J-A30029-15
2016 PA Super 4
ESTATE OF SUSAN C. MCANDREW IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: JOSEPH C. MCANDREW, JR.
No. 830 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Dated March 2, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2011- X1951
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., JENKINS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
OPINION BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JANUARY 05, 2016
Appellant Joseph McAndrew (“Appellant”), through his guardian ad
litem, Joseph Hylan (“Guardian”), appeals the order entered March 2, 2015
in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court Division,
dismissing Appellant’s exceptions to the adjudication of Appellant’s mother’s
will. After careful review, we affirm.
On March 5, 2011, Appellant, then 23 years old and deeply mentally
disturbed, killed his father, twin brother, and mother, Susan McAndrew
(“Mother”), with a sword. Following a bench trial, the trial court found
Appellant “guilty but mentally ill” of three first-degree murders. On
November 20, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to three consecutive
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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terms of life imprisonment without parole, with the recommendation that he
receive psychiatric treatment at SCI Waymart.1
Mother died intestate. Her husband and Appellant’s twin were deemed
to have predeceased her,2 leaving Mother’s father and Appellant himself as
the only heirs to her estate. The administratrix of Mother’s estate
(“Administratrix”) filed the estate’s first and final account, which showed a
balance of $837,639.83. Following the criminal proceedings, on December
19, 2014, the lower court entered an adjudication of the estate, holding
that, despite being found guilty but mentally ill, the killing was willful and
Appellant was a “slayer” barred from inheriting from Mother’s estate.
Appellant filed objections to the adjudication. The lower court
conducted oral argument on February 25, 2015, and dismissed and denied
the objections by order dated March 2, 2015. Appellant timely appealed on
March 27, 2015.
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1
A panel of this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on
November 5, 2015. See Commonwealth v. McAndrew, 3548 EDA 2014,
November 5, 2015, (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not file a
petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.
2
Pennsylvania’s Simultaneous Death Act provides:
Where the title to property or the devolution thereof depends
upon priority of death and there is no sufficient evidence that the
persons have died otherwise than simultaneously, the property
of each person shall be disposed of as if he had survived, except
as provided otherwise in this chapter.
20 Pa.C.S. § 8501.
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Appellant now raises the following claim for this Court’s review:
Does the Slayer’s Act prohibit the slayer, found guilty but
mentally ill of homicide, from inheriting the victim’s estate?
Appellant’s Brief, p. 3 (emphasis in original). Both parties agree this claim
presents an issue of first impression that constitutes a question of pure law.
Accordingly, the standard of this Court’s review is de novo, and the scope of
review is plenary. Shafer Elec. & Const. v. Mantia, 96 A.3d 989, 994
(Pa.2014).
1. The Slayer Act
Pennsylvania’s Slayer Act3 (“the Slayer Act”) defines a “slayer” as “any
person who participates, either as a principal or as an accessory before the
fact, in the willful and unlawful killing of any other person.” 20 Pa.C.S. §
8801. To prevent slayers from acquiring property or benefits from the
estates of those they killed, the Slayer Act provides:
No slayer shall in any way acquire any property or receive any
benefit as the result of the death of the decedent, but such
property shall pass as provided in the sections following.
20 Pa.C.S. § 8802. To accomplish this goal, the Slayer Act deems slayers
to have predeceased the decedent as to property which would
have passed from the decedent or his estate to the slayer under
the statutes of descent and distribution or have been acquired by
dower, by curtesy or by statutory right as surviving spouse.
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3
20 Pa.C.S. § 8801 et seq.
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20 Pa.C.S. § 8803. Further, the Slayer Act expressly states that it shall “be
construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this State that no person
shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong, wherever committed.” 20
Pa.C.S. § 8815.
In addition to the Slayer Act, the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code
expressly provides:
Slayer’s share.--Any person who participates either as a
principal or as an accessory before the fact in the wilful [sic] and
unlawful killing of any person shall not in any way acquire
property or receive any benefits as the result of such killing, but
such property or benefits shall be distributed as provided in
Chapter 88 of this code (relating to slayers).
20 Pa.C.S. § 2106(c).
A criminal conviction for murder acts as a conclusive bar to the slayer
receiving any benefit from the victim’s estate.4 In re Kravitz’s Estate, 211
A.2d 443, 448 (Pa.1965) (holding that a record of conviction and judgment
of sentence for murder is not merely prima facie evidence of, but is a
conclusive bar to, slayer’s right to take under or against decedent’s will);
see also In re Klein’s Estate, 378 A.2d 1182, 1186 n.21 (Pa.1977)
(record of a murder conviction conclusively establishes a willful and unlawful
killing under the Slayer’s Act). Further, the Slayer Act expressly permits the
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4
The same is true of convictions for voluntary manslaughter. In re Estate
of Bartolovich, 616 A.2d 1043, 1045 (Pa.Super.1992) (“voluntary
manslaughter is a willful killing under the Slayer’s Act”).
