FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 16 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KEITH PRESTON NANCE, No. 14-16900
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00313-SMM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ALLEN MISER; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 9, 2015**
Before: WALLACE, RAWLINSON, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Keith Preston Nance, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging First
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claims arising from the prison’s policies
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
regarding the observance of Ramadan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir.
2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nance’s First
Amendment claim on the basis of qualified immunity because it would not have
been clear to every reasonable prison official that providing sack meals to be
consumed pre-dawn and permitting inmates to engage in group prayer before
sunrise was unlawful. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011)
(explaining two-part test for qualified immunity).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nance’s RLUIPA
claim because Nance failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
defendants’ Ramadan policies substantially burdened the exercise of his religious
beliefs. See Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2015) (under
RLUIPA, the prisoner bears the initial burden of showing that the prison’s policy
imposes a “substantial burden” on his religious exercise; only then will the burden
shift to the prison to demonstrate that the policy furthers a “compelling
governmental interest” by the “least restrictive means” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360
F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (under RLUIPA, a “significant burden” exists if it
2 14-16900
imposes “a significantly great restriction or onus” on a religious exercise).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nance’s equal
protection claim because Nance failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether defendants intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his
religion. See Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (“To state a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an
intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a
protected class.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
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