Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Tamara Renee Good, Miscellaneous
Docket AG No. 66, September Term, 2014 & Miscellaneous Docket AG No. 8, September
Term, 2015
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT – Respondent Tamara
Renee Good violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”)
in her capacity as a representative of Blaine White, Jeanne Delaney, Joseph Chester, Eriss
Tubman, Cynthia Lewis, and Paul Newman. Good failed to perform legal services for
clients after accepting a retainer, ignored clients’ requests for updates, abandoned
representation of clients without communication, and refused to respond to Bar Counsel
during the course of its investigation. Such conduct violated MLRPC 1.1; MLRPC 1.2(a);
MLRPC 1.3; MLRPC 1.4(a) and (b); MLRPC 1.5(a); MLRPC 1.15(a), (c), and (d);
MLRPC 1.16(d); MLRPC 8.1(b); MLRPC 8.4(a), (c), and (d); and § 10-306 of the
Maryland Code (1989, Repl. Vol. 2010), Business Occupations and Professions Article.
Taken together, Good’s violations warrant disbarment.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No.: 03-C-14-13449
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No.: 03-C-15-004149
Argued: November 5, 2015 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 66
September Term, 2014
&
Misc. Docket AG No. 8
September Term, 2015
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
TAMARA RENEE GOOD
Barbera, C.J.
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr. (Retired,
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Adkins, J.
Filed: December 21, 2015
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“AGC”), acting through Bar
Counsel, filed two Petitions for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“petitions”) against
Respondent Tamara Renee Good (“Good”) on August 28, 2014 and January 7, 2015. Bar
Counsel charged Good with violating the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct (“MLRPC”) in her capacity as a representative of Blaine A. White, Jeanne P.
Delaney, Joseph A. Chester, III, Eriss Tubman, Cynthia Lewis, and Paul D. Newman.
Specifically, Bar Counsel alleged that Good violated the following rules: (1) MLRPC 1.1
(Competence); (2) MLRPC 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority
Between Client and Lawyer); (3) MLRPC 1.3 (Diligence); (4) MLRPC 1.4
(Communication); (5) MLRPC 1.5 (Fees); (6) MLRPC 1.15 (Safekeeping Property); (7)
MLRPC 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation); (8) MLRPC 8.1 (Bar Admission
and Disciplinary Matters); and (9) MLRPC 8.4 (Misconduct). In addition, Bar Counsel
alleged that Good violated § 10-306 of the Maryland Code (1989, Repl. Vol. 2010),
Business Occupations and Professions Article.
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), we referred the petitions to the Honorable
Nancy M. Purpura (“hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to conduct
an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Good did not
attend the hearings conducted on April 2, 2015 and August 21, 2015. Following the
hearings, Judge Purpura issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which she found
by clear and convincing evidence that Good violated MLRPC 1.1; MLRPC 1.2(a); MLRPC
1.3; MLRPC 1.4(a) and (b); MLRPC 1.5(a); MLRPC 1.15(a), (c), and (d); MLRPC 1.16(d);
MLRPC 8.1(b); MLRPC 8.4(a), (c), and (d); and § 10-306 of the Maryland Code, Business
Occupations and Professions Article. Neither Bar Counsel nor Good filed exceptions to
the hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. Good did not appear before us
for oral argument as to sanction. We issued a per curiam order on November 6, 2015,
disbarring Good immediately from the practice of law. We now explain the reasons for
that order.
THE HEARING JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT
Tamara Good was admitted to the Maryland Bar on December 17, 2008, and
maintained a practice in Towson, Maryland. Because the petitions here arose out of six
separate client complaints, we set forth the hearing judge’s factual findings pertaining to
each client complaint.
Complaint of Blaine A. White
Before retaining Good, Blaine A. White and Virlynn D. Atkinson-White (“Mr. and
Mrs. White”) failed to make three months of mortgage payments to their mortgage lender,
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA (“Chase”). In May 2012, Mr. and Mrs. White retained Good
to file a lawsuit against Chase. Mr. and Mrs. White paid Good a $500 retainer fee. In
December 2012, Good filed a lawsuit against Chase in the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland and the timeline of events as found by the hearing judge followed:
On or about March 15, 2013, [Good] filed an Amended
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. On March 15, 2013,
[Good] filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Response
to Chase’s Motion to Dismiss. On March 29, 2013, Chase filed
a Motion to Dismiss Mr. and Mrs. White’s case. On April 16,
2013, [Good’s] Motion for Extension was denied by the court,
although the court allowed her to submit a response by April
17, 2013. On April 22, 2013, [Good] filed a Response to
Chase’s Motion.
