In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐1831
TAO CHEN,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH,
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A099‐890‐056
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 4, 2015 — DECIDED JANUARY 8, 2016
____________________
Before KANNE, ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
KANNE, Circuit Judge. Tao Chen, a 39‐year‐old Chinese cit‐
izen, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Im‐
migration Appeals (“Board”), which upheld Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) Robert D. Vinikoor’s denial of Chen’s applica‐
2 No. 15‐1831
tion for asylum and withholding of removal.1 The IJ ruled
Chen’s testimony insufficiently credible and corroborated,
and he alternatively found Chen did not demonstrate a well‐
founded fear of persecution on account of a political opinion.
We deny Chen’s petition for review on all grounds.2
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
We recount the underlying facts principally from Chen’s
testimony during his final removal hearing. Chen was born
in Shenyang, China, in 1976. In 2004, Chen married Junhui
Feng, and together they had a daughter, Feng Jia Qi, that
same year. Chen was a farmer and owned farmland in the
countryside of Shenyang.
On August 8, 2005, the Chinese government appropriat‐
ed land from Chen’s village, including Chen’s farmland, to
1 The Board also upheld the IJ’s denial of Chen’s application for protec‐
tion under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). However, Chen did
not challenge the CAT ruling in his opening brief and thus waives his
ability to challenge that ruling. Haichun Liu v. Holder, 692 F.3d 848, 851
(7th Cir. 2012) (“Because [petitioner] did not discuss the Convention
Against Torture claim in his opening brief, he has waived it …”)
2 We are troubled that Chen’s counsel failed to mention in his brief
Weiping Chen v. Holder, 744 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2014), which constitutes
“legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be
directly adverse to the position of the client.” Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.3.
Chen’s counsel represented the petitioner in Weiping Chen and thus knew
of this legal authority. With this omission, Chen’s counsel came perilous‐
ly close to violating his duty of candor towards this tribunal in the pre‐
sent case. Id. Therefore, Chen’s counsel should take care to disclose and
address relevant legal authority, both favorable and unfavorable, in the
future.
No. 15‐1831 3
build an industrial park. Chen was allowed to keep his
house, and he received compensation for his land. Chen be‐
lieved, however, that he should have received twice the
amount in compensation. Approximately 300 other farmers
in Chen’s village had their land similarly appropriated with‐
out proper compensation.
Several weeks later, on August 29, 2005, Chen, his wife,
and 100 other farmers traveled to the Yuhong district gov‐
ernment building to protest the land appropriation and im‐
proper compensation. The farmers protested for two hours,
displaying signs and shouting demands. Then the police ar‐
rived. After issuing a warning, the police used a water can‐
non to disperse the protestors. Chen and twenty other farm‐
ers continued to protest, and the police arrested and held
them at Yuhong district police station.
Chen was held at the police station for four days. On the
first day, Chen was interrogated by three police officers. The
police officers told Chen that his protest was a crime, threat‐
ened him with life imprisonment, and demanded that Chen
sign a document transferring his land to the government.
Chen refused. The police officers then covered him with a
cotton quilt and beat him more than twenty times with a ba‐
ton. After the beating, Chen was forced to stand for two
hours in the courtyard before being taken to a detention cell.
The police ordered the other inmates to watch Chen, and at
mealtimes, they would take his food. Throughout his time in
custody, the police repeatedly interrogated, threatened, and
beat Chen in this manner. Chen, however, continued to re‐
fuse to sign the land‐transfer agreement.
Meanwhile, the police confronted Chen’s wife at their
home. The police told her that Chen was in jail with danger‐
4 No. 15‐1831
ous criminals and that he would be released if she signed the
land‐transfer agreement. Scared, she signed and paid a re‐
lease fee. The police then showed Chen the land‐transfer
agreement signed by his wife, and at this point, he also
signed.
After his detainment, Chen could not lift his arm because
of the beatings, and to this day, he still suffers from occa‐
sional pain. Chen was also required to periodically report to
the local police. Chen reported twice before deciding that he
could not continue to live under this type of police surveil‐
lance.
