FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JAN 07 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JANET HUGHLEY, No. 13-36069
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-2233-RSM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Western Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 08, 2015**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges and GLEASON,*** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
Janet Hughley appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner
of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability benefits under the
Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. Hughley argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not give
sufficient reasons for finding that she was not credible. But the ALJ provided
“specific, clear and convincing reasons” that were supported by substantial
evidence for why Hughley was not credible. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Mainly, the ALJ found that Hughley’s testimony conflicted
with her self-reported activities and the objective medical evidence, and that
Hughley minimized her activities in her hearing testimony. These reasons amply
support the ALJ’s credibility determination. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d
853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996).
2. Hughley contends that the ALJ erred by discounting an examining
physician’s opinion; she also argues that the ALJ should have discussed other
objective medical evidence found in the doctors’ reports, namely positive straight
leg raises and tenderness in her lower back. But the ALJ gave “specific, legitimate
reasons for [discounting the physician’s opinion] that are based on substantial
evidence in the record.” Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal
2
quotation marks omitted). The ALJ noted that the examining physician’s opinion
conflicted with the examining physician’s notes from the examination, objective
medical evidence, and Hughley’s treatment record. A conflict between an
examining physician’s opinion and the examining physician’s notes or other
medical evidence is an appropriate, specific basis on which to discount the opinion.
See Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 184 (9th Cir. 1995). And the ALJ was not
required to discuss every symptom in the medical record, especially where, as here,
the ALJ provided an in-depth discussion of the reports that identified the
symptoms. See Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir.
2003); Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam).
3. Hughley asserts that the ALJ failed to sufficiently develop the record.
The ALJ has a duty to further develop the record only if the evidence is ambiguous
or inadequate to allow him to make a decision. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453,
459–60 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the evidence was not ambiguous. The voluminous
medical reports contained sufficient documentation of Hughley’s symptoms, and
Hughley made it very clear that she considered her lower-back pain to be an
impediment to walking or standing for long periods of time.
AFFIRMED.
3