2
On April 22, 2013, Chase filed a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions.
[Good] did not file a response to Chase’s Motion for
Sanctions.1
In June 2013, Good emailed Mr. White advising him that she was awaiting the
court’s opinion. Shortly thereafter, Mr. White emailed Good requesting a status update.
Later that month, the federal judge granted Chase’s motion to dismiss the amended
complaint and Chase’s motion for sanctions, but granted the Whites’ motion for leave to
file a second amended complaint. Good, however, never filed a second amended complaint
on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. White.
Mr. and Mrs. White were unable to reach Good and obtain status updates regarding
their case. Mr. and Mrs. White “repeatedly” attempted to telephone Good during the
summer of 2013, but she did not return their phone calls. Mr. and Mrs. White also emailed
Good in October and November 2013 requesting a status update of their case, but Good
did not respond to these requests. The hearing judge found that despite the Whites’
telephone calls and emails, Good “failed to inform Mr. and Mrs. White that their case was
dismissed or file additional pleadings on their behalf.”
1
Internal citations to exhibits omitted. Although the hearing judge found that “[o]n
March 15, 2013, [Good] filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Response to Chase’s
Motion to Dismiss,” Bar Counsel’s Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action states that
“[o]n or about April 15, 2013, [Good] filed a Motion to Extend Time to File
Response/Reply to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.” This minor inconsistency in the
record, however, does not affect our analysis as to sanction.
3
Complaint of Jeanne Delaney
In June 2010, Jeanne Delaney retained Good to file a bankruptcy petition on her
behalf. During Delaney’s initial meeting with Good, she provided Good with a check in
the amount of $1,329.00 for legal services. Good’s “total attorney’s fees for Ms. Delaney’s
case, including the plan payments and the initial payment of $1,329.00 totaled $4,904.00.”
After this meeting, the hearing judge found that:
On June 21, 2010, [Good] filed Ms. Delaney’s Chapter
13 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court,
District of Maryland (Case Number 10-23937). Ms. Delaney
continued to make Plan payments over the next three years. On
December 20, 2013 Ms. Delaney received a notice from the
bankruptcy court informing her that her case would be closed
without proper discharge. [Good] failed to file the letter of
discharge for Ms. Delaney.
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Delaney repeatedly attempted to
contact [Good] to no avail. [Good] did not return Ms.
Delaney’s phone calls. Ms. Delaney sought assistance from
Legal Aid and was able to complete the Debtor’s Affidavit
Requesting Discharge pro se. On January 8, 2014, Ms.
Delaney’s bankruptcy was discharged.2
Complaint of Joseph Chester
In October 2012, Joseph Chester retained Good to file a bankruptcy petition with
the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Maryland. Chester is retired from the
United States Postal Service and currently suffers from scleroderma and arthritis. Chester
paid Good a total of $1,481 in attorney’s fees.
2
Internal citations to exhibits omitted.
4
After filing a bankruptcy petition on behalf of Chester, Good telephoned Chester at
11:00 A.M. on October 15, 2013 to inform him that he needed to be present at a hearing at
the bankruptcy court at 2:00 P.M. on the same day. Prior to October 15, 2013, Chester had
not been provided sufficient notice that his presence was necessary at the bankruptcy court.
On October 17, 2013, the bankruptcy judge issued an order denying confirmation
of the plan with leave to amend. The order required that an amended plan be filed on or
before November 4, 2013. Good told Chester that she would be filing an amended plan
before November 4, 2013. After receiving a copy of the bankruptcy court’s order, Chester
contacted Good “repeatedly” to remind her of the court’s denying confirmation of the plan.
Nonetheless, Good failed to respond to Chester’s phone calls. Good then failed to file an
amended plan with the bankruptcy court and Chester’s case was dismissed in November
2013.