In November 2005, Chen obtained a visa at the United
States Consulate in Shenyang. He told the American official
that he was a sales manager who wanted to learn about
American production technology. Chen had already ob‐
tained a passport on May 19, 2005, just prior to the land dis‐
pute with the government. Chen was admitted to the United
States as a visitor on November 26, 2005, with authorization
to remain until February 26, 2006. Chen’s wife remained in
China, and she told Chen that he had been threatened with
incarceration and sterilization if he ever returned.
B. Procedural Background
Chen stayed in the United States beyond his authoriza‐
tion date. On September 8, 2006, he filed applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He was referred to the
immigration court in Los Angeles. On December 27, 2006,
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) commenced
removal proceedings against Chen by filing a Notice to Ap‐
pear in Immigration Court. DHS charged him with remova‐
No. 15‐1831 5
bility under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as an alien who had re‐
mained in the United States longer than permitted. Repre‐
sented by counsel, Chen appeared before an IJ, who found
that alienage and removability had been established through
Chen’s admissions. Subsequently, Chen renewed his applica‐
tions for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under CAT.
On August 9, 2012, the IJ held a final hearing on the mer‐
its of Chen’s application. Chen was the only witness who tes‐
tified. He also submitted into evidence his passport and let‐
ters written by his wife and mother.
The IJ denied all relief on November 13, 2012. The IJ be‐
gan by analyzing the credibility of Chen’s testimony.
The IJ determined Chen’s testimony to be credible but not
detailed or persuasive enough without corroboration to meet
his burden of proof. The IJ characterized Chen’s testimony as
“for the most part internally consistent and consistent with
his written statement” but noted “some problems with his
testimony,” including the lack of post‐detention protest over
the appropriation of his farmland, as well as inconsistent tes‐
timony regarding post‐confinement police surveillance, the
ongoing police search in China for him, and the threat of
government sterilization.
The IJ then found that Chen did not provide, or ade‐
quately explain the absence of, reasonably available evi‐
dence to corroborate his testimony. The letters and passport
that he submitted did not support critical elements of his tes‐
timony, including the inadequate compensation for his land,
the injuries sustained in police custody, and the police sur‐
veillance that motivated him to flee China. The IJ stated that
6 No. 15‐1831
Chen provided no medical records or letters from any of the
individuals who also lost their land, participated in the pro‐
test, or were arrested with him. Consequently, because
Chen’s testimony and corroborating evidence were insuffi‐
cient to carry his burden of proof, the IJ denied Chen’s appli‐
cations for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under CAT.
Alternatively, the IJ ruled that even if Chen had submit‐
ted sufficient evidence to corroborate his testimony, he still
did not demonstrate eligibility for asylum because he did
not meet the statutory definition of a “refugee.” 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
First, the IJ found that Chen did not demonstrate that he
suffered harm rising to the level of past persecution. Chen’s
claim of inadequate government compensation for his farm‐
land was “not sufficiently severe to be considered persecu‐
tion.” The IJ also rejected Chen’s claim of mistreatment in
detention because he “offered no further details” regarding
his beatings or injuries. And the IJ concluded that Chen’s
claim of police surveillance in the form of periodic question‐
ing “does not constitute persecution.”
Second, Chen failed to demonstrate that any harm he suf‐
fered was on account of the protected ground of a political
opinion. The IJ characterized Chen’s dispute over inadequate
compensation as “an economic demand,” as opposed to an
expression of political opinion. Additionally, the IJ found
that the police detained Chen because he refused to disperse,
not because he expressed a political opinion.
Third, the IJ found that Chen failed to establish a “well‐
founded fear of persecution” should he return to China be‐
No. 15‐1831 7
cause his testimony relating to negative police actions to‐
wards him and his wife—including surveillance, harass‐
ment, imprisonment, and sterilization—was inconsistent and
uncorroborated.
