NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 15-1019
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TODD A. LAWTON,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(District Court Criminal No. 4-11-cr-00041-001)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 6, 2015
BEFORE: FUENTES, SMITH, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: January 13, 2016)
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OPINION*
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Todd A. Lawton appeals the District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
His counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967). We will grant counsel’s motion and affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
Lawton pled guilty to the possession of a prohibited weapon by a federal inmate; a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1719(a)(2). He was sentenced to a term of 20 months, to be
followed by supervised release for two years, which began in May of 2014. A few days
after beginning his term of supervised release, Lawton was arrested in Maryland for
narcotic related offenses. He pleaded guilty in state court to possession of Percocet—a
narcotic.
A supervised release revocation hearing took place in December of 2014 at which
the District Court sentenced Lawton to a term of imprisonment for 12 months and one
day. This sentence was premised on an agreement between Lawton and the Government
whereby Lawton agreed to admit to the supervised release violation and the Government
agreed to recommend a below-guidelines sentence of one year and one day.
Lawton filed a timely notice of appeal and his counsel, Assistant Federal Public Defender
Frederick W. Ulrich, filed a motion to withdraw. Lawton has not filed a brief pro se.
The Government has submitted a brief in response to Lawton’s Anders brief and supports
counsel’s motion.
II.
We start our review by considering whether counsel’s brief fulfills the Anders
requirements and whether our own independent review of the record reveals any
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nonfrivolous issues. United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). We have
instructed that “[t]he duties of counsel when preparing an Anders brief are (1) to satisfy
the court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues,
and (2) to explain why the issues are frivolous.” Id. Counsel’s brief reflects a
conscientious examination of the record and he identifies three potential grounds for
appeal: the jurisdiction of the District Court, the sufficiency of the evidence against
Lawton, and the reasonableness of Lawton’s sentence. Counsel argues that these grounds
for appeal lack merit and we agree.
The basis for the District Court’s jurisdiction is unassailable: 18 U.S.C. § 3231
gave the District Court subject matter jurisdiction over Lawton’s original criminal
conduct while 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) authorized the District Court to rescind a sentence of
supervised release. As to any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we see no
nonfrivolous arguments on this record. We review trial evidence for sufficiency “in the
light most favorable to the Government.” United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d
Cir. 1999). There was ample evidence of record to find Lawton guilty of violating his
supervised release terms. The District Court noted on the record that Lawton had been
charged with possession of narcotics (in violation of his supervised release) and Lawton
did not object. Indeed, he pleaded guilty to the drug charges, thereby conceding the
supervised release violation. App. at 56.
Finally, counsel asserts that it would be frivolous to contest the reasonableness of
Lawton’s below-guideline sentence of 12 months and one day. We agree. In handing
down its sentence, the District Court specifically noted Lawton’s criminal history and
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other relevant characteristics, such as the nature of his original offense, and his poor
adjustment to prison treatment and supervision. App. at 59. The District Court also
noted the specifics of Lawton’s supervised release violation and considered the nature
and circumstances of the offense. After considering the § 3553 factors, the District Court
sentenced Lawton to the term agreed upon by the parties. We therefore agree with
counsel that any challenge to Lawton’s sentence would be frivolous.
III.
In sum, we conclude that counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders. Our
independent review of the record confirms counsel’s belief that there are no nonfrivolous
issues on appeal. Therefore, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the
District Court’s judgment.1
1
Appellant is hereby advised that under the Criminal Justice Act, counsel is not obligated
to file a petition for rehearing in this Court or a petition for writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court. See also LAR 35.4; 109.2(b). If Appellant wishes to pursue these
avenues, he must do so pro se. Appellant should note that a petition for rehearing en banc
must be filed within 14 days of the entry of judgment; if that time has passed, Appellant
may promptly file a motion to enlarge the time for such filing. Counsel shall timely send
a copy of this Opinion to the Appellant.
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