At Good’s disciplinary hearing, Chester testified that she failed to pursue his
bankruptcy to its conclusion. The hearing judge found that “[Good’s] inaction resulted in
the near dismissal” of Chester’s bankruptcy until his new attorney began handling the
matter.
Complaint of Eriss Tubman
In May 2010, Eriss Tubman retained Good to file a bankruptcy petition on her
behalf. In June 2013, Tubman met with Good and gave her $1,271 to begin the preparation
of the bankruptcy petition. Tubman paid $1,671 in total attorney’s fees and filing fees for
the bankruptcy. In September 2013, Good informed Tubman that she was having family
5
problems that prevented her from filing the bankruptcy petition. Later that month, Good
filed the petition.
After the petition was filed, Tubman attended the meeting of creditors in October
2013. Good contacted Tubman in November 2013 and told her that she did not have to
attend the confirmation hearing later that month. Tubman then attempted to contact Good
on several occasions over a nine month period, but Good did not reply to these voicemail
requests for information. In June 2014, Tubman sent Good a termination letter informing
her that she had “called her several times a month since our last face to face meeting which
was with the creditors” and wrote that their last telephone conversation had been on
November 11, 2013. Tubman also filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance
Commission in June 2014.
Bar Counsel sent Good two letters in July 2014 regarding Tubman’s complaint, but
Good never replied to either of these letters. In September 2014, Good filed a motion to
withdraw with the bankruptcy court. Good, however, did not provide Tubman with notice
that she was withdrawing from her case.
Complaint of Cynthia Lewis
Good met with Cynthia Lewis in 2012 to discuss Lewis’s legal options related to
her financial situation. In September 2013, Good filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of
Lewis. Lewis agreed to pay Good $3,000 in attorney’s fees and filing fees under the
retainer agreement. Lewis attended the meeting of creditors in October 2013 and her
repayment plan was confirmed by the bankruptcy court in December 2013.
6
The hearing judge found that “[Good] failed to respond to Ms. Lewis’s requests for
information concerning her case.” In June 2014, Lewis sent Good a letter regarding the
status of her bankruptcy case and sent a second letter regarding Good’s lack of
communication. Good did not respond to either of these letters. In addition, the U.S.
bankruptcy trustee wrote to Lewis that she had been unable to contact Good. Lewis was
unable to retain new counsel for her bankruptcy matter because of her financial situation.
During AGC’s investigation of Lewis’s complaint, Good was similarly
unresponsive:
On July 24, 2014, Bar Counsel sent [Good] a letter notifying
her of Ms. Lewis’s complaint. [Good] failed to respond to Bar
Counsel’s initial letter. On August 13, 2014, Bar Counsel sent
[Good] a second letter notifying her of Ms. Lewis’s complaint.
[Good] failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s second letter.3
Complaint of Paul Newman
In March 2009, Paul Newman, a disabled retiree, retained Good to file a patent
application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and paid
$2,500 in total attorney’s fees.4 Newman provided Good with original drawings of his
design for her to file with his application. Although Good initially communicated with
Newman, the hearing judge found that he later experienced difficulty contacting Good:
[Good] provided invoices to Mr. Newman related to her
purported work on Mr. Newman’s USPTO application for
3
Internal citations to exhibits omitted.
4
From 2010 to 2011, Good also represented Newman in a matter involving the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The hearing judge in this attorney discipline
proceeding noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission matter “was
eventually dismissed.”
7
work performed in 2009. In 2009, [Good] initially contacted
Mr. Newman on a regular basis, but later ceased all
communication sometime in 2013.
Beginning in 2009 through 2013, Mr. Newman
continued to contact [Good] to arrange meetings with her, but
she cancelled each of their scheduled meetings.5
In September 2014, Bar Counsel sent Good two letters notifying her of Newman’s
complaint, but she failed to respond to either of these letters. Notably, the hearing judge
also found that Good has neither provided Newman a refund of attorney’s fees for the
patent application nor returned copies of his original drawings.