Having determined that Chen did not meet his burden to
show eligibility for asylum, the IJ rejected Chen’s remaining
claims for withholding of removal and protection under
CAT because they required a higher burden of proof. The IJ
ordered Chen removed to China.
On March 25, 2015, the Board affirmed the IJ’s decision in
all material respects, holding that the IJ’s findings of fact
were not “clearly erroneous.” This appeal follows.
II. ANALYSIS
When the Board agrees with the decision of the IJ, adopts
that decision, and supplements that decision with its own
reasoning, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by
the Board. Tawuo v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2015).
We review questions of law de novo. Id. We review findings
of fact and credibility determinations, which are questions of
fact, under a deferential “substantial evidence” standard,
meaning we may “only reverse [the IJ and Board’s] factual
findings if the facts compel an opposite conclusion” Id. (em‐
phasis in original). In other words, the IJ’s findings of fact are
conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).
On appeal, Chen challenges the denial of his applications
for asylum and withholding of removal. All of Chen’s argu‐
ments relate to the IJ Robert D. Vinikoor’s findings of fact
8 No. 15‐1831
and are reviewed under a deferential “substantial evidence”
standard.
A. Asylum
The Attorney General “may grant asylum to an alien”
who is a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A “refugee” is de‐
fined as a person who is unable or unwilling to return to his
or her home country “because of persecution or a well‐
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, na‐
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or politi‐
cal opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
We begin our review with the IJ’s credibility and corrobo‐
ration analysis, which applies to both Chen’s asylum and
withholding of removal claims. Then, we address the IJ’s al‐
ternative finding of ineligibility for asylum relief.
1. Credibility and Corroboration
An applicant bears the burden of proving that he is a
“refugee” and eligible for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i);
see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a). The testimony of the applicant
“may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without
corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of
fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive,
and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the
applicant is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(a).
In determining whether the applicant has met his bur‐
den, the IJ “may weigh the credible testimony along with
other evidence of record.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). An IJ’s
credibility determination considers the “totality of circum‐
stances, and all relevant factors” and may be based on a
myriad of factors, including the inherent plausibility and in‐
No. 15‐1831 9
ternal consistency of the applicant’s statements. Id.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Where the IJ determines that the appli‐
cant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise
credible testimony, “such evidence must be provided unless
the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reason‐
ably obtain the evidence.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
Chen challenges the IJ’s findings with regard to his testi‐
mony, specifically arguing that the IJ erred in finding that
Chen did not provide, or adequately explain the absence of,
reasonably available evidence to corroborate his testimony.3
First, Chen argues that he could not reasonably provide
corroboration for his testimony from the other protestors be‐
cause of his rapid flight from China after his detention and
his wife’s relocation from their home.
Chen’s argument is similar to those rejected by this court
in Weiping Chen v. Holder, 744 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2014).4 In
Weiping Chen, the court reviewed an IJ finding that required
3 Chen does not dispute the IJ’s credibility ruling, which determined that
his testimony required corroboration. Therefore, this argument is
waived. See Long‐Gang Lin v. Holder, 630 F.3d 536, 543 (7th Cir. 2010).
(“[Petitioner] has not made any cogent argument to challenge these rea‐
sons for the adverse credibility finding. Thus, he has waived any chal‐
lenge to them.”)
4 Although the burdens of proof differ between asylum and withholding
of removal, the credibility and corroboration analysis is the same in ex‐
amining the underlying claim of potential persecution on account of a
protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (referring to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)); see I.N.S. v. Cardoza‐Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423–24 (1987).
Therefore, Weiping Chen’s corroboration analysis, which pertains specifi‐
cally to a claim of withholding of removal, is relevant to the present cor‐
roboration analysis, which relates to Chen’s claims of asylum and with‐
holding of removal.