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introduction of the record of a murder conviction in estate challenges as
follows:
The record of his conviction of having participated in the willful
and unlawful killing of the decedent shall be admissible in
evidence against a claimant of property in any civil action arising
under this chapter.
20 Pa.C.S. § 8814.
2. Insanity defense vs. guilty but mentally ill
Appellant was found “guilty but mentally ill” of three first-degree
murders. The Crimes Code defines first-degree murder as an “intentional
killing[,]” which by definition is a killing that is “willful, deliberate and
premeditated[.]” See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502 (a & d). Appellant now invites this
Court to treat his verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” the same as a verdict of
“not guilty by reason of insanity,” which verdict would allow Appellant to
inherit from Mother’s estate. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 9-12. We decline
Appellant’s invitation.
In a codification of the English common law insanity defense known as
the M’Naghten Rule, the Crimes Code defines the insanity defense as
follows:
(a) General rule.--The mental soundness of an actor engaged
in conduct charged to constitute an offense shall only be a
defense to the charged offense when the actor proves by a
preponderance of evidence that the actor was legally insane at
the time of the commission of the offense.
(b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the phrase
“legally insane” means that, at the time of the commission of
the offense, the actor was laboring under such a defect of
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reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing or, if the actor did know the
quality of the act, that he did not know that what he was doing
was wrong.
18 Pa.C.S. § 315. As of 1982, the Crimes Code has included the additional
verdict option of “guilty but mentally ill”, which the Code explains as follows:
(a) General rule.--A person who timely offers a defense of
insanity in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure may
be found “guilty but mentally ill” at trial if the trier of facts finds,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person is guilty of an
offense, was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the
offense and was not legally insane at the time of the commission
of the offense.
*****
(c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section and 42
Pa.C.S. § 9727 (relating to disposition of persons found guilty
but mentally ill):
(1) “Mentally ill.” One who as a result of mental disease or
defect, lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
(2) “Legal insanity.” At the time of the commission of the act,
the defendant was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.
(d) Common law M’Naghten’s Rule preserved.--Nothing in
this section shall be deemed to repeal or otherwise abrogate the
common law defense of insanity (M’Naghten’s Rule) in effect in
this Commonwealth on the effective date of this section.
18 Pa.C.S. § 314.
Regarding the interplay between the insanity defense and a verdict of
guilty but mentally ill, this Court has explained:
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Several steps of inquiry logically follow from the
legislature’s express language. First, the fact finder is called
upon to determine if the Commonwealth has proven that the
actor is guilty of every element of the offense charged beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth needed to prove that
[the defendant] was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each
element of [the crimes charged]. If the Commonwealth fulfills
its burden of proof, . . . the fact finder then moves to the second
step of the probe.
The second step calls for a determination of whether the
accused has proven the defense of insanity by a preponderance
of the evidence. If he was able to succeed in proving by a
preponderance of evidence that he was insane at the time of the
commission of the offense, then he must be acquitted.
However, if the accused was unable to fulfill his burden of
proving insanity, . . . then the fact finder moves to the third level
of scrutiny.
The third level of examination calls for the fact finder to
ascertain whether the facts establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused was mentally ill. If the fact finder establishes
that the accused meets the statutory definition, the verdict must
be guilty but mentally ill. If [the fact finder finds] that the
evidence [does] not support the finding of mental illness, then
the verdict would [be] merely guilty.
Commonwealth v. Trill, 543 A.2d 1106, 1127-28 (Pa.Super.1988).
Here, (1) the Commonwealth proved the elements of first-degree
murder beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) Appellant failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the
commission of the murders;5 and (3) the trial court – the fact-finder –
determined Appellant was mentally ill.
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5
Had Appellant proven he was insane, the trial court would have returned a
verdict of not guilty.
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The fundamental fact is that Appellant was found guilty of first-degree
murder. By definition, this guilty verdict means that Appellant committed a
“willful, deliberate and premeditated” crime. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502 (a &
d). While the guilty but mentally ill verdict will entitle Appellant to greater
access to mental health treatment while in prison, it does not transform the
verdict into a successful insanity defense, which would have resulted in an
acquittal.
