J-S66030-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: L.J.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: B.W., NATURAL FATHER No. 851 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Decree Entered May 4, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Orphans’
Court, at No: O.A. No. 42 of 2014
IN RE: D.M.X.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: B.W., NATURAL FATHER No. 852 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Decree Entered May 4, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Orphans’
Court, at No: O.A. No. 41 of 2014
IN RE: D.M.X.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: B.W., NATURAL FATHER No. 957 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered May 8, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Criminal
Division, at No: D.P. No. 27 of 2013
IN RE: L.J.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: B.W., NATURAL FATHER No. 958 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered May 8, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Criminal
Division, at No: CP-10-DP-0000028-2013
BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.FILED DECEMBER 15, 2015
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S66030-15
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:
B.W. (Father) appeals from the decrees entered May 4, 2015, in the
Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, which involuntarily terminated his
parental rights to his minor sons, L.J.W., born in April of 2007, and
D.M.X.W., born in May of 2009 (collectively, the Children).1 Father also
appeals from the orders entered May 8, 2015, which changed the Children’s
permanency goals to adoption. Additionally, Father’s counsel has filed a
motion to withdraw and brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
Upon review, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the decrees
and orders.
On approximately May 9, 2013, the Butler County Children and Youth
Agency (the Agency) received a report indicating that Mother was using
heroin, and that Mother and Father were “[f]ighting.” N.T., 1/12/15, at 13.
On May 10, 2013, Agency caseworker, Heather Kneiss, visited Mother’s
home to investigate the report. Id. at 13-14. During the visit, Mother
admitted to using heroin. Id. at 15. Mother explained to Ms. Kneiss that
Father had traveled from Pittsburgh to assist with the Children while she
went to an inpatient rehabilitation facility. Id. Mother entered a
rehabilitation facility on May 13, 2013, but did not complete treatment. Id.
1
The parental rights of the Children’s mother, T.M. (Mother), were
terminated by separate decrees entered that same day. Mother is not a
party to the instant appeal.
-2-
J-S66030-15
at 16. Additionally, the Agency received information that Father may be
using drugs and failing to feed the Children. Id.
Ms. Kneiss visited Mother’s home again on May 23, 2013. Id. During
the visit, Mother admitted to taking Vicodin that had not been prescribed to
her. Id. Father admitted to taking Vicodin, but claimed that he received it
from a dentist. Id. at 16-17. Father could not provide a prescription to
support this claim. Id. at 17. As a result, a safety plan was implemented,
whereby Mother and Father were to be monitored at all times while with the
Children. Id.
Ms. Kneiss visited the home for a third time on June 11, 2013. Id.
Once there, Ms. Kneiss discovered that the safety plan had “fallen through”
the weekend before. Id. Mother admitted to continued drug use. Id. at
18. Father submitted to a drug screen, and tested positive for opiates and
cocaine. Id. at 17-18. Accordingly, the Children were removed from the
care of Mother and Father, and placed in foster care. Id. The Children were
placed in their current foster home on June 19, 2013, and adjudicated
dependent on August 2, 2013. Id. at 19.
On July 29, 2014, the Agency filed petitions to terminate Father’s
parental rights to the Children involuntarily. The Agency filed petitions to
change the Children’s permanency goals to adoption on October 21, 2014. A
combined termination and goal change hearing was held on January 12,
2015, February 23, 2015, and March 9, 2015. During the hearing, the
-3-
J-S66030-15
orphans’ court heard the testimony of Agency caseworker, Heather Kneiss;
Agency caseworker, Michelle Womer; Ms. Rebecca Toogood, who formerly
was employed at Family Pathways; Family Pathways outpatient therapist,
Sandra Booth; Agency caseworker, Aaron Williams; Family Pathways mental
health worker, Angela Simmons; Ms. Kaylie Baker, who formerly was
employed at the Ellen O’Brien Gaiser Center; Mother; and Father. Following
the hearing, on May 4, 2015, the court entered decrees terminating Father’s
parental rights. The court also entered orders changing the Children’s
permanency goals to adoption on May 8, 2015. Father timely filed notices of
appeal on May 27, 2015, along with concise statements of errors complained
of on appeal. Father’s counsel filed an Anders brief on July 22, 2015, and
filed a motion to withdraw on July 23, 2015.
