12-3509
Saleh v. Lynch
BIA
A091 317 588
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 22nd day of December, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT:
BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
PETER W. HALL,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
HASSAN AHMED SALEH,
Petitioner,
v. 12-3509
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Shahla Khan, New York, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant
Director; Tim Ramnitz, Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of
decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for
review is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
Hassan Ahmed Saleh, a native and citizen of Yemen,
seeks review of the March 26, 2012, and August 9, 2012,
decisions of the BIA denying his third motion to reopen
immigration proceedings and a subsequent combined motion for
reconsideration and reopening, respectively. In re Hassan
Ahmed Saleh, No. A091 317 588 (B.I.A. Mar. 26, 2012; Aug. 9,
2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history of this case.
We dismiss the petition to the extent it challenges the
BIA’s March 26, 2012, decision. We lack jurisdiction to
review that decision because the petition for review was not
timely filed from that decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)
(setting forth 30-day deadline for filing a petition for
review).
We deny the petition as to the August 9, 2012 decision.
A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in
the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent
authority. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265
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F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2001). In his motion to reconsider,
Saleh identified no facts or law that the BIA had overlooked
in denying his third motion to reopen. Therefore, the BIA
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. See Ke
Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90 (providing that a motion to
reconsider must identify the errors of fact or law in the
BIA’s decision).
Saleh only objected to the BIA’s determination that his
unauthenticated evidence was insufficient to establish
changed country conditions. As the BIA found, the letter
Saleh submitted with the third motion to reopen was not
notarized and discussed a feud that began in 1995.
Therefore, it did not support a finding that conditions in
Yemen had worsened since Saleh’s 2001 merits hearing, as
would be needed to excuse the time and number limitations on
his motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C);
Matter of H-L-H & Z-Y-Z, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A.
2010) (giving diminished evidentiary weight to letters from
relatives because they were “interested witnesses who were
not subject to cross-examination”), rev’d on other grounds
by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012); see
also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315,
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342 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the weight accorded to the
applicant’s evidence lies largely within the discretion of
the agency).
Moreover, because Saleh’s final motion relied on new
evidence, the BIA also construed the motion as a fourth
motion to reopen. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in
denying reopening; the March 2012 letter purportedly from
Saleh’s cousin was not signed or notarized, and gave no
assurance of the author’s identity. See Matter of H-L-H &
Z-Y-Z, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 215; see also Xiao Ji Chen, 471
F.3d at 342. Additionally, this letter discussed an ongoing
feud between the Saleh and Alaaraj families and thus did not
show any change in conditions in Yemen. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
Finally, although Saleh argues that the BIA overlooked
a country conditions report on Yemen with respect to the
danger his family would face due to Islamic fundamentalism
and anti-American bias in Yemen, Saleh did not raise any
arguments before the BIA regarding these alleged country
conditions. Therefore, the arguments have not been
preserved for review. See Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 78
(2d Cir. 2004).
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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
In addition, the pending motion for remand filed on
March 24, 2015 is DENIED as any new evidence or request for
a new form of relief should be presented to the BIA through
a motion to reopen. See Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonazles, 494 F.3d
260, 269 (2d Cir. 2007).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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