Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed December 23, 2015.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D15-2490
Lower Tribunal No. 80-9587D
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Samuel Lee Lightsey, Jr.,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the
Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria Elena Verde, Judge.
Samuel Lee Lightsey, Jr., in proper person.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before ROTHENBERG, SALTER, and LOGUE, JJ.
ROTHENBERG, J.
Samuel Lee Lightsey, Jr. (“Lightsey”) appeals the trial court’s order denying
his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm.
In 1981, Lightsey was tried, convicted, and sentenced to three consecutive
non-mandatory life sentences for three counts of second degree murder. When he
committed these offenses in 1980, he was a juvenile. Lightsey contends that based
on the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and the Florida
Supreme Court’s opinion in Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393 (2015), his life
sentences are illegal and he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. For the reasons
that follow, we disagree, but because this issue is currently before the Florida
Supreme Court in Landrum v. State, 163 So. 3d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), review
granted, 2015 WL 3937380 (Fla. June 18, 2015), we join the following certified
question issued by the Second District Court of Appeal in Landrum:
BECAUSE THERE IS NO PAROLE FROM A LIFE SENTENCE IN
FLORIDA, DOES MILLER V. ALABAMA, ____ U.S. ____, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 183 L. Ed.2d 407 (2012), REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF
THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN SECTIONS 775.082,
921.1401, and 921.1402, FLORIDA STATUTES (2014), TO
JUVENILES CONVICTED OF SECOND-DEGREE MURDER
AND SENTENCED TO A NON-MANDATORY SENTENCE OF
LIFE IN PRISON BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF CHAPTER
2014-220, LAWS OF FLORIDA?
In Graham, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits a sentence of life imprisonment
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without parole for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses. Graham, 130 S.
Ct. at 2011. Two years later, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller that a
mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender
who commits a homicide offense also violates the Eighth Amendment. The Miller
court held that although a trial court may sentence a juvenile offender who
commits a homicide offense to a sentence of life imprisonment, such a sentence
should be reserved for the “rare” juvenile offender “whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (internal quotation omitted).
Thus, juvenile offenders are entitled to individualized consideration of the
attendant circumstances associated with their youth. Id. “A judge or jury must
have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the
harshest possible penalty for juveniles.” Id. at 2475.
In 2014, the Florida Legislature enacted legislation in order to bring Florida
in compliance with Graham and Miller. See Ch. 2014-220, Laws of Fla.
However, the legislation was written to run prospectively, with an effective date of
July 1, 2014. Because the legislation did not remedy the pre-July 1, 2014
unconstitutional sentences, the Florida Supreme Court ordered the application of
Chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, “to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are
unconstitutional in light of Miller.” Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 405-06.
Lightsey’s 1981 sentence is not unconstitutional under Graham or Miller,
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and it is not in conflict with Chapter 2014-220 or Horsley. Lightsey was sentenced
for three homicide offenses to three consecutive non-mandatory life sentences.
Because the jury convicted Lightsey of second degree murders, the trial court did
not impose mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole as it would
have been required to impose in 1981 if Lightsey had been convicted of first
degree murder. Instead, the trial court conducted an individualized sentencing
hearing and imposed non-mandatory life sentences after considering the facts and
circumstances surrounding the homicides and the mitigating circumstances,
including Lightsey’s age at the time the homicides were committed.
Because Lightsey’s sentences are not unconstitutional, and they do not
violate any of the principles or holdings in Graham, Miller, or Horsley, his
sentences are not illegal and he is therefore not entitled to another individualized
sentencing hearing. To hold otherwise would simply provide Lightsey and
similarly situated defendants who committed homicide offenses and whose
sentences are not illegal with a second sentencing hearing many years, and in this
case over twenty-five years, after they were constitutionally sentenced, resulting in
great prejudice to the State.
A new sentencing hearing substantially differs from a review hearing. A
review hearing essentially focuses on evidence of the defendant’s rehabilitation. A
sentencing hearing is much broader and the interests are different. At a sentencing
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hearing, the trial court generally considers the defendant’s actions during
commission of the offense, the defendant’s prior involvement in the criminal
justice system, the impact his actions have had upon the victim’s family, the
defendant’s age and level of maturity at the time he committed the offense, and
other aggravating and mitigating factors. One of the components at a sentencing
hearing is to punish the defendant for his criminal actions.
While evidence of rehabilitation will generally be fairly easy to access by
reviewing prison records, the converse is true regarding the evidence typically
relied on at a sentencing hearing. In many cases, as in Lightsey’s case, because his
offenses were committed over twenty-five years ago, the prosecutor and judge who
tried the case, and who would have been most familiar with the facts and
circumstances of the case, will be long gone. Family members of the homicide
victims may be unlocatable or deceased, law enforcement who investigated the
case may no longer be available, and trial transcripts, police reports, and other
important data may have been destroyed. Thus, the new sentencing judge, in many
cases, will be tasked with imposing a sentence based on a cold and most likely
incomplete record with little or no input from the people who were most affected
by the death of the victim. While such sentencing problems must be dealt with
when the original sentence has been deemed to have been unconstitutional, there is
no reason to create these sentencing problems where the original sentence imposed
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is constitutional and consistent with Florida’s current statutory scheme regarding
juvenile sentencing.
Accordingly, we affirm the order under review, but because this issue is
currently before the Florida Supreme Court, we join the certified question posed by
the Second District Court of Appeal in Landrum.
Affirmed; question certified.
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