Before reaching the merits of Father’s appeal, we must first address
counsel’s request to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d
638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“‘When faced with a purported Anders brief,
this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first
passing on the request to withdraw.’”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith,
700 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Pa. Super. 1997)). “In In re V.E., 417 Pa.Super. 68,
611 A.2d 1267 (1992), this Court extended the Anders principles to appeals
involving the termination of parental rights.” In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa.
Super. 2014). To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
-4-
J-S66030-15
determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the
[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
of the court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super.
2009)). With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel
inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this
Court has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy
of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.”
Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Additionally, an Anders brief must comply with the following
requirements:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to
the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
In the instant matter, counsel has filed a motion to withdraw,
certifying that he has reviewed the case and determined that Father’s appeal
-5-
J-S66030-15
is without merit. Counsel has attached a copy of his letter to Father,
advising him that he may obtain new counsel or raise additional issues pro
se.2 Counsel also has filed a brief that includes a summary of the history
and facts of the case, issues raised by Father, and counsel’s assessment of
why those issues are meritless, with citations to relevant legal authority.
Accordingly, counsel has substantially complied with the requirements of
Anders and Santiago. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 781
(Pa. Super. 2015) (observing that substantial compliance with the Anders
requirements is sufficient). We, therefore, may proceed to review the issues
outlined in the Anders brief. In addition, we must “conduct an independent
review of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-frivolous
issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d
1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (footnote omitted).
Counsel’s Anders brief raises the following issues for our review,
which we have reordered for ease of disposition.
2
On July 28, 2015, this Court issued a per curiam order, indicating that
counsel’s letter failed to accurately advise Father of his rights, and requiring
counsel to send Father a new letter, and to file a new motion to withdraw.
On August 3, 2015, counsel filed an amended motion to withdraw, which
included a copy of counsel’s new letter to Father. However, on August 11,
2015, this Court issued an order indicating that Father’s counsel had again
misadvised Father, and instructing counsel to send another letter and file
another motion to withdraw. Father’s counsel filed a second amended
motion to withdraw on August 17, 2015. We have examined the letter
attached to counsel’s second amended motion to withdraw, and we conclude
that it sufficiently advises Father of his rights in compliance with the Anders
requirements. Additionally, we note that Father has not responded to
counsel’s motions to withdraw.
-6-
J-S66030-15
[1.] Whether the [orphans’ c]ourt erred in finding that [the
Agency] presented clear and convincing evidence to terminate
the parental rights of [] [F]ather, where:
a. [] [F]ather was not given sufficient time to fix his
problems with homelessness, unemployment,
incarceration, and drug use.
b. Despite his obstacles, [] [F]ather and the
[C]hildren are bonded and love each other, and
severing that bond is detrimental to the [C]hildren’s
well-being.
c. The resource family alienated the [C]hildren from
[] [F]ather by continuously making negative
statements about him to the [C]hildren.
d. The [] Agency and the resource family put
obstacles in [] [F]ather’s way to make visitation
difficult.
e. The [C]hildren should never have been removed
from [] [F]ather’s care at the beginning of the case.
[2.] Whether the [orphans’ c]ourt erred in finding that [the
Agency] presented clear and convincing evidence to change the
goal from reunification to placement for adoption, where:
a. [] [F]ather was not given sufficient time to fix his
problems with homelessness, unemployment,
incarceration, and drug use.
b. Despite his obstacles, [] [F]ather and the
[C]hildren are bonded and love each other, and
severing that bond is detrimental to the [C]hildren’s
well-being.
c. The resource family alienated the [C]hildren from
[] [F]ather by continuously making negative
statements about him to the [C]hildren.
d. The [] Agency and the resource family put
obstacles in [] [F]ather’s way to make visitation
difficult.