10 No. 15‐1831
corroborating evidence for a Chinese alien who had provid‐
ed inconsistent testimony regarding a property dispute with
the government, participation in a protest, and detainment
and abuse by the police. The Weiping Chen court upheld the
IJ’s finding, noting that the lack of required corroborating
evidence—specifically from his wife, with whom he had
contacted two months before his hearing, and the other mer‐
chant‐protestor, with whom he claimed to have lost con‐
tact—“dooms” the applicant’s arguments. Id. at 533.
In the instant case, Chen has likewise maintained contact
with his wife who allegedly lives at their home. In fact,
Chen’s inconsistent testimony regarding his wife’s location—
he initially stated that she had left home to escape police
harassment but then admitted that she currently lived at
home—was a reason the IJ required corroboration. At his fi‐
nal hearing, Chen submitted a letter from his wife, which
provided limited corroboration to his story in that it indicat‐
ed that he protested, that he was arrested, and that she paid
a fine to obtain his release. But neither his wifeʹs nor his
motherʹs letter mentioned that he was beaten by the police,
that he sustained injuries, or that he fled China because of
the ongoing police surveillance. Moreover, because Chen
was able to contact his wife who lives at home in their vil‐
lage and obtain a letter from her, it is reasonable to assume
that he could have also contacted the other protestors who
live in the same village as his wife and obtain evidence from
them. Thus, Chen fails to adequately explain his lack of cor‐
roborating evidence.
Second, Chen argues that it is reasonable that he did not
provide any medical evidence corroborating the physical in‐
juries he sustained while in police custody. He asserts that
No. 15‐1831 11
the medical records were unavailable because the original
copies were lost during his flight from China and his wife’s
relocation and new copies of the records are unobtainable
due to deficient recordkeeping in rural China.
Chen’s argument is without merit. We initially note that
the IJ specifically highlighted Chen’s detention injuries as a
critical part of his testimony requiring corroboration: “There
is no medical evidence either from doctors in China or the
United States corroborating his injury.” Although Chen ar‐
gues that his Chinese medical records are unavailable, he
provides no support for this assertion, such as a statement
from his wife or Chinese doctors. In other words, Chen “did
not explain why he could not obtain the medical evidence or
even assert that he had tried.” Singh v. Ashcroft, 93 F. Appʹx
929, 934 (7th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, even accepting Chen’s
statement that his Chinese medical records are unavailable,
the lack of corroborating medical evidence from American
doctors is fatal to his claim. Chen does not provide, nor does
he explain the absence of, corroborating medical evidence
from this reasonably available source.
Third, Chen attempts to rely on Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424
F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2005), for the proposition: “To expect [asy‐
lum applicants] to stop and collect dossiers of paperwork
before fleeing is both unrealistic and strikingly insensitive to
the harrowing conditions they face.” Id. at 613.
Chen’s reliance on Dawoud is misplaced because the cred‐
ibility determination in Dawoud is different from the finding
in Chen’s case. Dawoud explicitly concerned the “rule permit‐
ting reliance solely on credible testimony,” which is meant
for asylum applicants who “flee their home countries under
circumstances of great urgency … literally running for their
12 No. 15‐1831
lives … [and] abandon[ing] their families, friends, jobs, and
material possessions without a word of explanation.” Id. at
612–13. In contrast, here, the IJ explicitly found that sole reli‐
ance on Chen’s testimony was not appropriate and required
corroboration. In addition, unlike those who “flee … circum‐
stances of great urgency,” Chen traveled to the United States
on a valid visitor visa obtained two months after his deten‐
tion and protest. Id.
In sum, the IJ’s credibility and corroboration findings
were supported by “substantial evidence” and the record
does not compel the conclusion that Chen could not have
reasonably obtained corroborating evidence. Consequently,
his failure to produce such evidence when required is fatal
to his asylum claim.
2. Eligibility for Asylum Relief
Chen also challenges the IJ’s alternative finding that,
even if his testimony was accepted as true, he is not eligible
for asylum relief because he has not shown past persecution
or a well‐founded fear of future persecution on account of a
political opinion.
