker was sentenced to six to
twelve months’ imprisonment for his conviction of flight to avoid
apprehension, a third-degree felony, which was set to run concurrently to his
sentence of five to ten years’ imprisonment on his burglary conviction.
Therefore, the trial court should have merged Parker’s conviction of flight to
avoid apprehension with his burglary conviction for sentencing purposes.
Consequently, Parker’s sentence regarding this conviction is illegal.
For the reasons set forth above, although we do not disturb the
underlying conviction, we vacate the sentence imposed at docket number
2383-2013 for flight to avoid apprehension because it merges with burglary
for sentencing purposes.
- 14 -
J-S64026-15
Judgment of sentence at docket number 2383-2013 vacated.
Judgment of sentence at docket number 5688-2013 affirmed. Case
remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/14/2015
- 15 -