Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
December 15, 2015
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 46907-3-II
Respondent,
v.
MARK DOUGLAS WILMER, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
WORSWICK, P.J. — Mark Wilmer appeals the sentence imposed following his conviction
for second degree assault—domestic violence, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing legal
financial obligations (LFOs) against him without having made a determination of his current or
likely future ability to pay them. He also argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by not challenging the imposition of the LFOs at sentencing. Declining to consider
his challenge to the LFOs made for the first time on appeal and concluding that he does not
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm.
At sentencing, the State recommended the following mandatory LFOs: a $500 victim
assessment, $200 court costs, and a $100 DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) collection fee. It also
recommended the following discretionary LFOs: $1,500 for Wilmer’s court appointed attorney.
Wilmer did not object to the State’s recommendations or argue that he was unable to pay the
LFOs.
No. 46907-3-II
Wilmer’s judgment and sentence contains the following preprinted finding:
The court has considered the total amount owing, the defendant’s past, present and
future ability to pay legal financial obligations, including the defendant’s financial
resources and the likelihood that the defendant’s status will change. The court finds
that the defendant has the ability or likely future ability to pay the legal financial
obligations imposed herein. RCW 9.94A.753.
Clerk’s Papers at 72. On November 14, 2014, the trial court imposed the LFOs recommended by
the State.1
Wilmer argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in imposing the LFOs
without having made any inquiry into his current or likely future ability to pay them. On March
12, 2015, the Washington State Supreme Court decided State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 839,
344 P.3d 680 (2015) (Blazina II), and held that before imposing discretionary LFOs, the trial
court must make an individualized inquiry into the defendant’s current and likely future ability to
pay those LFOs. Blazina II also rejected prior holdings that a challenge to LFOs was not ripe
until the State sought to collect the LFOs. 182 Wn.2d at 833 n.1.
But in State v. Lyle, 188 Wn. App. 848, 852, 355 P.3d 327 (2015), we held that for LFOs
imposed after May 21, 2013, when we decided State v. Blazina, 174 Wn. App. 906, 301 P.3d 492
(2013), remanded by Blazina II, we will not consider challenges to LFOs under Blazina II unless
the defendant challenged the LFOs in the trial court. Because he did not challenge the LFOs at
sentencing, we decline to consider Wilmer’s challenge to his LFOs made for the first time on
appeal.
1
The trial court also ordered restitution, but the record before this court is silent as to whether an
order of restitution was entered.
2
No. 46907-3-II
Wilmer also argues that by not challenging the imposition of LFOs at sentencing, his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, he must
demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and that as a result of that deficient performance, the result of his case probably would have been
different. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). This court presumes
strongly that trial counsel’s performance was reasonable. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 42, 246
P.3d 1260 (2011), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 153 (2014). Wilmer’s counsel’s failure to challenge
the imposition of LFOs at sentencing appears to constitute deficient performance. Lyle, 188 Wn.
App. at 853. But Wilmer must still show a reasonable probability of a different result had his
counsel challenged the imposition of the LFOs. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 337; Lyle, 188 Wn.
App. at 853-54.
In his declaration for appointment of appellate counsel, Wilmer declared that he did not
own any property or cash and that he had been receiving $720 per month in social security. But
at the time of the assault, he was cleaning his deceased father-in-law’s house in preparation for
selling it, indicating that he would receive some of the proceeds of that sale. And nothing in the
record suggests that he suffered from any physical limitations on his ability to become employed.
Wilmer fails to show a reasonable probability that the trial court would not have imposed the
discretionary LFO had his trial counsel objected to it, and so fails to show prejudice resulting
from his trial counsel’s deficient performance.
3
No. 46907-3-II
We affirm the imposition of Wilmer’s LFOs.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Worswick, P.J.
We concur:
Melnick, J.
Sutton, J.
4