As previously stated, the Attorney General may grant
asylum to aliens who fall under the statutory definition of a
“refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
An applicant can establish asylum eligibility as a refugee in
one of two ways: (1) “past persecution” or (2) “a well‐
founded fear of future persecution.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b).
To establish “past persecution,” an applicant must show
that “he or she has suffered persecution in the past” on ac‐
count of a protected ground, such as political opinion. 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). If “past persecution” is established, it
No. 15‐1831 13
creates a rebuttable presumption of a “well‐founded fear of
persecution.” Id.
To establish a “well‐founded fear of future persecution”
regardless of past persecution, an applicant must show: (a) a
fear of persecution in his or her country on account of a pro‐
tected ground, (b) there is a “reasonable possibility of suffer‐
ing such persecution if he or she were to return to that coun‐
try,” and (c) he or she is “unable or unwilling to return to, or
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country be‐
cause of such fear.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2).
a. Past Persecution
Chen contends that he has established “past persecution”
on account of a political opinion through his protest against
the Chinese government’s appropriation of his land and his
subsequent treatment by the police.
Chen’s contention fails because his case is controlled by
Weiping Chen. Like in Weiping Chen, Chen has not demon‐
strated past persecution on account of a political opinion, a
protected ground, because he has not shown expression of a
political opinion.5
In Weiping Chen, based on nearly identical facts, this court
upheld the IJ’s finding that an asylum applicant did not ex‐
5 Although the burdens of proof differ between asylum and withholding
of removal, the protected ground analysis is the same in examining the
underlying claim of potential persecution on account of a protected
ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A); see Cardoza‐Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423–24. Therefore,
Weiping Chen’s protected ground analysis, which pertains specifically to
a claim of withholding of removal, is relevant to the present protected
ground analysis, which relates to Chen’s claims of asylum and withhold‐
ing of removal.
14 No. 15‐1831
press a political opinion. 744 F.3d at 533–34. Weiping Chen
was a Chinese storeowner, and in April 2004, the Chinese
government developed the area containing Weiping Chen’s
store, destroying it and other buildings. In response,
Weiping Chen and one hundred other merchants and family
members protested against the local government office and
demanded “proper compensation.” Id. at 530. The local po‐
lice responded by dispersing the crowd with a water cannon.
When Weiping Chen and other protestors refused to leave,
the police arrested them. Subsequently, Weiping Chen was
detained for three days, beaten, and forced to sign an
agreement stating that he “would not approach the govern‐
ment asking for compensation.” Id. Weiping Chen was then
released and required to report to the police station periodi‐
cally. Several months later, he entered the United States on a
non‐immigrant visitor visa and stayed beyond his authoriza‐
tion date. Meanwhile, his wife remained in China and re‐
ported that the police were looking for him.
In Weiping Chen, this court upheld the IJ’s finding that
Weiping Chen had not suffered past persecution or had a
well‐founded fear of future persecution on account of a po‐
litical opinion. The court described Weiping Chen’s protest
as “non‐political” noting that he “was unable to articulate
any political opinion, and he admitted that he did not belong
to any political organizations, and that other than this pro‐
test, he participated in no other political activities.” Id. at 534.
Moreover, the court upheld the IJ’s finding that Weiping
Chen’s circumstances “should be characterized as a personal
property dispute rather than an expression of political opin‐
ion” and held that a “personal property dispute, no matter
how nasty, cannot support an alien’s claim of asylum.” Id.
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
No. 15‐1831 15
Chen’s case is indistinguishable from Weiping Chen. In the
present case, Chen claimed that his property was appropri‐
ated by the government without fair compensation. He par‐
ticipated in a protest with other landowners. Chen was al‐
legedly arrested, detained, beaten, and forced to sign an
agreement to end the dispute. Furthermore, like Weiping
Chen, there is no record evidence indicating that Chen articu‐
lated any political opinion, belonged to any political organi‐
zations, or participated in any political activities. Because
Chen’s case is indistinguishable from Weiping Chen, we simi‐
larly uphold the IJ’s finding that Chen has not shown past
persecution on account of a political opinion.