-7-
J-S66030-15
e. The [C]hildren should never have been removed
from [] [F]ather’s care at the beginning of the case.
Anders brief at 4.
We first address whether orphans’ court erred or abused its discretion
by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children. We
consider this issue mindful of our well-settled standard of review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
-8-
J-S66030-15
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree
with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384
(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).
Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Sections
2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows.
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties.
***
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall
not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
-9-
J-S66030-15
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
To meet the requirements of Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at
least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which
reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or
failure to perform parental duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (citing In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa.
Super. 2006)). The court must then consider “the parent’s explanation for
his or her conduct” and “the post-abandonment contact between parent and
child” before moving on to analyze Section 2511(b). Id. (quoting In re
Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1998)).
This Court has explained that a parent does not perform his or her
parental duties by displaying a “merely passive interest in the development
of the child.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal
denied, 872 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (quoting In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462
(Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 859 A.2d 767 (Pa. 2004)). Rather,
“[p]arental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith
interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the
parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult
circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted). Notably, incarceration does not
relieve a parent of the obligation to perform parental duties. An
incarcerated parent must “utilize available resources to continue a
- 10 -
J-S66030-15
relationship” with his or her child. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817,
828 (Pa. 2012) (discussing In re Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d 652 (Pa.
1975)).
Instantly, the orphans’ court found that Father failed to perform
parental duties for the six months preceding the filing of the termination
petitions. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/4/15, at 12.3 The court reasoned that
Father “barely attended visits with the [C]hildren, let alone provide[d] them
with the love and support necessary for their physical and mental well-
being.” Id.
After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that
the orphans’ court did not err or abuse its discretion by terminating Father’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). During the termination and
goal change hearing, Agency caseworker, Michelle Womer, testified that she
was assigned to this matter on July 16 or 17, 2013. N.T., 1/12/15, at 24.
Ms. Womer prepared the Children’s permanency plans. Id. at 24-25.
Pursuant to the permanency plans, Father was required to enhance his
parenting skills, and provide appropriate care and supervision for the
Children. Id. at 25. Father was to participate in parenting programs and
participate in parenting instruction during visitation. Id. at 25-26.
Additionally, Father was required to remain free from drug addiction in order
to provide for the Children’s emotional and physical needs. Id. at 26.
3
The orphans’ court filed a separate opinion in support of the decrees
terminating Father’s parental rights for each of the Children. However, the
opinions are nearly identical, and separate citations are not required.
- 11 -
J-S66030-15
Father was to follow the recommendations of a drug and alcohol
assessment, sign releases for any and all drug and alcohol treatment, and
complete three drug tests per week. Id. at 27.
Agency caseworker, Aaron Williams, testified that he has been
assigned to this matter since March of 2014. Id. at 79. Mr. Williams had no
information to suggest that Father has completed any of his permanency
plan objectives. Id. at 100. Father did not participate in any parenting
instruction. Id. at 89. Father did complete a drug and alcohol assessment
in June of 2014. Id. at 87. As a result of this assessment, it was
recommended that Father attend Turning Point Rehabilitation. Id.
However, Father left the facility against medical advice on approximately
July 8, 2014. Id. Father has not reported that he has been involved in any
drug treatment since that time. Id. Mr. Williams also stated that Father
“hasn’t been very compliant” with drug screens. Id. at 88. On October 28,
2014, Father tested positive for cocaine.4 Id. Additionally, to the
knowledge of Mr. Williams, Father has no legal source of income. Id. at 98.
Father has not had an address and appears to lack stable housing. Id. at
97-98.
Ms. Rebecca Toogood testified that she formerly was involved in this
matter as an employee at Family Pathways. Id. at 39. Most notably, Ms.
Toogood assisted with supervised visitation between Father and the
4
Father also tested positive for cocaine on January 29, 2014, and April 16,
2014. See Exhibit 1 (results of drug screens collected on January 29, 2014,
and April 16, 2014).