THE HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
From the facts of the six complaints, the hearing judge concluded that Good violated
MLRPC 1.1; 1.2(a); 1.3; 1.4(a) and (b); 1.5(a); 1.15(a), (c), and (d); 1.16(d); 8.1(b); and
8.4(a), (c), and (d). The hearing judge also decided that Good violated § 10-306 of the
Maryland Code, Business Occupations and Professions Article.
Rule 1.16
MLRPC 1.1 requires that an attorney provide competent representation. As to
Blaine White’s complaint, the hearing judge found that “[Good] failed to accomplish what
she was hired for: to complete the prosecution of [] White’s [sic] case against Chase.” The
5
Internal citations to exhibits omitted.
6
Rule 1.1 Competence
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
8
judge concluded that Good’s failure to file a second amended complaint after the district
judge granted Chase’s motion to dismiss constituted a lack of thoroughness and supported
a violation of Rule 1.1.
The judge also determined that Good failed to provide competent representation of
Joseph Chester when she failed to file an amended plan, which “largely led” to the
dismissal of Chester’s bankruptcy proceeding. The judge stated that this “inaction”
violated Rule 1.1.
Regarding the complaints of Eriss Tubman, Cynthia Lewis, and Paul Newman, the
hearing judge wrote:
Competency includes, “at a minimum, the attorney’s
presence at any court proceeding for which he or she was
retained, absent an acceptable explanation for that attorney’s
absence.” Attorney Grievance Commission v. Harris, 366 Md.
376, 403, 784 A.2d 516, 531 (2001); see Attorney Grievance
Commission v. De La Paz, 418 Md. at 534, 553-54, 16 A.3d at
181, 193 (2011) (finding that an attorney violated MLRPC 1.1
when he failed to appear before the court in his client’s case).
If an attorney “fails to act or acts in an untimely manner,
resulting in harm to his or her client,” generally this Court finds
a violation of MLRPC 1.1. Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 551, 103 A.3d 629, 646-647 (2014).
[Good] failed to provide competent representation to
both Ms. Tubman and Ms. Lewis in that she failed to continue
to represent them during their Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceedings despite their requests for information. [Good]
failed to act with the requisite legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation thereby violating RPC 1.1.
[Good] also violated RPC 1.1 for Mr. Newman’s case.
[Good] did little to no discernable work on Mr. Newman’s case
after she was retained to file his USPTO application.
Respondent’s conduct supports a violation of RPC 1.1
9
Rule 1.2(a)7
MLRPC 1.2(a) requires that an attorney abide by a client’s decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation and, when appropriate, consult with the client as to the
means by which those objectives are to be pursued. Addressing Blaine White’s complaint,
the hearing judge concluded that Good violated Rule 1.2(a) when she failed to “fully
Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client
7
and Lawyer
(a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the
representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A
lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer
shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter. In
a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision,
after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
(b) A lawyer’s representation of a client, including
representation by appointment, does not constitute an
endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral
views or activities.
(c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation in
accordance with applicable Maryland rules if (1) the limitation
is reasonable under the circumstances, (2) the client gives
informed consent, and (3) the scope and limitations of any
representation, beyond an initial consultation or brief advice
provided without a fee, are clearly set forth in a writing,
including any duty on the part of the lawyer under Rule 1-324
to forward notices to the client.
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of
any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel
or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
10
prosecute the White’s [sic] case with their informed consent.” The judge also found a
violation of Rule 1.2(a) when Good failed to file papers seeking discharge for Jeanne
Delaney in her bankruptcy proceeding. In addition, the hearing judge determined that
Good violated Rule 1.2(a) when she failed to file an amended petition on behalf of Joseph
Chester after he “repeatedly asked” her to do so. The judge wrote that Good “continually
ignored [Chester’s] entreaties to assist him” and that this conduct supported a violation of
Rule 1.2(a).
The hearing judge concluded that Good’s failure “to fully execute her clients’
objectives” and her actions while representing Eriss Tubman, Cynthia Lewis, and Paul
Newman constituted a violation of Rule 1.2(a). The judge pointed to Good’s failure to
provide Tubman with information concerning her bankruptcy as well as her decision to
withdraw from Tubman’s case without first consulting her client as support for a Rule 1.2
violation. The hearing judge highlighted Good’s failure to respond to requests for
information by Lewis and her performing almost no legal services concerning Newman’s
patent application as additional violations of Rule 1.2.