Chen asked, at oral argument, for this court to overrule
Weiping Chen. Chen argues that because the Chinese gov‐
ernment controls everything in China and excludes its citi‐
zens from the decision and political process, every confron‐
tation between the Chinese government and Chinese citizens
“assumes a political significance.”
We decline to overrule Weiping Chen. Chen offers no sup‐
port for his characterization of the Chinese political climate,
nor does he provide adequate justification for such a broad
interpretation of “on account of a political opinion” in Chi‐
na, a view that would greatly enlarge the scope of asylum
eligibility for applicants from that country. Thus, Weiping
Chen stands.
b. Well‐Founded Fear of Future Persecution
Chen additionally contends that he has demonstrated a
“well‐founded fear of future persecution” on account of a
political opinion through the following: (1) his post‐
16 No. 15‐1831
detainment police surveillance and travel restrictions and (2)
continued police inquiries into his location.
To establish a well‐founded fear of future persecution, an
asylum applicant “must satisfy both the objective and sub‐
jective prongs of the well‐founded fear standard.” Ayele v.
Holder, 564 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2009). The subjective com‐
ponent “often depends upon the applicantʹs own credibility
and testimony.” Id. In contrast, the objective prong requires
evidence that there is a “reasonable probability” that the ap‐
plicant “will be singled out individually for persecution” or
that “there is a pattern or practice of persecution of an iden‐
tifiable group” to which the applicant belongs. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Chen first argues because he suffered past persecution in
the form of post‐detainment police surveillance and travel
restrictions and is therefore entitled to a presumption of a
well‐founded fear of future persecution.
Assuming that Chen could overcome Weiping Chen and
establish expression of a political opinion, this argument still
fails because of his inconsistent testimony and lack of cor‐
roborating evidence. Chen initially testified that he left Chi‐
na because he could not live under police surveillance but
then conceded he only had to report to police twice and did
not allude to any mistreatment during those times. Regard‐
ing police surveillance, Chen did not provide the required
corroborating evidence to support this assertion. In terms of
reporting to the police, we have held that periodic question‐
ing by police does not constitute persecution. E.g., Mekhtiev
v. Holder, 559 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, Chen
is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a well‐founded
fear of future persecution.
No. 15‐1831 17
Chen also argues that he has established a well‐founded
fear of future persecution because of continued police in‐
quiries into his location.
Chen’s argument is meritless because he has not demon‐
strated an objectively reasonable fear. His argument is un‐
dercut by his inconsistent testimony and lack of corroborat‐
ing evidence. On one hand, Chen had testified that he fears
the police will be “enraged” at him and incarcerate him be‐
cause he was supposed to remain under surveillance. On the
other hand, he gave conflicting testimony about whether the
police were even still looking for him. Additionally, Chen
initially stated that his wife had fled their home to avoid po‐
lice harassment but then admitted that his wife lived at
home and had informed him that the police were still look‐
ing for him. Moreover, Chen provides no corroborating evi‐
dence to support any of these assertions. In other words,
Chen has not shown a “reasonable possibility” that he will
be persecuted if returned to China. Ayele, 564 F.3d at 868.
We thus hold that the IJ’s alternative finding that Chen
was ineligible for asylum relief was supported by substantial
evidence, and the record does not compel a conclusion oth‐
erwise.
B. Withholding of Removal
To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must
“demonstrate[s] a clear probability of persecution on ac‐
count of a protected ground, in this case, political opinion.”
E.g., Weiping Chen, 744 F.3d at 532 (alteration in original); see
also I.N.S. v. Cardoza‐Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). This burden of proof is higher than
that required for asylum. Cardoza‐Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 427–49.
18 No. 15‐1831
Because Chen has not carried his burden for asylum relief,
he cannot meet the higher burden of proof required for
withholding of removal. Toure v. Holder, 624 F.3d 422, 428
(7th Cir. 2010).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Chen’s petition for review is
DENIED.