- 12 -
J-S66030-15
Children. Id. at 40. Between January 29, 2014, and July 2, 2014, Father
participated in two of twenty-three scheduled visits. Id. at 41-42. The
twenty-one visits that were missed were canceled due to lack of
confirmation by Father. Id. at 42. Ultimately, Father was removed from the
visitation schedule due to a lack of participation. Id. at 45. Father’s only
explanation for failing to attend visits was that “it was difficult to come to
Butler.” Id. at 53.
Ms. Sandra Booth testified that she is an outpatient therapist at Family
Pathways, and that she has been providing therapeutic supervised visits in
this matter since November 4, 2014. Id. at 54. Ms. Booth explained that
Father confirmed his attendance for three out of ten scheduled visits, but
attended only two visits. Id. at 56. Both visits had to be ended early due to
Father’s erratic behavior and impaired mental state. Id. at 62; Exhibit 3
(report from Family Pathways dated January 8, 2015) at 4 (unnumbered
pages).
Father stated that he spends time living in both Butler and Pittsburgh,
but that “I am in Pittsburgh a lot.” N.T., 3/9/15, at 10. When Father is in
Pittsburgh, he lives with his sister. Id. at 11. When Father is in Butler, he
stays with friends. Id. Father stated that he is employed by his uncle, who
owns a “property management business and I work with him, . . . keeping
up the properties.” Id. Father admitted that he did not attend visits with
the Children consistently. Id. at 7. Father explained that, “I was in a
hospital a lot,” because “I had injuries to my hands and I had surgery on my
- 13 -
J-S66030-15
shoulder. I had an infection in my blood.” Id. Father specified that he was
hospitalized for the infection “around October 2013 . . . .” Id. at 8. Father
did not indicate when he injured his hands or had surgery on his shoulder,
although he claimed that the injury to his hands took place when “I was
working with my uncle a[]while back and I got hurt working for him on a job
real bad.” Id. at 7. Father conceded that he was incarcerated from early
February until early March of 2015, because he “[d]idn’t report to
probation.” Id. at 9. Father also was incarcerated in 2014 for about a
month, for reasons that are not clear from the record.5 Id. at 10. Father
stated that had an additional probation violation in 2014 for failing to report.
Id. Father acknowledged that he has failed to comply with his service plan.
Id. at 11. Father claimed that he one day will be able to obtain housing and
income and stay out of jail, and that “I just need more time.” Id. at 12.
Thus, the record supports the finding of the orphans’ court that Father
refused or failed to perform parental duties for a period of at least six
months prior to the filing of the petitions to terminate his parental rights on
July 29, 2014. Father made minimal efforts to complete the objectives
outlined in the Children’s permanency plans. Moreover, Father attended
only two of his scheduled visits during the relevant six months. While it
appears that Father was incarcerated for about a month during this period,
5
The Children’s permanency plans indicate that Father was incarcerated on
March 5, 2014, and released on April 4 or 5, 2014. Exhibit 1 (July 2014
permanency plans) at B-1.
- 14 -
J-S66030-15
the record does not reveal that Father made any attempt at maintaining a
relationship with the Children while in jail. Father is not entitled to relief.
We next consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have
discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has
explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding
analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act.
Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond,
if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as
part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or
her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-
interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be
considered by the court when determining what is in the best
interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court
stated that the trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Here, the orphans’ court concluded that terminating Father’s parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the Children. Orphans’
- 15 -
J-S66030-15
Court Opinion, 5/4/15, at 16-17. The court emphasized that the Children
are bonded with their foster parents, and that, “a bond with Father, if any
exists at all, is minimal.” Id. at 16.
We again conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion.
Ms. Womer testified that she visited the Children once per month at their
current foster home, and had “lots of contact” with the Children’s foster
mother. N.T., 1/12/15, at 30. It took some time for the Children to adjust
to their foster placement, but “once they adjusted, they soared. . . . [T]he
improvements I saw in the [C]hildren’s behavior upon first getting the case
and the middle of the case was outstanding.” Id. Ms. Womer stated that
the Children are bonded with their foster parents. Id. at 31. Similarly, Mr.
