IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
EVAN EUGENE MOORE, No. 68882 FILED
Appellant,
vs.
JAN 07 2016
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. TRACE K. LINDEMA,
CLE!..CIF SUPREME CC JRT
BY •
DEPUTY CLERK
ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT AND REMANDING
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a post-conviction
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Second Judicial District Court,
Washoe County; Scott N. Freeman, Judge.
Appellant Evan Moore is currently serving two consecutive
sentences of 20 years to life for murder with the use of a firearm. After
attempting a direct appeal, Moore filed a pro-se, post-conviction petition
for a writ of habeas corpus on June 4, 2010. After the district court
ordered an answer, respondent, the State of Nevada, filed its answer on
February 2, 2011. Moore filed his reply on March 25, 2011. After Moore
filed his reply, the district court took no action.
On July 31, 2014, and November 24, 2014, Moore filed
separate motions to expedite the decision. There are no responses or
orders in the record pertaining to these motions.
On July 24, 2015, the State filed a motion to dismiss Moore's
habeas corpus petition, solely citing NRCP 41(e)'s rule permitting
dismissal of a civil action for failure to bring the case to trial after five
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years had passed. Moore filed an opposition on August 6, 2015. Moore
also filed a request for appointment of counsel on August 7, 2015. 1
On September 9, 2015, the district court issued an order
granting the State's motion to dismiss the petition. In the order, the
district court acknowledged that Moore filed his petition and reply,
including the dates upon which they were filed. The district court also
acknowledged that it ordered the State to file an answer and that the
State did so. The only other fact noted in the order is that five years had
passed without a hearing.
There is nothing in the record on appeal that indicates why,
after Moore filed his reply, the district court failed to rule or set a hearing
date.
The issue before this court is whether the district court
correctly dismissed the petition for failure to prosecute. We conclude that
the district court erred in dismissing the petition because, pursuant to our
prior rulings on using the NRCP for procedural shortcuts in post-
conviction habeas corpus cases, dismissal under NRCP 41(e) is not
appropriate.
Error in dismissing a post-conviction petition under NRCP 41(e)
"The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they
are not inconsistent with NRS 34.360 to 34.830, inclusive, apply to
proceedings pursuant to NRS 34.720 to 34.830, inclusive." NRS 34.780(1).
Under NRCP 41(e), if an action is not brought to trial within five years,
'In addition to vacating the order granting the State's motion to
dismiss, we direct the district court to consider Moore's motion to appoint
counsel pursuant to NRS 34.750 and use its discretion to decide whether
appointment of counsel is appropriate in this case.
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the court must dismiss it, unless the parties have stipulated otherwise.
We conclude that because MRS Chapter 34 does not provide for the
dismissal of a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus due to
the failure of the petitioner to take further action after the filing of the
petition, dismissal under NRCP 41(e) is not permitted in a post-conviction
proceeding.
Even when there is no explicit conflict in NRS Chapter 34, we
have held that certain provisions of the NRCP simply do not apply to post-
conviction appeals. See, e.g., Beets v. State, 110 Nev. 339, 341, 871 P.2d
357, 358 (1994) (stating that despite no rule to the contrary, a petitioner
cannot move for summary judgment in the context of post-conviction
relief); see also Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1019, 103 P.3d 25, 37 (2004)
("If the rules of civil procedure governing summary judgment are
inappropriate for post-conviction cases, then permitting entry of default
pursuant to NRCP 55 is even more inappropriate."). "[H]abeas corpus
proceedings are unique—neither civil nor criminal for all purposes."
Means, 120 Nev. at 1019, 103 P.3d at 37.
As in Means, where we held that a petitioner could not use
default under NRCP 55, here it would be similarly inappropriate to allow
the State to use NRCP 41(e) as a method to avoid a determination on the
merits. Default in Means would have meant automatically ruling against
the State for a procedural violation. Here, dismissal would mean
automatically ruling against Moore for a procedural violation, one he did
not commit. Even if there was any delay attributable to Moore, our
precedent prohibits dismissal under NRCP 41(e).
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Because NRCP 41(e) cannot apply to post-conviction
proceedings, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court VACATED AND
REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with
this order. 2
Parraguirre
, J.
Hardesty
J.
Saitta
Gibbons
Pitleu
7 , J.
cc: Hon. Scott N. Freeman, District Judge
Evan Eugene Moore
Attorney General/Carson City
Washoe County District Attorney
Washoe District Court Clerk
2 Becausewe vacate the district court's order granting the State's
motion to dismiss, we deny Moore's October 27, 2015, motion to file proper
person documents as moot.
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