In the Matter of the Commitment of D.E. v. Columbus Regional Hospital Mental Health Center (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Dec 22 2015, 9:43 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Michael P. DeArmitt Steven J. Cohen
Columbus, Indiana Zeigler Cohen & Koch
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the December 22, 2015
Commitment of D.E., Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Respondent, 03A04-1505-MH-313
Appeal from the Bartholomew
v. Superior Court
The Honorable James D. Worton,
Columbus Regional Hospital Judge
Mental Health Center, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Petitioner. 03D01-1504-MH-1755

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case
[1] D.E. appeals the trial court’s order that he be committed to Columbus Regional

Hospital Mental Health Center (“Columbus”). D.E. raises a single issue for our

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 review, namely, whether Columbus presented sufficient evidence to support the

trial court’s order. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[2] On March 13, 2015, officers with the Brown County Sheriff’s Department

picked up D.E. while he was walking along the side of a road. Because they

were concerned about D.E. and knew that he had a history of mental illness

and “a history of carrying around a machete and trying to get into fights when

he is off his medications,” the officers escorted D.E. to Columbus. Tr. at 7.

There, Dr. Michael Stark treated D.E., and Dr. Stark observed D.E. threaten to

kill one patient and slap another patient.

[3] Columbus petitioned the trial court for the involuntary regular commitment of

D.E. to Columbus. At an ensuing fact-finding hearing, Dr. Stark testified to

D.E.’s history of mental illness, including Dr. Stark’s diagnosis that D.E. suffers

from schizophrenia. And Dr. Stark testified that D.E. had threatened and

attacked other patients at Columbus. Following the hearing, the court found

D.E. to be both dangerous and gravely disabled, and it ordered that he be

involuntarily and regularly committed to Columbus. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision
[4] D.E. appeals the commitment order. As our supreme court has explained:

To obtain an involuntary regular commitment of an individual, a
petitioner is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that: (1) the individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or

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 gravely disabled; and (2) detention or commitment of that
individual is appropriate. . . .

***

The purpose of civil commitment proceedings is dual: to protect
the public and to ensure the rights of the person whose liberty is
at stake. The liberty interest at stake in a civil commitment
proceeding goes beyond a loss of one’s physical freedom, and
given the serious stigma and adverse social consequences that
accompany such physical confinement, a proceeding for an
involuntary civil commitment is subject to due process
requirements. To satisfy the requirements of due process, the
facts justifying an involuntary commitment must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence which not only communicates the
relative importance our legal system attaches to a decision
ordering an involuntary commitment, but also has the function of
reducing the chance of inappropriate commitments.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
determination made under the statutory requirement of clear and
convincing evidence, an appellate court will affirm if, considering
only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences
supporting it, without weighing evidence or assessing witness
credibility, a reasonable trier of fact could find the necessary
elements proven by clear and convincing evidence. This
appellate standard of review applies in civil commitment
decisions.

T.K. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs (In re T.K.), 27 N.E.3d 271, 273-74 (Ind. 2015)

(footnote, internal alterations and omissions, quotation marks, and citations

omitted). Because we hold that Columbus presented sufficient evidence to

show that D.E. was dangerous, we need not consider the trial court’s alternative

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 conclusion that D.E. was gravely disabled. See G.Q. v. Branam, 917 N.E.2d 703,

707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). D.E. does not challenge any other requirements for

his commitment on appeal.

[5] D.E. asserts that Columbus did not present sufficient evidence to show that he

is dangerous. “‘Dangerous’ is ‘a condition in which an individual[,] as a result

of mental illness, presents a substantial risk that the individual will harm the

individual or others.’” Id. at 274 (quoting Ind. Code § 12-7-2-53 (2012)). Here,

Dr. Stark testified that D.E. “has a history of carrying around a machete and

trying to get into fights when he is off his medications” and that, when D.E.

was admitted to Columbus, “he was . . . agitated [and] endorsing auditory

hallucinations of hearing God’s voice or multiple God[s] talking to him.” Tr. at

7-8. Dr. Stark further testified as follows:

. . . I do believe he is a potential danger to others when off his
medications as well. [S]ome of those behaviors were displayed
early in his hospital stay . . . . [S]ome of the behaviors he
engaged in . . . were threatening other patients. He threatened to
kill another male patient here[. H]e exhibited inappropriate
laughter[,] which often is a sign . . . that he is responding to
internal stimulatory auditory hallucinations . . . .

Id. at 9. When asked to elaborate on the “issue with another patient,” Dr. Stark

testified: “[D.E.] threatened to kill one of the male patients. At one point he

slapped another male patient on the back and had a rather unprovoked uh, and

had to be removed from that patient.” Id. at 13.

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[6] D.E. emphasizes on appeal that Dr. Stark testified that D.E. was only a

“potential danger.” Id. at 9. But Dr. Stark testified to specific instances in

which D.E. acted in a manner that presented a substantial risk to others, and

the trial court need not wait until D.E. actually harms another to order his

commitment. See M.Z. v. Clarian Health Partners, 829 N.E.2d 634, 638 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2005), trans. denied. D.E. also emphasizes his own testimony or otherwise

attacks Dr. Stark’s credibility, but these arguments are merely requests for this

court to reweigh the evidence on appeal, which we will not do. See In re T.K.,

27 N.E.3d at 273-74.

[7] We hold that Columbus presented sufficient evidence to show that D.E. was

dangerous to others. See I.C. § 12-7-2-53. As such, we cannot say that the trial

court erred when it committed D.E. to Columbus, and we affirm the court’s

judgment.

[8] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and May, J., concur.

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