Williams testified that he visits the Children at their foster home every thirty
days. Id. at 95. The Children are doing well in the foster home and appear
to be bonded with their foster parents. Id. at 95-96. The foster parents are
pre-adoptive. Id. at 96-97.
Family Pathways permanency facilitator, Miranda Wilburn, testified
that she has been visiting the Children at their foster home since June of
2014. Id. at 70-71. Ms. Wilburn believed that the Children’s foster parents
have an adequate home, and can meet the Children’s needs. Id. at 74. The
Children seek out their foster parents for comfort and security. Id. at 72.
Ms. Toogood testified that Father and the Children initially did not
interact during their visits together. Id. at 42. When Father and the
- 16 -
J-S66030-15
Children finally did interact, their interaction “appeared to be guarded.”6 Id.
When Father visited the Children with Mother in September of 2014, Father
“spent most of the visit talking to [Ms. Toogood] about his toothache. He
had been to the dentist and was in extreme pain . . . .” Id. at 46. Father
also requested that the Children be moved to a different foster home
because the Children referred to their foster parents as “mom and dad,”
which irritated Father. Id.
Thus, the record supports the conclusion of the orphans’ court that it
would best serve the Children’s needs and welfare to terminate Father’s
parental rights. As observed by the orphans’ court, the Children are thriving
in foster care, and are bonded with their foster parents. In contrast, Father
has barely even seen the Children since they were placed in foster care.
While there is some evidence in the record that the Children maintain a
degree of affection for Father, it is clear that any possible bond is
outweighed by Father’s complete inability to care for the Children, and by
6
A report from Family Pathways, dated January 22, 2014, provides a similar
description of the visits between Father and the Children. See Exhibit 1
(report from Family Pathways dated January 22, 2014) at 4 (observing that
the Children “appeared to be hesitant and distracted in [Father’s] presence”
during a visit on November 6, 2013). However, a later report from Family
Pathways, dated July 3, 2014, provides a more positive assessment.
According to the report, D.M.X.W. “appeared close” to Father during a visit
on January 29, 2014, and referred to Father as “Daddy.” Exhibit 1 (report
from Family Pathways dated July 3, 2014) at 3. During a visit on April 16,
2014, D.M.X.W. was initially hesitant, “but then appeared to open up
quickly,” and informed Father that “I still love you.” Id. L.J.W. “often asked
[Father] to pretend play with him,” and both of the Children “were very
interactive with [Father].” Id.
- 17 -
J-S66030-15
the Children’s need for permanence and stability. See C.D.R., 111 A.3d at
1220 (concluding that the appellant mother’s bond with C.D.R was
outweighed by the mother’s “repeated failure to remedy her parental
incapacity,” and by C.D.R.’s need for permanence and stability). No relief is
due.
Next, we consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by
changing the Children’s permanency goals to adoption.
[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the
lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we
review for an abuse of discretion.
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).
Pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act,
when considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent
child, the juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the
continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement;
(2) the extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the
extent of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances
which necessitated the original placement; (4) the
appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for
the children; (5) a likely date by which the goal for the child
might be achieved; (6) the child’s safety; and (7) whether the
child has been in placement for at least fifteen of the last
twenty-two months. The best interests of the child, and not the
interests of the parent, must guide the trial court. As this Court
has held, a child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope
that the parent will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.
In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
- 18 -
J-S66030-15
For the reasons discussed throughout this memorandum, we again
conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion. The Children
are doing well in foster care and are bonded with their foster parents.
Meanwhile, Father abandoned the Children and failed to advance toward the
completion of the Children’s permanency plans. Adoption clearly will serve
the needs and welfare of the Children by providing them with a stable and
permanent home.
Accordingly, our independent review of Father’s claims demonstrates
that they do not entitle him to relief. Moreover, our review of the record
does not reveal any non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel. Flowers,
113 A.3d 1246, 1250. Therefore, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw,
and affirm the orphans’ court’s decrees and orders.
Motion to withdraw granted. Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/15/2015
- 19 -