Opinion issued January 7, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-01015-CV
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SANDRA NZE, Appellant
V.
UCHENNA NWABUEZE, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 14-CCV-053717
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Sandra Nze, appeals from the county court’s December 12, 2014
judgment affirming the justice court’s judgment in a forcible-detainer action and
ordering appellant and all other occupants to vacate the subject premises by
December 31, 2014. Appellant did not file a supersedeas bond and appellee
subsequently took possession of the premises at issue pursuant to a writ of
possession executed on June 22, 2015. Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal as moot on the basis that appellant is no longer in possession of the premises
at issue. We grant appellee’s motion and dismiss the appeal as moot.
An action for forcible detainer is intended to be a speedy, simple, and
inexpensive means to obtain immediate possession of property. Marshall v. Hous.
Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006) (citation omitted).
Judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is not intended to be a final
determination of whether the eviction is wrongful; rather, it is a determination of the
right to immediate possession. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.008 (West
Supp. 2015) (providing that a suit for forcible detainer “does not bar a suit for
trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits”)); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e)
(stating that the only issue before a justice court in eviction cases is “right to actual
possession and not title”). Accordingly, the only issue in a forcible detainer action is
the right to possession of the premises. See Geters v. Baytown Hous. Auth., 430
S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
Because the only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to possession
of the premises, an appeal in a forcible detainer action becomes moot when the
appellant ceases to have actual possession of the property, unless the appellant has a
potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession. See Marshall,
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198 S.W.3d at 787 (holding appeal in forcible detainer action was moot because
lease had expired and tenant presented no basis for claiming right to possession after
expiration date); Geters, 430 S.W.3d at 582. We lack jurisdiction to entertain moot
controversies. See Geters, 430 S.W.3d at 582.
The record demonstrates that appellant did not supersede the judgment, a writ
of possession has been executed, and appellant no longer has possession of the
property at issue in the underlying forcible detainer action. Accordingly, we grant
the motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the appeal is moot.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a); Bey v. ASD Fin., Inc., No. 05-14-00534-CV, 2014 WL
4180933, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2014, no pet.) (dismissing appeal of
forcible detainer action as moot because appellant no longer possessed property at
issue); McDonald v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 03-13-00770-CV, 2014 WL
1433061, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 10, 2014, no pet.) (same). We dismiss all
other pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Massengale and Brown.
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