Rule 1.38
MLRPC 1.3 stipulates that a “lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.” The hearing judge concluded that Good’s failure to
file a response to Chase’s motion to dismiss within the time specified by the court, failure
8
Rule 1.3 Diligence
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client.
11
to respond to Chase’s motion for sanctions, and failure to inform the Whites that they had
leave to file a second amended complaint before she “abandon[ed]” their case constituted
a violation of Rule 1.3. The judge determined that Good also violated Rule 1.3 when she
failed to file papers seeking discharge, which “could have resulted in the dismissal” of
Jeanne Delaney’s bankruptcy.
Further, the hearing judge found that Good failed to represent Joseph Chester with
reasonable diligence and promptness when she failed to file an amended plan as ordered
by the bankruptcy court, which resulted in the dismissal of Chester’s bankruptcy. The
judge also concluded that Good violated Rule 1.3 when she initially filed bankruptcy
petitions on behalf of Eriss Tubman and Cynthia Lewis but “failed to complete the
representation.” Finally, the judge cited Good’s deficient representation of Paul Newman
in his patent application as another violation of Rule 1.3.
Rule 1.4(a) and (b)9
MLRPC 1.4 mandates that attorneys communicate with their clients. The hearing
judge identified many instances in which Good failed to act in accordance with this rule.
9
Rule 1.4 Communication
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or
circumstance with respect to which the client's
informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is
required by these Rules;
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the
status of the matter;
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests
for information; and
(4) consult with the client about any relevant
limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the
12
As to the complaint of Blaine White, the judge concluded that Good violated Rule 1.4 “by
failing to respond to both Mr. and Mrs. White’s separate requests for information regarding
their case.” The judge explained that “Mr. and Mrs. White frequently contacted [Good],
but she failed to respond to any of their phone calls or emails.” Additionally, the judge
concluded that Good’s failure to “communicate to her clients that there was a need to file
a [s]econd [a]mended [c]omplaint” supported a finding of a Rule 1.4 violation.
The judge also concluded that Good violated Rule 1.4 when she “failed to return
[Jeanne] Delaney’s phone calls regarding requests for updates concerning her case.” In
addition, the judge concluded that Good initially communicated with Joseph Chester, but
“as time progressed,” Good “failed to communicate with him regarding updates concerning
his case.” The judge stated that Good’s behavior denied Chester the “opportunity to make
informed decisions regarding his representation.” The judge also found that Good
“repeatedly failed to communicate” with Eriss Tubman, Cynthia Lewis, and Paul Newman:
“[Good] failed to respond to her clients’ requests for information and failed to update them
on the status of their legal matters in violation of RPC 1.4.”
lawyer knows that the client expects assistance
not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules
of Professional Conduct or other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.
13
Rule 1.5(a)10
MLRPC 1.5(a) provides that a “lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or
collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.” Regarding the
complaint of Blaine White, the hearing judge concluded Good violated Rule 1.5 and
explained:
Good billed a flat fee of $500.00, which on its face was
not an excessive fee. However, the court finds that [Good’s]
overall billing charges were unreasonable, considering her
inability to complete Mr. and Mrs. White’s case.
Part (4) of RPC 1.5(a) contemplates the amount of fees
involved and the results obtained, which is perhaps the most
glaring example of why [Good’s] billing was excessive.
[Good] failed to complete the legal matter for which she was
hired, with the exception of the initial and amended filing of
the complaint.
10
Rule 1.5 Fees
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect
an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.
The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness
of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that
the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment of the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or
by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
14
The judge also concluded that Good violated Rule 1.5 while representing Jeanne
Delaney. The judge reasoned that Good was paid $4,904 to complete Delaney’s
bankruptcy yet “failed to perform the legal services for which she was retained and
therefore was not entitled to the entire $4,904.00 fee.” As to Joseph Chester’s complaint,
the judge stated that Good’s “failure to pursue [Chester’s bankruptcy] to its conclusion
resulted in her obtaining an excessive fee” and concluded that this violated Rule 1.5.
