United States v. Jarod Brown

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4278

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAROD A. BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:10-cr-01096-PMD-1)

Submitted: December 21, 2015 Decided: January 5, 2016

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christopher L. Murphy, MURPHY LAW OFFICES, LLC, Mt. Pleasant,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Nick Bianchi, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Jarod A. Brown appeals his conviction and 180-month

sentence imposed following his conditional guilty plea to

possession of firearms by a convicted felon, in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2012). On appeal, Brown raises

several challenges to the district court’s denial of his

suppression motion and argues that the district court erred in

declining to sentence him below the statutory minimum. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.

In evaluating the denial of a suppression motion, we review

the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its

legal determinations de novo. United States v. Green, 740 F.3d

275, 277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 207 (2014). We

construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, the prevailing party. United States v. Davis, 690

F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012). Generally, we “defer to a

district court’s credibility determinations, for it is the role

of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their

credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United

States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Brown first asserts that his initial incriminating

statement to officers, made during his arrest, was taken in

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violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Our

review of the record reveals no clear error in the district

court’s finding that Brown’s statement was a spontaneous

utterance not prompted by custodial interrogation. See Rhode

Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-31 (1980) (defining

interrogation in Miranda context).

Brown also argues that his incriminating statements were

involuntary because they were made in response to officers’

threats that his loved ones would be sent to jail and that a

baby present during his arrest would be taken into the custody

of the Department of Social Services. We find no clear error in

the district court’s finding that officers never made such

statements.

Brown next asserts that the district court should have

found that the officers’ search exceeded the scope of the

consent they were given to search for Brown and his clothing in

his girlfriend’s home. Because Brown did not raise this

challenge in the district court, we review the issue for plain

error. United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 509 (4th Cir.

2013); see Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27

(2013) (defining plain error standard).

Given Brown’s testimony during the suppression hearing, it

is questionable, at best, whether Brown could establish the

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“legitimate expectation of privacy” in his girlfriend’s

apartment needed to demonstrate standing to challenge its

search. United State v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir.

2007); see United States v. Castellanos, 716 F.3d 828, 846 (4th

Cir. 2013) (listing relevant factors). Additionally, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the

guns were found under the mattress on which Brown attempted to

hide, and they were discovered during the search for Brown’s

clothing. The district court committed no plain error in

declining to conclude, sua sponte, that the search exceeded the

scope of consent.

Brown also asserts that the district court erred in not

sentencing him below the statutory mandatory minimum established

by the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We

review a sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness,

applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). We review questions

of statutory interpretation related to the ACCA enhancement de

novo. United States v. Carr, 592 F.3d 636, 639 n.4 (4th Cir.

2010).

We find no error in Brown’s sentence. Because the

Government did not move for a substantial assistance departure

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012), and the safety valve

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provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012) did not apply, the court

was not authorized to sentence Brown below the statutory

minimum. United States v. Allen, 450 F.3d 565, 568 (4th Cir.

2006). While Brown cites the recent decision in Johnson v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2010), that case has no impact

on Brown’s predicate serious drug offenses, which we previously

affirmed as valid ACCA predicates. See United States v. Brown,

494 F. App’x 374, 376 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-4073); see also

United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 283-84 (4th Cir. 2012)

(addressing mandate rule in sentencing context). Finally,

although Brown claims that the Sentencing Commission exercises

an excessive delegation of lawmaking authority that violates the

separation of powers principle, Brown’s sentence resulted from a

statutory floor established by Congress itself.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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