Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
December 15, 2015
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 46961-8-II
Respondent,
v.
OSMAR GUILLEN-VAZQUEZ, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
JOHANSON, C.J. — Osmar Guillen-Vazquez appeals the sentence imposed following his
conviction for first degree child molestation,1 arguing that the trial court entered contradictory
orders regarding contact with his daughter, the victim of his crime. 2 Concluding that the orders
are not contradictory, we affirm.
The trial court sentenced Guillen-Vasquez to 75 months of confinement, followed by
community custody for life, but suspended the term of confinement under the special sex offender
sentencing alternative, RCW 9.94A.670. Section 4.5 of Guillen-Vasquez’s judgment and sentence
provides,
1
A commissioner of this court initially considered this appeal as a motion on the merits under
RAP 18.14 and then transferred it to a panel of judges.
2
Guillen-Vasquez was also convicted of bail jumping, but that conviction is not relevant to his
appeal.
No. 46961-8-II
The defendant shall not have contact with RG (female, 7/21/2001) including, but
not limited to, personal, verbal, telephonic, written or contact through a third party
for life (which does not exceed the maximum statutory sentence).
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 69.3
Paragraph 6 of the stipulated conditions of sentence/community custody provides,
You shall not have any direct or indirect contact with the victims, including but not
limited to personal, verbal, telephonic, written, or through a third person without
prior written permission from the community corrections officer, the therapist, the
prosecuting attorney, and the court only after an appropriate hearing. This
condition is for the statutory maximum sentence of life, and shall also apply during
any incarceration.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE UNDER CHAPTER
7.90 RCW AND 26.50 RCW AND WILL SUBJECT THE VIOLATOR TO
ARREST.
CP at 75.
Guillen-Vasquez argues that the trial court erred in imposing the no-contact order contained
in section 4.5 because it contradicts the no-contact order contained in paragraph 6. But they are not
contradictory. Upon a defendant’s conviction for a sex offense, RCW 7.90.150(6) requires the trial
court to enter an order prohibiting contact with the victim for the duration of the terms of
imprisonment and community custody. Under RCW 9.94A.507(6)(b), RCW 9A.44.083(2), and
RCW 9A.20.021(1)(a), the duration of Guillen-Vasquez’s term of community custody is life.
Therefore, the court was required to impose a lifetime no-contact order. But consistent with RCW
7.90.150(6), paragraph 6 gives Guillen-Vasquez an opportunity to ask the court to permit him contact
with his daughter in the future. Guillen-Vasquez does not demonstrate a contradiction.
3
The court also entered a separate sexual assault protection order prohibiting Guillen-Vasquez
from contact with his daughter “directly, indirectly or through third parties” for life. CP at 83.
That order also allows for the court to change the order.
2
No. 46961-8-II
Guillen-Vasquez also argues that the trial court erred in imposing a lifetime no-contact order
because it did not give a reason for the duration of the order. In re Pers. Restraint of Rainey, 168
Wn.2d 367, 381-82, 229 P.3d 686 (2010). But Rainey is inapposite, because it involved a no-contact
order entered as part of a domestic violence sentence, not a sexual assault protection order. And as
addressed above, the court was required to impose a lifetime sexual assault protection order.
We affirm Guillen-Vasquez’s sentence.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
JOHANSON, C.J.
We concur:
BJORGEN, J.
SUTTON, J.
3