Additionally, the hearing judge concluded that Good violated Rule 1.5 in her
representation of Eriss Tubman, Cynthia Lewis, and Paul Newman. The judge cited our
recognition that fees charged when little or no work is performed are unreasonable fees
under Rule 1.5(a) and offered the following support for her conclusion:
According to [Good’s] retainer agreement, [Good] was hired
by Ms. Lewis for:
a. Analysis of the debtor’s financial situation
and rendering advice to the debtor in determining
whether to file a petition in bankruptcy and if so
under which Chapter of Bankruptcy.
b. Preparation and filing of any petition,
schedules, statement of financial affairs, and
plan which may be required; and
c. Representation of the debtor at the initial
meeting of creditors and confirmation hearing,
and any adjourned hearings thereof.
[Good] did not adhere to the terms of her representation
agreement in its entirety for Ms. Lewis. [Good’s] failure to
communicate with the bankruptcy trustee in Ms. Lewis’s case
violated both (b) and (c) of her representation agreement. She
also failed to earn her attorney’s fees for Ms. Tubman’s and
Mr. Newman’s cases.11
11
Internal citation to exhibits omitted.
15
Rule 1.15(a), (c), and (d)12
MLRPC 1.15 requires attorneys to maintain their clients’ property in safekeeping.
The hearing judge found that Good “initially provided records of transactions” for Blaine
White, but after June 2013, “failed to provide any information related to the safekeeping
of Mr. and Mrs. White’s funds.” Likewise, the judge concluded that Good violated Rule
12
Rule 1.15 Safekeeping Property
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation
separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept
in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter
600 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and
maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other
property shall be identified specifically as such and
appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and
distribution shall be created and maintained. Complete records
of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the
lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years
after the date the record was created.
***
(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing, to a different arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit legal
fees and expenses that have been paid in advance into a client
trust account and may withdraw those funds for the lawyer’s
own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.
(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or
third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the
client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall
deliver promptly to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and,
upon request by the client or third person, shall render
promptly a full accounting regarding such property.
16
1.15 when, in late 2013, she “failed to provide any information related to the safekeeping
of [Joseph] Chester’s funds” despite initially providing records of transactions for Chester.
Regarding the complaints of Eriss Tubman, Cynthia Lewis, and Paul Newman, the
judge concluded that Good violated Rule 1.15(a), (c), and (d). The judge wrote:
[Good] failed to return unearned attorney’s fees or
provide records for her compensation in violation of RPC
1.15(a). [Good] did not maintain records and she kept
unearned attorney’s fees in each clients’ matter.
***
[Good] did not obtain informed consent from Ms.
Tubman, Ms. Lewis and Mr. Newman to keep unearned
attorney’s fees and [did] not return them to her clients in
violation of RPC 1.15(c).
***
[Good’s] failure to promptly deliver unearned legal fees
to Ms. Tubman, Ms. Lewis and Mr. Newman after she
ostensibly withdrew from their cases violates RPC 1.15(d).
Rule 1.16(d)13
MLRPC 1.16 requires attorneys to protect their clients’ interests when declining or
terminating representation. The hearing judge determined that Good violated Rule 1.16(d)
13
Rule 1.16. Declining or Terminating Representation
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take
steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s
interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering
papers and property to which the client is entitled and
refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating
to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
17
when she failed to return client files to Eriss Tubman, Cynthia Lewis, and Paul Newman.
Specifically, the judge highlighted Good’s failure to return Newman’s original drawings
related to his patent application. The judge also identified Good’s failure “to notify Ms.
Tubman that she was withdrawing from her bankruptcy case, prior to filing a Motion to
Withdraw” in concluding that Good violated Rule 1.16(d).
Rule 8.1(b)14
MLRPC 8.1 prohibits attorneys from failing to respond to inquiries for information
from a disciplinary authority. The hearing judge concluded that Good violated Rule 8.1(b)
when she “failed to respond to any of Bar Counsel’s letters related to the complaints filed
by [Eriss] Tubman, [Cynthia] Lewis, and [Paul] Newman.”
Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d)
MLRPC 8.4 provides in part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct,
14
Rule 8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a
lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material
fact . . . .