Both sides and the lower court correctly note that no reported Superior
Court case has determined the application of the Slayer’s Act to a verdict of
guilty but mentally ill. However, Appellant and the trial court each discuss a
1988 Common Pleas case, Prudential Insurance v. Roberts, 8
Fiduc.Rep.2s 309 (C.P. Westmoreland 1988). See Appellant’s Brief, p. 10;
Trial Court Order, December 19, 2014, pp. 3-4. In Roberts, the
Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas addressed the application of
the Slayer Act to a verdict of guilty but mentally ill in denying the slayer
benefits from the decedent’s insurance policy. The Roberts court
determined as follows:
No one questions the fact that the shooting death of [the
deceased] was unlawful, the question is: does the mentally ill
aspect of the guilty verdict preclude what would be the normal
legal conclusion arising out of a guilty verdict on a murder
charge, that the killing was also willful.
A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity has been held
not to raise the bar of the Slayer[] Act (Gabel Est., 27
Fiduc.Rep. 322); but that is not the verdict rendered in [the
defendant’s] case.
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In [In re] Kravitz[’s Estate, 211 A.2d 443,] 418 Pa. 319
[(1965)], the Supreme Court held that a murder conviction was
a conclusive bar to the convicted party’s right to receive any
property or benefit because of the Slayer Act. We have here a
murder conviction. Should it be treated any differently because
the verdict reflected that the defendant was mentally ill in
addition to being guilty?
The verdict of guilty but mentally ill was created by statute
in 1982: 18 Pa.C.S.[] Section 314. Its intended effect was not
to excuse criminal conduct as is the case where a defendant is
found not guilty by reason of insanity; rather, the legislature
provided that a person found guilty but mentally ill “may have
the same sentence imposed upon him which may be lawfully
imposed on any defendant convicted of the same offense.” 42
Pa.C.S.[] Section 9727. The act does not in any way reduce the
defendant’s culpability for his or her act nor in any way does it
negate the element of intent or willfulness normally required for
conviction. The only difference is that at sentencing the court
may, after a finding that the defendant is severely mentally
disabled and in need of treatment, order the defendant to serve
some or all of the sentence imposed in treatment pursuant to
the “Mental Health Procedures Act” 42 Pa.C.S.[] Section 9272(a)
and (b).
***
[W]e conclude that a guilty but mentally ill verdict where the
defendant has been convicted of murder does not diminish the
legal sanctions which may come to bear on the person convicted.
Among the sanctions which follow a murder conviction is the civil
disability imposed upon the convicted person under the Slayer’s
Act.
Roberts, 8 Fiduc.Rep.2s at 310.
Using the Roberts court’s reasoning, the trial court stated the
following in denying Appellant’s objections to Mother’s estate’s accounting:
We can find no flaw in [the Roberts court’s] logic. For
this reason, we are not persuaded by the spirited arguments of
[Appellant’s] guardian ad litem as to why the Slayer’s Act should
not apply. The guardian parses the concept of “guilty but
mentally ill” by referring to the definition of a mentally ill person
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in the Crimes Code, to wit: “One who as a result of mental
disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.” 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 314.
The guardian asserts that, under this definition,
[Appellant] should not be deemed to have acted willfully and
with the intent to kill. He argues that the Slayer’s Act should
apply only when “a person who intentionally kills the decedent
with a primary motivation of gaining financial benefit from the
decedent’s estate or . . . the person, not suffering from a mental
disorder, kills the decedent[.]” (Guardian’s Supplemental Brief,
6).
We find this proposed refinement of the Slayer’s Act can
not [sic] be grafted onto the plain language of the statute.
Therefore, we must dismiss the [Appellant’s] objections to the
account, and hold [Appellant] is a slayer and is barred from
inheriting from his mother’s estate.
Trial Court Order, December 19, 2014, pp. 4-5.
We find the trial court properly decided this matter based on the sound
reasons in the Roberts court’s persuasive decision. Accordingly, we hold
that a verdict of guilty but mentally ill for first-degree murder bars a killer
from inheriting from the decedent’s estate under the Slayer Act.6
Order affirmed.
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6
We note that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in a separate matter
brought in federal court by father’s life insurer, applied Pennsylvania law to
also determine that Appellant was a slayer. See Genworth Life & Annuity
Insurance Company v. Estate of Joseph McAndrew, Sr., et al., Civil
Action No. 2:14-cv-01578-W.Y. (E.D.Pa.) (applying Pennsylvania law).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/5/2016
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