IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-2047
Filed January 13, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RODERICK JOVAN WALLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Cheryl Traum,
District Associate Judge.
Roderick Walls appeals his convictions for failure to comply with the sex
offender registry. CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, AND
REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli Huser Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.
Roderick Walls appeals his convictions for two counts of failure to comply
with the sex offender registry, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective and the
district court erred in sentencing. We find Wall’s has failed to prove his trial
counsel was ineffective. However, we vacate Wall’s sentence and remand to the
district court for further proceedings.
On August 15, 2014, Walls was charged with one count of failure to
comply with the sex offender registry by failing to properly register, in violation of
Iowa Code sections 692A.104 and 692A.111 (2013). Walls pleaded not guilty,
demanded a speedy trial, and waived his right to a jury trial. On October 20, the
State filed a motion to amend the trial information and added an additional count
of failure to comply with the sex offender registry, which occurred on the same
date as count one, by allegedly providing false information. The district court
approved the amendment.
A bench trial was held on October 24. The court found Walls guilty of both
counts of failure to comply with the sex offender registry. On November 21, the
court sentenced Walls to concurrent suspended two-year terms, probation, and
$1250 in fines. Walls now appeals from his conviction and sentence.
On appeal, Walls claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the State’s amendment to the trial information, and the district court
erred by referencing a nonexistent plea agreement as one of the reasons for its
sentence.
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We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v.
Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Iowa 1999). “Although claims of ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel are generally preserved for postconviction-relief
proceedings, we will consider such claims on direct appeal where the record is
adequate.” Id. Upon our review of the record, we find it adequate to address
Walls’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. See State v. Straw, 709
N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006). An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
requires a demonstration of both ineffective assistance and prejudice. Ledezma
v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). The ineffective-assistance prong requires proof the
attorney performed below the standard demonstrated by a reasonably competent
attorney as compared against prevailing professional norms. Id. The prejudice
prong requires proof that, but for the ineffective assistance, “the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
The applicant must “show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not
altered the outcome in the case.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). Walls
must prove both the “essential duty” and “prejudice” elements by a
preponderance of the evidence. Ennenga v. State, 812 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Iowa
2012).
The State admits the amendment to the trial information was improper,
pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.4(8),1 but claims Walls is unable
1
Rule 2.4(8) provides:
The court may, on motion of the state, either before or during the trial,
order the indictment amended so as to correct errors or omissions in
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to show his trial attorney breached an essential duty or caused prejudice as the
result of the proceeding would not have been different. We agree. If Walls’s
counsel had objected to the amendment and the amendment had been
disallowed by the court, the State had ample time to file a new trial information
adding count two. Walls cannot show “a reasonable likelihood the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. We find
Walls’s trial counsel was not ineffective.
Walls also claims he should be re-sentenced because the district court
listed “[t]he plea agreement of the parties” (which does not exist in the record) as
a reason for Walls’s sentence and did not adequately list other reasons for the
sentence imposed.
We review a sentence imposed in a criminal case for correction of errors
at law. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). When the court
imposes a sentence, it is required to “state on the record its reason for selecting
the particular sentence.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 2.23. In State v. Thacker, our supreme
court evaluated how a court may properly “state on the record its reasons for
selecting the particular sentence.” 862 N.W.2d 402, 407–08 (Iowa 2015).
While the rule requires a statement of reasons on the record,
a “terse and succinct” statement may be sufficient, “so long as the
brevity of the court’s statement does not prevent review of the
exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.” State v.
Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989). A terse and succinct
statement is sufficient, however, only when the reasons for the
exercise of discretion are obvious in light of the statement and the
record before the court. See, e.g., State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201,
matters of form or substance. Amendment is not allowed if substantial
rights of the defendant are prejudiced by the amendment, or if a wholly
new and different offense is charged.
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205 (Iowa 1981) (noting it was “clear from the trial court’s statement
exactly what motivated and prompted the sentence” (emphasis
added)). When the reasons for a particular sentence have not
been stated on the record, however, we have vacated the sentence
and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. See,
e.g., State v. McKeever, 276 N.W.2d 385, 388–90 (Iowa 1979);
State v. Thompson, 275 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1979).
We have rejected a boilerplate-language approach that does
not show why a particular sentence was imposed in a particular
case. In [State v.] Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d [302,] 304 [(Iowa 2001)],
we considered boilerplate language in a written order that provided,
“The court has determined that this sentence will provide
reasonable protection of the public. Probation is denied because it
is unwarranted.” We concluded such language, standing alone, did
not satisfy the requirement that the district court make an on-the-
record statement of reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Id.
at 304–05.
Id. at 408.
Here, the district court listed the following reasons for Walls’s sentence:
“The Plea Agreement of the parties;” “The nature and circumstances of the
crime;” “Protection of the public from further offenses;” “Defendant’s criminal
history, or lack thereof.” Upon our review, we are unable to determine whether
the court exercised its discretion by listing a nonexistent plea agreement as a
reason for its sentence and also the court’s reliance on “boilerplate-language.”
We vacate Walls’s sentence and remand for resentencing so the district can
satisfy the requirements of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d) by
“stat[ing] on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence.”
CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, AND REMANDED.
State of Iowa v. Roderick Jovan Walls
Combined Opinion