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a
misapprehension known by the person to
have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to
respond to a lawful demand for information
from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require
disclosure of information otherwise protected
by Rule 1.6.
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knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or
do so through the acts of another;
***
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice . . . .
The hearing judge concluded that Good’s violations of the MLRPC in representing
Blaine White, Jeanne Delaney, Joseph Chester, Eriss Tubman, Cynthia Lewis, and Paul
Newman established a violation of Rule 8.4(a).
The judge determined that Good violated Rule 8.4(c) and (d) when she failed to
provide competent legal services to Mr. and Mrs. White after being retained by them.
Similarly, the judge concluded that Good violated Rule 8.4(c) and (d) when representing
Jeanne Delaney:
[Good] failed to act on Ms. Delaney’s behalf after both the
bankruptcy court and Ms. Delaney informed her that Ms.
Delaney’s bankruptcy would be dismissed without [Good]
taking action to file an affidavit on her behalf. [Good] also
retained Ms. Delaney’s entire fee for a matter that she did not
complete. Such behavior violated RPC 8.4(c).
[Good’s] indifference to Ms. Delaney’s precarious
time-sensitive filing that could have resulted in the dismissal
of her case, constituted conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice, in violation of RPC 8.4(d).
In addition, the judge concluded that Good’s promising to file an amended plan on
Joseph Chester’s behalf but failing to do so constituted a violation of Rule 8.4(c). The
judge also concluded that Good violated Rule 8.4(d) when she “fail[ed] to prosecute”
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Chester’s bankruptcy and noted that the “negligent handling” of this matter resulted in the
dismissal of Chester’s bankruptcy.
Regarding the complaints of Eriss Tubman, Cynthia Lewis, and Paul Newman, the
hearing judge found that:
[Good’s] failure to return unearned attorney’s fees after not
performing the legal services for which she was compensated
for by Ms. Tubman, Ms. Lewis, and Mr. Newman violated
RPC 8.4(c). [Good] additionally failed to return Mr.
Newman’s original drawings to him after his repeated requests
in violation of both 8.4(c) and 8.4(d). [Good’s] abandonment
of her clients further demonstrates a clear violation of Rule
8.4(d).
Section 10-306 of the Maryland Code, Business Occupations and Professions Article
Section 10-306 of the Maryland Code, Business Occupations and Professions
Article provides that a “lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the
purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.” The hearing judge concluded
that Good violated § 10-306 in her handling of unearned attorney’s fees in the Eriss
Tubman, Cynthia Lewis, and Paul Newman matters. The judge explained that:
[Good] did not refund unearned attorney’s fees to either Ms.
Tubman or Ms. Lewis for the portion of the work that she did
not complete related to their bankruptcies. Additionally,
[Good] failed to refund any attorney’s fees for Mr. Newman’s
USPTO application matter for which she produced no tangible
work. [Good’s] conduct thereby was a misuse of trust money
in violation of § 10-306 of the Maryland Code, Business
Occupations and Professions Article.
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DISCUSSION
As we recently explained:
“In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has
original and complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent
review of the record.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker,
414 Md. 147, 167, 994 A.2d 928, 940 (2010) (citations
omitted). “We accept a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless
we determine that they are clearly erroneous.” Att’y Grievance
Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 706, 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010)
(quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50,
891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006)). That deference is appropriate
because the hearing judge is in a position to assess the
demeanor-based credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 707, 4 A.3d
at 964. In that regard, “[t]he hearing judge is permitted to ‘pick
and choose which evidence to rely upon’ from a conflicting
array when determining findings of fact.” Guida, 391 Md. at
50, 891 A.2d at 1095 (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.
Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 253, 760 A.2d 1108, 1118 (2000)).
We review de novo the hearing judge’s proposed
conclusions of law. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Ugwuonye,
405 Md. 351, 368, 952 A.2d 226, 236 (2008). In other words,
“the ultimate determination . . . as to an attorney’s alleged
misconduct is reserved for this Court.” Att’y Grievance
Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 764 (2002)
(quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315,
322, 786 A.2d 763, 768 (2001) (alteration in original)). In that
regard, we examine the record to ascertain whether there was
sufficient evidence to support the hearing judge’s legal
conclusions, by a “clear and convincing” standard of proof.
Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54, 930 A.2d
328, 335 (2007).
Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 427 Md. 15, 27–28, 45 A.3d 281, 288 (2012).
Exceptions
Neither Good nor Bar Counsel notes any exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings
of fact or conclusions of law. Thus, we shall accept the hearing judge’s “findings of fact
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as established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions.” Md. Rule 16-
759(b)(2)(A). In addition, based upon our review without deference to the hearing judge’s
conclusions of law, we agree that Good violated the following MLRPC provisions: Rule
1.1; Rule 1.2(a); Rule 1.3; Rule 1.4(a) and (b); Rule 1.5(a); Rule 1.15(a), (c), and (d); Rule
1.16(d); Rule 8.1(b); and Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d). We also agree that Good violated § 10-306
of the Maryland Code, Business Occupations and Professions Article.
Sanction
As a general principle, when a lawyer is found to have engaged in misconduct, this
Court sanctions the lawyer not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public and to
maintain confidence in the legal profession. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Greenleaf, 438
Md. 151, 163, 91 A.3d 1066, 1073 (2014). In attorney discipline cases, the appropriate
sanction depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including our assessment of
aggravating and mitigating factors promulgated by the American Bar Association. Att’y
Grievance Comm’n v. Coppock, 432 Md. 629, 648, 69 A.3d 1092, 1102 (2013). We also
keep in mind that sanctions should be “commensurate with the nature and gravity of the
violations and the intent with which they were committed.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.
Stein, 373 Md. 531, 537, 819 A.2d 372, 375 (2003).
Here, Bar Counsel recommends that Good be disbarred. In its Recommendation for
Sanction, Bar Counsel directs the Court’s attention to five aggravating factors found in
Standard 9.22 of the American Bar Association’s Compendium of Professional
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Responsibility Rules and Standards.15 Bar Counsel points to Good’s dishonest or selfish
motive (Standard 9.22(b)), her pattern of misconduct (Standard 9.22(c)), her multiple
offenses (Standard 9.22(d)), her failure to respond to requests during the disciplinary
process (Standard 9.22(e)), and the vulnerability of the victims affected by the conduct
(Standard 9.22(h)). Indeed, the hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that
Good’s conduct fell within these aggravating factors. Consequently, these factors support
a sanction of disbarment.
When determining the appropriate sanction, we must also consider any mitigating
factors. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Roberts, 394 Md. 137, 165, 904 A.2d 557, 574 (2006)
(“The appropriate sanction depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including
any mitigating factors.”); see Coppock, 432 Md. at 648, 69 A.3d at 1102. The hearing
15
Aggravating factors include:
(a) prior disciplinary offenses;
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
(d) multiple offenses;
(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the
disciplinary agency;
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
(h) vulnerability of victim;
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(j) indifference to making restitution;
(k) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of
controlled substances.
American Bar Association, Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and
Standards, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 9.22 (1992).
23
judge in this proceeding found no mitigating factors, and there is no reason to upset that
finding. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. West, 378 Md. 395, 411, 836 A.2d 588, 597 (2003)
(“On review, we keep in mind that the findings of the trial judge are prima facie correct
and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.”).
Pertaining to Good’s failure to communicate with her clients, her egregious
abandonment of client cases, her repeated ignoring of clients’ requests for status updates,
and her failure to return unearned fees as well as original design drawings in a patent
application matter, we are guided by our holding in Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Heung Sik Park, 427 Md. 180, 46 A.3d 1153 (2012). In that case, we held that:
[D]isbarment is the appropriate sanction when an attorney
abandons a client by failing to pursue the client’s interests,
failing to communicate with the client, ignoring a client’s
repeated requests for status updates, terminating the
representation without notice by failing wholly to provide
effective services, and failing to return unearned fees.
Id. at 196, 46 A.3d at 1162. Good’s conduct while representing Blaine White, Jeanne
Delaney, Joseph Chester, Eriss Tubman, Cynthia Lewis, and Paul Newman fits well within
the dictates of Park.
Accordingly, we conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. For this
reason, we entered the November 6, 2015 per curiam order disbarring Tamara Renee Good.
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